The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-724

24-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUIST

DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294

CERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court

against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York,

and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction,

arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court

agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-

court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter

of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the

district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered

the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-

removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of

appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely

diverse parties before it.

The questions presented are:

1.

Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties

must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a

non-diverse party at the time of removal.

2.

Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by

amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a

nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-808

24-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTON

DECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438

CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of

personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal

courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must

be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that

there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule

60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence

of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment

entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this

case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

The question presented is:

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set

aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-924

24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.

DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured

by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked

on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary

contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation

of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for

negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims

Act.

Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken

"federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking

Boyle v. United Technologies

Corp.

, 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the

government

for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval

forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against

the

contractor

. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth,

Ninth and D.C. Circuits over

Boyle

's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by

invoking §2680(j).

The question presented is:

Should

Boyle

be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's

combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government

contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994

Rico v. United States | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-1056

24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900

CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662

Case v. Montana | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-624

24-624 CASE V. MONTANA

DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on

less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid

exception requires probable cause.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136

Louisiana v. Callais | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-109

Background: Louisiana was ordered by federal courts to create a second majority-Black congressional district to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The Louisiana Legislature responded by passing S.B. 8, which created the required second majority-Black district. However, a different federal court then ruled that S.B. 8 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and blocked its implementation.

The Core Issue: Can a state be required to create a majority-minority district under the Voting Rights Act, but then have that same district struck down as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering? Louisiana argues this creates an impossible legal bind.

Questions Before the Court: Whether the lower court erred in finding that race predominated in drawing S.B. 8, whether the map fails strict scrutiny review, whether certain legal tests were properly applied, and whether courts should even be deciding these redistricting disputes.

Current Status: The case has been restored for reargument. The Court has ordered supplemental briefing on whether intentionally creating majority-minority districts violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

Significance: This case could reshape how states balance Voting Rights Act compliance with constitutional requirements, potentially affecting redistricting nationwide.

Ellingburg v. United States | 10/14/25 | Docket #: 24-482

24-482 ELLINGBURG V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 113 F.4th 839

JOHN F. BASH, ESQUIRE, OF AUSTIN, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND

ARGUE THIS CASE, AS

AMICUS CURIAE

, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT

BELOW.

CERT. GRANTED 4/7/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is

penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-3129

Bowe v. United States | 10/14/25 | Docket #: 24-5438

24-5438 BOWE V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: CA 11 ORDER 6/27/2024

KASDIN M. MITCHELL, ESQUIRE, OF DALLAS, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE

THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO

QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1),

“[

a] claim presented in a second or successive

habeas

corpus application under section 2254

that was presented in a prior application shall be

dismissed.

”

(emphasis added).

The first question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive

motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

*

*

*

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E),

“[

t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of

appeals to file a second or successive

application

shall not be appealable and shall not be the

subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari.

”

(emphasis added).

The second question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the

grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to

vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-11704

USPS v. Konan | 10/08/25 | Docket #: 24-351

24-351 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE V. KONAN

DECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 799

CERT. GRANTED 4/21/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671

et

seq

.), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or

omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the

place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts

from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent

transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b). The question presented is as

follows:

Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal

Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the

loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10179

Bost v. IL Bd. of Elections | 10/08/25 | Docket #: 24-568

24-568 BOST V. ILLINOIS BOARD OF ELECTIONS

DECISION BELOW: 114 F.4th 634

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the

federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including

Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after

Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections

and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be

received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

The sole question presented here is whether Petitioners, as federal candidates,

have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state

time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-2644