Talking Talmud

Mishnayot! 1 - Someone who has incurred two different kinds of death penalties (but can only be killed once) - he is killed with the worse of them. Someone who has incurred two death penalties with one action, likewise to the more severe punishment. Which is tricky because there are such disputes over the hierarchy of the severity of the ways of execution. Also, 2 - someone who has been punished with lashes twice is then given the judgement of "machnisin oto la-kipah," even though he can't be executed at this time. (How many times does he have to have been judged for lashes?) 3 - Someone who kills another, but with no witnesses - another case of being consigned to that little hut, where basically the person starves. But why does this judgement usually include barley? Possibly it's the same across the board, and with each part of the meal in the different mishnayot. 4. Violations that are beyond the scope of the judgement of the courts - open the way for zealots, which is its own discussion (stay tuned!).

Ongoing discussion of a guilty party intermingled with innocent people (for example). Beginning with a case of two people standing together - and an arrow being shot from there those two people are, which kills someone. But since there's no way to identify which of those two shot the arrow, both are off the hook. Even if one of them is so righteous (like Abba Halafta) that the perpetrator seems obvious. Also, a group of those who all are waiting for their respective death sentences, but the executions are different, so how do you establish which should be put to death how? Look to the majority of the death sentences for the group and also the ranking of the severity of the different executions, to determine which should be applied to all.

Two new mishnayot! First, one with the case of one who intends to kill an animal, but kills a person, or a non-Jew and then Jew, etc. Disturbing cases, but in the effort of determining the parameters of the case - when the perpetrator would be culpable, and when not. Plus, many cases of intending one action (including killing), but where the result is the death of someone else - where the perpetrator is deemed not liable. Such that intent and the degree of his blow, for example, will bring about a death - he may well be culpable after all. But if the intent included the person who is killed - then the culpability is more likely, depending on the logic of the given case. Also, the exempt cases - when you're not sure who of the group killed someone outside of the group -- applying to and assessing the perpetrator... which leads to the decision for "machnisin oto la-kipah," where the court can't establish a death sentence judgement, but they also can't let these perpetrators go free.

With partial or shared causation, who is culpable? Which leads to a discussion of someone who is already mortally wounded or ill or injured, and then someone kills that person, when is that considered murder (and the perpetrator would be held accountable) - as compared to being exempt because there was no new "death" to perpetrate (because he was already dying)? And what if one's strike is not forceful enough, but someone else follows up? Or one's strike IS forceful enough, but happens not to kill? Plus, the position of Rabbi Nechemiah, and the assessment that the victim will live after all.

When one person ties up another, and the tied-up person died of starvation, or of the elements (on delay), then the person who tied him up is exempt - unless he tied him up, for example, in such a way that the elements begin their affect on the person who dies immediately. Or a person ties another person up in front of a lion - where the lion might not eat the guy... or mosquitos, which would definitely bite him until he dies... that's the distinction between whether the perpetrator is held accountable or not. Plus, a discussion over who takes the approach of exempting the perpetrator, or holding him culpable. Also, a person in a pit where another party pushes a ladder in (so he can't escape), or when someone shoots an arrow at another, and another party takes the victim's shield... if that shield would have protected its holder, then the arrow-shooter wouldn't be held liable. Likewise, if one has medicine to heal himself at the time of the shooting, even if he later loses them, then the shooter is not liable. Including games that need to include a warning to be able to hold someone who uses the games as a means of the attack liable.

Complicated incestuous relationship - such as a man with a woman he raped and the daughter of that rape (don't we know that that's an unacceptable!?!). Plus, a discussion of poverty and the potential for moving on or, conversely, falling back. Plus, the counter to the loving family, as presumed from the ceiling decoration And the ambiguity a word "et'hen," the meaning of it, and the dispute over its meaning. Also, a new mishnah - execution via decapitation - which may yet apply to a murderer.

Chapter 9! With a new mishnah too - on those whose crimes warrant execution, at this time, the death penalty is to be burning, including the adulterous daughter of a kohen. Plus, the man who sleeps with both a wife and her mother, as an example of other cases of incest that get the "burning" execution. And then Gemara works hard to show that the cases are learned from each other, via the use of an unusual term, as in promiscuity of "lewedness." Also, the prohibited liaisons are extended to both sides of the family, even if only by rabbinic decree. With a lot of attention to linguistic parallels to derive the laws.

A gathering of sages in an attic in Lod, and they were discussing martyrdom and when it was mandated. That is, most of the time, saving one's life takes precedence, except for "the big 3" - idolatry, adultery (and other illicit sexual relations), and murder (because who can say "whose blood is redder"?!). But whether the violation of the mitzvah is to be public or private also makes a difference. As does a time of persecution against Judaism. Plus, and suitable for Rosh Chodesh Adar (thank you, neis nistar) - an intricate discussion of Esther and why she wasn't culpable for her sexual relationship with Achashverosh, and the usual focus on Abaye's interpretation of the issues (we look at Rava's interpretation too).

A new mishnah! When a person who is committing a crime can be killed - and what kind of crimes warrant putting such a person to death before he can commit the crime. With sources from the Torah to derive the cases. Also, the many sins that one can save another from sinning by killing him - take his life in order to save him. But not every sin! With rape, even of the betrothed young woman as a complicated case.

The case of the burglar who is judged now for what is determined to be certain to happen later. Such that the homeowner would not be held liable if he killed the burglar while burgling. Plus, the burglar would not be held liable for damage to property during this action of willingness to kill, as if he "bought" it with his risk-taking. Plus, "if someone comes against you to kill you, you rise up and kill him first." Also, the case of "rodef," the pursuer. And how one is to kill a person who is about to kill someone else. Plus, the verses in the Torah that teach the laws of the pursuer. Also: Delving into the expression "ha-ba ba-machteret."