It’s been more than 266 days since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In more recent few months, the war’s momentum has swung dramatically in Kyiv’s favor amid a Ukrainian counteroffensive that has Russian troops retreating from areas that Moscow has formally annexed.

To get a grasp on where things stand currently in the war, Meduza spoke to military analyst Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), who’s been meticulously gathering operational data about the conflict since before Russian troops started pouring over the Ukrainian border.

Timestamps for this episode:

• (2:38) What’s so special about HIMARS, or High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems?
• (10:22) What other advanced weapons could give Ukraine new advantages in the war?
• (14:57) What’s the military impact of Russia’s airstrikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure?
• (18:57) How far might Ukraine’s counteroffensive reach into occupied territory? Will Russian defenses hold at some point?
• (25:19) Is the Russian military regrouping or on the verge of collapse?
• (27:41) What happened with the missile(s) that recently killed two civilians in Poland?
• (30:26) Is Russia going to run out of rockets or ammunition?

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

It’s an exaggeration to say that Russian aviation has been cut off from the outside world, but the loss of routes to popular Western destinations has squeezed airlines profits while sanctions complicate basic maintenance. In late July, for example, several Russian airlines reportedly advised pilots, not to use their brakes so much when landing, in order to extend the equipment’s lifespan. To keep its fleets in the air, Russia must now rely chiefly on repairing planes using spare parts from other aircraft.

The country already operates a policy charmingly known as cannibalization.

The Naked Pravda spoke to two experts to find out more about the risks of safety lapses in Russia’s aviation industry amid international sanctions that could soon jeopardize domestic commercial air travel.

Timestamps for this episode:

• (4:28) Richard Aboulafia, managing director at AeroDynamic Advisory
• (19:38) Dr. Pavel Luzin, visiting scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

On October 23, following a report in Russia’s state news, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu started calling his counterparts in France, Turkey, the UK, and the United States, warning that Moscow has collected intelligence suggesting that the Ukrainian government is preparing a “provocation” involving the use of a dirty bomb. A day later, Russia’s Foreign Ministry claimed that Kyiv plans to “camouflage” an explosion of “the radioactive substances derived from the spent nuclear fuel storages of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant” as the effects of a “low-power Russian nuclear warhead that contains highly enriched uranium in its charge,” supposedly framing Moscow for using tactical nukes.

At Kyiv’s own request, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog has already begun inspections to investigate Russia’s claims, but the Kremlin has pressed on, undeterred. On October 27, Vladimir Putin said again that the Ukrainian government is “preparing an incident with a so-called dirty bomb” with plans to accuse Russia of using a nuclear weapon.

To understand what radiological weapons actually are and what their use would mean in Ukraine, The Naked Pravda turned to three experts.

Timestamps for this episode:

• (3:39) Dr. Andrey Baklitskiy, a senior researcher in the Weapons of Mass Destruction and other Strategic Weapons Program at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, compares Moscow’s “dirty bomb” allegations to past claims about U.S. bioweapons on Ukrainian soil.
• (15:08) Dr. Nicole Grajewski, a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow with the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Kennedy School, describes how Russian warnings about Ukrainian radiological weaponry mimic past accusations against the White Helmets in Syria.
• (25:21) Sarah Bidgood, the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, explains the rise and demise of state-level radiological weapons programs.

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Now that Vladimir Putin is 70 years old, we’re understandably getting less of his torso in official photographs, but the Kremlin nevertheless relies on tropes of masculinity to validate the regime and its actions abroad, particularly in Ukraine and when it comes to confrontation with the West. This gendered rhetoric resonates with Russians just as it does in societies and nations all over the world. The authorities and the public work together to manufacture consensus about who gets to be on top, who constitutes a threat, and what actions are legitimate.

When it comes to the invasion of Ukraine, for example, the promotion and draw of various anti-feminism and anti-gay narratives in Russia have facilitated the idea itself that an independent, Western-leaning Ukraine poses an existential threat. This language has helped make plausible for Russians a war that was inconceivable until only recently. But what happens if you take away that rhetoric? Without gender’s role in influencing Russia’s securitization process, what’s left of Moscow’s justifications for war?

These are questions inspired by a new article titled “Damsels in Distress: Fragile Masculinity in Digital War,” published in the academic journal Media, War & Conflict and written by Dr. Lisa Gaufman, an assistant professor of Russian Discourse and Politics at the University of Groningen. Also the author of “Security Threats and Public Perception: Digital Russia and the Ukraine Crisis” (2017) and the forthcoming “Everyday Foreign Policy: Performing and Consuming the Russian Nation after Crimea,” Dr. Gaufman joined The Naked Pravda to discuss her work.

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

On Tuesday, November 8, the U.S. is holding midterm elections — all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 of the 100 seats in the Senate will be contested, in addition to gubernatorial races in 39 states and territories. In all this politicking, mainstream support for Ukraine remains strong, but it was only a few years ago when Donald Trump declared at his inauguration: “We assembled here today our issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power, from this day forward: a new vision will govern our land, from this day forward, it’s going to be only America first. America first.”

74.2 million Americans voted for Trump, just two years ago, even after the U.S. House of Representatives impeached him for withholding military aid to Kyiv in order to influence Ukraine to announce an investigation into Joe Biden and to promote a discredited conspiracy theory that Ukraine, not Russia, was behind interference in the 2016 presidential election. So, what happens to American support for Ukraine if U.S. partisan politics shift again?

Timestamps for this episode:

• (4:48) Aaron Schwartzbaum, fellow in the FPRI Eurasia Program, founder of the FPRI’s BMB Russia newsletter, and host of the podcast “The Continent”
• (19:06) Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk, associate professor in Department of International Relations at Mechnikov National University in Odesa, where he’s also the director of the Center for International Studies. Currently a visiting professor at Tufts University in Massachusetts.

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

The Chinese government has consistently threatened to take Taiwan by force if the government there declares formal independence. American politician Nancy Pelosi completed a two-day trip to Taiwan in early August, enraging Beijing, raising regional tensions, and thrilling Russian state propagandists, who are clearly desperate to draw the two most powerful countries on Earth into a shooting war that would presumably weaken Western resolve to counter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Two months after Pelosi’s visit, fears of a war over Taiwan have receded, but the conflict could flare up again at any time, raising questions about what might happen if fighting does break out over the island. And if China invaded Taiwan, what would it mean for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? For answers, The Naked Pravda spoke to two regional experts.

Timestamps:

• (6:49) Dr. Sergey Radchenko, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
• (18:24) Dr. Natasha Kuhrt, senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

When announcing a draft to reinforce Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin accused the West of “nuclear blackmail,” claiming that “high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO countries” have endorsed the “possibility and admissibility” of using nuclear weapons against Russia. In the same remarks, Putin vowed to use “all available weapon systems” to defend Russia’s “territorial integrity” — a precarious position now that Moscow has annexed four more Ukrainian regions without even controlling the territories militarily.

In his annexation speech on September 30, Putin focused mainly on the evils of the West: centuries of European colonialism, decades of American militarism, progressive values that he described as Satanism, and what he called the U.S.-created precedent of twice attacking Japanese cities with nuclear bombs.

Considering that the Kremlin has repeatedly described its victory in Ukraine as essential to Russia’s existence, there are rising concerns about how the Putin regime will respond if its troops continue to lose ground in the war. Will he order a nuclear strike? The Naked Pravda asked two experts in nuclear weapon strategy and nuclear crises.

Timestamps:

• (3:52) Dr. Olga Oliker, program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group in Brussels and cohost of the podcast “War & Peace“
• (16:18) Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, senior research associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and author of the forthcoming book “Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine”

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

As acting president, elected president, prime minister, and then president again, Vladimir Putin has now ruled Russia for almost 23 years. And it doesn’t look like he plans to retire any time soon. Following amendments to the Russian constitution in 2020, Putin is now able to run in two more presidential elections. This means he could potentially remain in power until 2036, at which point he’ll be turning 83. 

Putin is indeed getting old, and ever since he ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, there's been a lot of speculation about his future. With his seventieth birthday coming up on October 7, reports and rumors about the state of Putin’s health abound. But death by old age is probably years (if not decades) away for a man whose physical survival is one of Russia’s greatest national security priorities.

Of course, no one lives forever, and just like Mikhail Gorbachev and Queen Elizabeth II, Vladimir Putin will one day pass away. But what if he dies suddenly, while still in office? What happens then? The Naked Pravda turns to three experts for insights into the potential domestic and global consequences of Putin’s death.

Timestamps for this episode:

• (6:08) Fabian Burkhardt, a post-doctoral Research Associate at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, on how Putin’s death would impact Russia’s domestic politics — and political elites — in the short term. 
• (16:04) Ronald Grigor Suny, the William H. Sewell Jr. Distinguished University Professor of History and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, on the death of Stalin and the Soviet Union’s transfer of power problem. 
• (25:06) Domitilla Sagramoso, Senior Lecturer in Security and Development in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, on Putin’s foreign policy legacy and what it means for the future trajectory of Russia’s relations with the wider world. 

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Meduza’s only English-language podcast, The Naked Pravda, returns for a third season tomorrow on Friday, September 23. Throughout the new season, each show explores a hypothetical event and its potential consequences for Russia and its relationship with the rest of the world.

On upcoming episodes, Meduza asks journalists, scholars, and other experts about the context and possibilities behind the questions that keep people up at night: What if Putin dies tomorrow? What happens to the Ukraine war if China invades Taiwan? What if sanctions against Russian commercial aviation lead to a disaster in the air? What happens to Chechen dictator Ramzan Kadyrov if Russia loses in Ukraine?

The Naked Pravda’s “What If?” season is all about the big and unanswerable questions that animate the public’s interest in news stories and tease our imagination about what comes next. The first episode will be available tomorrow.

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Meduza welcomes European Council on Foreign Relations Senior Policy Fellow Kadri Liik for a discussion about her recent article, “Putin’s Archaic War: Russia’s Newly Outlawed Professional Class – And How It Could One Day Return,” where she argues that the invasion of Ukraine is “effectively de-modernizing Russia” and derailing processes that could have put the country on a less aggressive, more professional path.

A specialist in Russian domestic and foreign policy and in relations between Russia and the West, Liik joined The Naked Pravda to address the issues she raised in her essay.

Timestamps for this episode:

• (2:07) How does the invasion of Ukraine trigger the “de-modernization” of Russian society and foreign policy?
• (4:36) How does Soviet foreign policy compare to the diplomacy Moscow practiced before and since launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
• (5:58) What are the “modern” aspects of Russia’s recent and current foreign policy in Syria and Africa?
• (9:14) How long will the war’s de-modernization plague Russian society and policymaking?
• (11:23) To what degree is Russia now “de-modernized” and ostracized globally (not just in the West)?
• (15:00) What will it take for the West to come to a consensus with the Global South about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
• (16:47) How does the “decolonization” debate in Western academia and activism fit into all this? Does this perspective have traction inside Russia?
• (21:46) What are the “needs” that fueled Russia’s “homegrown” democratization potential before the February invasion?

Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно