The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

By Brad Neal

The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments episodes

January 21 Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook
Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312
25A312 TRUMP V. COOK
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE
COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026.
JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:
2 hr
January 20 M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund
M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 23-1209
23-1209 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC V. TRUSTEES OF THE IAM PENSION FUND
DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 316
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act imposes "withdrawal liability"
when an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan. This
withdrawal liabilty covers the employer's share of the plan's underfunding. Because a
plan's amount of underfunding hinges on projections about its projected liabilities and
assets decades into the future, withdrawal liability computations are partly a product of
actuarial assumptions about anticipated interest rates and other predictions. Withdrawal
liability must be computed "as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in
which the employer withdraws."
E.g.,
29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)(E)(i). The question
presented is:
Whether 29 U.S.C. 1391's instruction to compute withdrawal liability "as of the
end of the plan year" requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial
assumptions to which its actuary subscribed at the end of the year, or allows the plan to
use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after the end of the year
.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-7157, 22-7158, 23-7028
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER
29
U. S. C. §
1391
’
S INSTRUCTION TO
COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
“
AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR
”
REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL
ASSUMPTIONS TO WHICH ITS ACTUARY SUBSCRIBED AT THE END OF THE
YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR.
Order of July 3, 2025:
The order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari is amended as follows. THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. §1391
’
S INSTRUCTION TO
COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
“
AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR
”
REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL
ASSUMPTIONS MOST RECENTLY ADOPTED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR,
OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT
WERE ADOPTED AFTER, BUT BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF, THE
END OF THE YEAR.

CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
59 min
January 20 Wolford v. Lopez
Wolford v. Lopez | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 24-1046
24-1046 WOLFORD V. LOPEZ
DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 959
LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen
, 597 U.S. 1, 33 (2022), holds that
"the Second Amendment guarantees a general right to public carry" of arms, meaning ordinary,
law-abiding citizens may "'bear' arms in public for self-defense." In this case, the Ninth Circuit
sustained a Hawaii law that makes it a crime for a concealed carry permit holder to carry a
handgun on private property unless he has been "given express authorization to carry a firearm
on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." H.R.S. § 134-9.5.
That holding is in acknowledged direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in
Antonyuk v.
James
, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), a decision that struck down an
identical
State law in the
same procedural posture as this case.
The Ninth Circuit also sustained a multitude of other location bans on carry by permit
holders, relying solely on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws. That doctrinal approach is in
direct conflict with the Third Circuit's decision
in Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State
Police
, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Connelly
, 117
F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Worth v. Jacobson
, 108 F.4th 677 (8th
Cir. 2024), and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in
NRA v. Bondi
, No. 21-
12314, 2025 WL 815734 at *5 (11th Cir. March 14,2025) (en banc), all of which hold that
primary focus must be on Founding generation laws and tradition in applying the text, history
and tradition test
Bruen
mandates.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit,
that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry
permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively
gives express permission to the handgun carrier?
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later
laws in applying
Bruen
's text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the
Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-16164
1 hr 53 min
January 14 Galette v. NJ Transit Corp.
Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | 01/14/26 | Docket #: 24-1021
24-1021 GALETTE V. NJ TRANSIT CORP.
DECISION BELOW: 332 A.3d 776
THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED, LIMITED TO
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE NEW JERSEY TRANSIT
CORPORATION IS AN ARM OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR INTERSTATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PURPOSES.
CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH
24-1113
.
ORDER OF SEPTEMBER
19,2025
:
THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER
15
,
2025
, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY, IS THEREFORE STAYED PENDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN
NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL.
V.
COLT, JEFFREY, ET AL.
, CASE NO.
24-
1113
, AND
GALETTE, CEDRIC
V.
NJ TRANSIT CORP.
, CASE NO.
24-1021
.

CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is entitled to interstate sovereign
immunity under the Federal Constitution, as held by the highest court of Pennsylvania in
square conflict with the highest court of New York.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 4 EAP 2024
1 hr 11 min
January 13 West Virginia v. B. P. J.
West Virginia v. B. P. J. | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-43
24-43 WEST VIRGINIA V. B.P.J.
DECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 542
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Like everywhere else, West Virginia schools offer separate sports teams for boys
and girls. The West Virginia Legislature concluded that biological boys should compete
on boys' and co-ed teams but not girls' teams. This separation made sense, the
Legislature found, because of the "inherent physical differences between biological
males and biological females."
A parent sued on behalf of her child, B.P.J., arguing that the State must allow
biological boys who identify as girls to compete on girls' teams. After extensive
discovery, the district court disagreed, entering summary judgment for the State on
claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Yet a divided Fourth Circuit panel
granted an injunction pending appeal. B.P.J. then beat and displaced hundreds of girls
in track and field.
Ultimately, the same divided panel ruled in B.P.J.'s favor on the Title IX claim and
vacated the district court's judgment for the defendants on the equal-protection claim.
Judge Agee dissented, criticizing the majority for "inappropriately expand[ing] the scope
of the Equal Protection Clause and upend[ing] the essence of Title IX." App.44a. He
hoped this Court would "take the opportunity with all deliberate speed to resolve these
questions of national importance." App.74a
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether Title IX prevents a state from consistently designating girls' and boys'
sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
2.
Whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from offering separate boys'
and girls' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1078, 23-1130
0 min
January 13 Little v. Hecox
Little v. Hecox | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-38
24-38 LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO V. HECOX
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1061
ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 2025:
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE AS MOOT IS DEFERRED PENDING
ORAL ARGUMENT. SEE
ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER
, 601 U. S. 1, 4 (2023).
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Women and girls have overcome decades of discrimination to achieve a more
equal playing field in many arenas of American life-including sports. Yet in some
competitions, female athletes have become bystanders in their own sports as male
athletes who identify as female have taken the place of their female competitors-on the
field and on the winners' podium.
The Idaho Legislature addressed that injustice by enacting the Fairness in
Women's Sports Act, which ensures that women and girls do not have to compete
against men and boys no matter how those men and boys identify. The Act-one of 25
such state laws around the country-is consistent with longstanding government policies
preserving women's and girls' sports due to the "average real differences" between the
sexes.
Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n,
695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.
1982).
Breaking with this Court's precedents, its own caselaw, other circuit decisions,
and biological reality, the Ninth Circuit panel here upheld an injunction against the Act
because it prevents "transgender women and girls"-meaning males who identify as
women and girls-from competing in "women's student athletics." App.4a-5a.
The question presented is:
Whether laws that seek to protect women's and girls' sports by limiting
participation to women and girls based on sex violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-35813, 20-35815
1 hr 54 min
January 12 Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish
Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | 01/12/26 | Docket #: 24-813
24-813 CHEVRON USA INC. V. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 324
January
8
,
2026
JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.
CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This petition arises from Louisiana parishes' efforts to hold petitioners liable in
state court for,
inter alia
, production of crude oil in the Louisiana coastal zone during
World War II. Petitioners removed these cases from state court under 28 U.S.C. §1442
(a)(1), which as amended in 2011 provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against
"any person acting under [an] officer" of the United States "for or relating to any act
under color of such office." The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that petitioners satisfy the
statute's "acting under" requirement by virtue of their WWII-era contracts to supply the
federal government with high-octane aviation gasoline ("avgas"). But the panel divided
on the "relating to" requirement, with the two-judge majority holding that petitioners'
wartime production of crude oil was "unrelated" to their contractually required refinement
of that same crude into avgas because the contracts did not contain any explicit
"directive pertaining to [petitioners'] oil production activities." App.38. Judge Oldham
dissented, explaining that the majority's approach reinstates a variant of the "causal
nexus" requirement that multiple circuits (and the U.S. Congress) have expressly
rejected. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 7 to 6.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011
amendment to the federal-officer removal statute.
2.
Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for
oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-30294, 23-30422
1 hr 19 min
December 10, 2025 FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund
FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-345
24-345 FS CREDIT CORP. V. SABA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD.
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 3174971
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The courts of appeals have split 2-1 over whether Congress created an implied
private right of action in Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which
provides:
(1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this
subchapter ... is unenforceable by either party ....
(2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1) has been performed, a
court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that
under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result
than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1)-(2).
The Third and Ninth Circuits, relying on statutory text and structure, hold that
Section 47(b) does
not
create an implied private right of action, and a panel of the
Fourth Circuit has agreed in an unpublished opinion. Only the Second Circuit-where
plaintiffs may be able to sue most investment funds subject to the ICA, given New York's
and the New York Stock Exchange's roles in financial operations- holds the opposite
based on an "inference": parties may bring a lawsuit under Section 47(b), even though
Congress never said so.
The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46
(b), creates an implied private right of action.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-8104, 24-79, 24-80, 24-82, 24-83, 24-116, 24-189
1 hr 20 min
December 10, 2025 Hamm v. Smith
Hamm v. Smith | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-872
24-872 HAMM, COMMISSIONER AL DOC V. SMITH
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4793028
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER AND HOW COURTS MAY CONSIDER THE
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MULTIPLE IQ SCORES IN ASSESSING AN ATKINS
CLAIM.
CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Like most States, Alabama requires that offenders prove an IQ of 70 or less to
satisfy the intellectual-functioning prong of
Atkins v. Virginia
. This case was not close:
Smith scored 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74 on five full-scale IQ tests. There is no way to
conclude from these five numbers that Smith's true IQ is
likely
to be 70 or below. So the
courts below required Smith to prove only that his IQ "
could be
" 70 and required the
State to bring evidence "strong enough" to "foreclose" and "rule out the possibility" of
intellectual disability. The first question presented is:
1.
Whether, under a proper application of
Atkins
, a State can require a claimant to
prove an IQ of 70 or less by a preponderance of the evidence.
Evaluating multiple IQ scores is "complicated," and "this Court has not specified
how" to do it. In the State's view, five scores are more accurate than one, and there are
ways to account for that fact. The courts below disagree. The district court relied on
Smith's 72 ± 3 to find that his IQ "could be" 69. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit's
"holistic approach" asked whether Smith had scores of "about" 75 or less. Counting four
out of five scores between 72 and 75, the court found "consistent evidence" that Smith
"may" qualify as mildly disabled. Thus, the court "followed the law's requirement," in its
view, to "move on" to Smith's adaptive deficits. The second question presented is:
2.
Whether courts evaluating multiple IQ scores must find that every valid score of
"about" 75 or less supports an
Atkins
claim.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-14519
2 hr 3 min
December 09, 2025 NRSC v. FEC
NRSC v. FEC | 12/09/25 | Docket #: 24-621
24-621 NRSC V. FEC
DECISION BELOW: 117 F.4th 389
Order of July 1, 2025:
ROMAN MARTINEZ, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF
AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT
BELOW.
Order of December
5
,
2025
:
THE MOTION OF COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IS GRANTED.
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
A political party exists to get its candidates elected. Yet Congress has severely
restricted how much parties can spend on their own campaign advertising if done in
cooperation with those very candidates. 52 U.S.C.
§ 30116(d).
In an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton, a 10-judge majority of the en banc Sixth
Circuit agreed that these so-called "coordinated party expenditure limits" stand in
serious tension with recent First Amendment doctrine. App.10a-15a. It nevertheless
upheld them as constitutional, both on their face and as applied to coordinated political
advertising ("party coordinated communications"), believing the case to be controlled by
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
, 533 U.S. 431 (2001)
(
Colorado II
). In doing so, the majority acknowledged that in the 23 years since
Colorado II
, this Court "has tightened the free-speech restrictions on campaign finance
regulation," that "tension has emerged between the reasoning of
Colorado II
and the
reasoning of later decisions of the Court," and that relevant facts have "changed, most
notably with 2014 amendments" to the limits and "the rise of unlimited spending by
political action committees." App.3a-4a, 11a. But it thought "any new assessment of the
validity of the limits" remained this Court's "province, not ours." App.14a-15a.
The question presented is:
Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate
the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection
with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3051
0 min

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