The John Batchelor Show

Charles Spicer concludes that after the war, Christie and Conwell-Evans published a limited-run book, None So Blind, detailing their ignored warnings to the government. Though Martin Gilbert later attempted to correct the record, these amateur spies largely slipped from historical memory. Tennant died in 1962, his contributions unacknowledged. Conwell-Evans lived modestly until 1968, having advised five Prime Ministers. Grahame Christie, a heroic and modest figure, committed suicide in 1971 at age 91. Their story remains a testament to the "blindness" of official diplomacy and the bravery of those who tried to "civilize" the Nazis to avert global catastrophe. (16)
1943

Charles Spicer recounts how, at the Nuremberg trials, Ribbentrop tried to use his pre-war Fellowship efforts as a defense, claiming he had always worked for peace. Göring remained unrepentant, while Hess insisted on wearing his flying boots in the witness box. Spicer notes that after the war, Vansittart and the Foreign Office obscured their connections to the German resistance to avoid admitting that more energetic diplomacy might have prevented the conflict. The Oster Conspiracy of 1938 is highlighted as a more effective, though overlooked, opportunity than the famous 1944 bomb plot, as Hitler's grip on power was not yet absolute during the earlier crisis. (15)
19353

Charles Spicer describes how, following the May 1940 retreat at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, finally acting on the intelligence Christie had provided for years. The polemic Guilty Men was published, simplifying the blame for the war onto appeasers like Chamberlain and Baldwin. Meanwhile, Lord Lothian, serving as ambassador to the US, successfully mobilized the "arsenal of democracy" by persuading Roosevelt and the American public to support Britain. The segment also notes the Rudolf Hess mystery, as the deputy Führer flew to Scotland in 1941, mistakenly believing his Fellowship connections could facilitate a peace treaty with the British elite. (14)
1939

Charles Spicer notes that even after war broke out in September 1939, the amateur spies remained active. The Kordtbrothers planned to assassinate Hitler using a bomb from German military intelligence, but their plot was delayed by Georg Elser's independent bomb attack, which narrowly missed the dictator. Christie continued meeting with Göring, whom London briefly considered as a potential replacement for Hitler, though Göring remained a self-serving opportunist. Meanwhile, Tennant performed a dangerous mission to Norway, narrowly escaping exposure. Despite these brave efforts to stop the war from within, the British leadership failed to grasp the scale of the threat during the "Phony War." (13)
1945

Charles Spicer relates how, in the summer of 1939, Ernest Tennant undertook an incognito mission to meet Ribbentrop, hoping to find a path to peace. He returned with warnings that Hitler was focused on Poland and prepared for a ten-year war. While London believed the information, Chamberlain's antipathy toward Stalin led to a slow, failed attempt at an alliance with Moscow, allowing Ribbentrop to secure a pact with the Soviets first. Spicer echoes Churchill's sentiment that this was an "unnecessary war," highlighting multiple missed opportunities to support the German resistance and remove the dictator before the global catastrophe began. (12)
1935

Charles Spicer describes how, as 1939 began, the diplomatic situation worsened due to the catastrophic appointments of Henderson and Ribbentrop. Henderson, the "arch-appeaser," fed Chamberlain's natural tendencies and suppressed reports that might upset Hitler. Conversely, Ribbentrop had become irrational and vitriolic toward the British, feeling socially snubbed. Despite accurate intelligence from Christie and Conwell-Evans flowing to Halifax, the Foreign Secretary vacillated between their warnings and Henderson's appeasement. Although the Fellowship's activities were suspended after the invasion of Prague, it remained a vital conduit for information that the official British embassy in Berlin failed to provide. (11)
1940

Charles Spicer recounts how, by September 1938, the amateur spies learned of the Oster Conspiracy, a robust plan by German military and police units to arrest Hitler and prevent war. Spicer argues this was a credible arrangement that could have succeeded had Britain supported the resistance. Instead, Chamberlain's "Plan Zed"—his personal flights to meet Hitler—undermined the conspirators by robbing them of their casus belli. Intelligence regarding this plot reached the cabinet and was referenced in minutes, but it was never acted upon. Consequently, Hitler gained the Sudetenland and vital armament works without a fight, effectively fueling his future war machine. (10)
1940

Charles Spicer describes how, during the 1937 coronation of George VI, Ribbentrop hosted a chaotic, overcrowded party at the German embassy. Despite the champagne-fueled festivities, the event was a social failure that highlighted the growing friction between the two cultures. Meanwhile, Vansittart realized the traditional intelligence services had poor access to the Nazi leadership. He established a parallel network—"Van's Detective Agency"—utilizing Christie and Conwell-Evans as private intelligence sources. Conwell-Evans, previously optimistic, underwent a total volte-face in 1937, bravely shifting his focus to gathering intelligence through his high-level German networks to warn the Britishgovernment. (7)
1945

Charles Spicer explains that by late 1937, the Fellowship was being monitored by MI5 and penetrated by the NKVD. Soviet spy Kim Philby was even hired to manage the organization's PR, feeding information to Stalin, who feared an Anglo-German alliance against Russia. In November, Lord Halifax visited the Berghof. While he was appalled by Hitler's suggestion to shoot Indian protestors, the dictator successfully fooled Halifax into believing he did not want war. This meeting left the British cabinet with a dangerously false sense of security, as they prioritized Hitler's protestations over the warnings of amateur spies like Christie. (8)
1938

Charles Spicer describes how, during the 1937 coronation of George VI, Ribbentrop hosted a chaotic, overcrowded party at the German embassy. Despite the champagne-fueled festivities, the event was a social failure that highlighted the growing friction between the two cultures. Meanwhile, Vansittart realized the traditional intelligence services had poor access to the Nazi leadership. He established a parallel network—"Van's Detective Agency"—utilizing Christie and Conwell-Evans as private intelligence sources. Conwell-Evans, previously optimistic, underwent a total volte-face in 1937, bravely shifting his focus to gathering intelligence through his high-level German networks to warn the Britishgovernment. (7)
1940