The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

By Brad Neal

The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments episodes

April 27 Chatrie v. United States
Chatrie v. United States | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 25-112
25-112 CHATRIE V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 136 F.4th 100
LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This case concerns the constitutionality of geofence warrants. For cell phone users to
use certain services, their cell phones must continuously transmit their exact locations to their
service providers. A geofence warrant allows law enforcement to obtain, from the service
provider, the identities of users who were in the vicinity of a particular location at a particular
time.
In this case, law enforcement obtained, and served on Google, a geofence warrant
seeking anonymized location data for every device within 150 meters of the location of a bank
robbery within one hour of the robbery. After Google returned an initial list, law enforcement
sought - without seeking an additional warrant - information about the movements of certain
devices for a longer, two-hour period, and Google complied with that request as well. Then -
again without seeking an additional warrant-law enforcement requested de-anonymized
subscriber information for three devices. One of those devices belonged to petitioner Okello
Chatrie. Based on the evidence derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of
armed robbery.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
2.
Whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence derived from the geofence
warrant.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-4489
0 min
April 23 Blanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau
Blanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau | 04/22/26 | Docket #: 25-429
25-429 BLANCHE V. LAU
DECISION BELOW: 130 F.4th 42
CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), various categories of aliens, including those who have
committed or been convicted of certain crimes, are "ineligible to be admitted to the United
States" and subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2);
see 8 U.S.C. 1229a.
Under 8
U.S.C. 1101
(a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who is returning to the United States after a trip
abroad is generally not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States" and is
therefore not typically subject to the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a). But that
general rule does not apply to an LPR who "has committed an offense identified in section 1182
(a)(2)"
i.e
., an offense that would render him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). The
question presented is:
Whether, to remove an LPR who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and
was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed
clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR's last reentry into the
United States.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-6623
1 hr 31 min
April 21 FCC v. AT&T
FCC v. AT&T | 04/21/26 | Docket #: 25-406
25-406 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V. AT&T
DECISION BELOW: 149 F.4th 491
CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-567 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT.
CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151
et seq
., empowers the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to assess monetary forfeiture penalties for certain
violations of the Act or the FCC's regulations by issuing a notice of apparent liability, giving the
regulated party an opportunity to respond in writing, and then issuing a final decision. If the
regulated party declines to pay and the government sues to collect the penalties, the regulated
party is entitled to a de novo jury trial in a federal district court. Alternatively, the subject of an
FCC forfeiture order may pay the monetary penalty and file a petition for review in a court of
appeals, thereby triggering a judicial-review proceeding in which no jury is available. The
question presented is as follows:
Whether the Communications Act provisions that govern the FCC's assessment and
enforcement of monetary forfeitures are consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article
III.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60223
0 min
April 20 T. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp.
T. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp. | 04/20/26 | Docket #: 25-197
25-197 T.M. V. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION
DECISION BELOW: 139 F.4th 344
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine
can be triggered by a state-court decision that
remains subject to further review in state court.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1707
1 hr 2 min
April 20 Sripetch v. SEC
Sripetch v. SEC | 04/20/26 | Docket #: 25-466
25-466 SRIPETCH V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
DECISION BELOW: 154 F.4th 980
CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over an exceptionally important
question regarding the SEC's civil-enforcement power.
In
Liu v. SEC,
591 U.S. 71 (2020), this Court held the SEC may seek equitable
"disgorgement" in civil-enforcement actions if an award "does not exceed a wrongdoer's net
profits" and "is awarded for
victims
." 591 U.S. at 74- 75 (emphasis added).
In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit held that investors can be ''victims" for
disgorgement purposes despite not suffering pecuniary harm. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
recognized a direct "split" on this question, "reject[ed] the reasoning of the Second Circuit,"
and "joined the First Circuit in holding that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required." This
statutory holding was the sole basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it leaves the SEC's
enforcement power in disarray: disgorgement requests are ubiquitous in SEC actions, and there
are now conflicting rules in the two main circuits (the Second and Ninth) where enforcement
actions are most prominent. There are millions (if not billions) of dollars at stake.
The question presented is:
Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7)
without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm
.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3830
1 hr 11 min
April 02 Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara
Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara | 04/01/26 | Docket #: 25-365
25-365 TRUMP V. BARBARA
DECISION BELOW:
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that those
"born * * * in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," are U.S. citizens. U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV, § 1. The Clause was adopted to confer citizenship on the newly freed slaves and their
children, not on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160,
Protecting the
Meaning and Value of American Citizenship
, which restores the original meaning of the
Citizenship Clause and provides, on a prospective basis only, that children of temporary visitors
and illegal aliens are not U.S. citizens by birth. The Citizenship Order directs federal agencies
not to issue or accept citizenship documents for such children born more than 30 days after the
Order's effective date.
The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the
Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-1861
2 hr 9 min
March 31 Pitchford v. Cain
Pitchford v. Cain | 03/31/26 | Docket #: 24-7351
24-7351 PITCHFORD V. CAIN
DECISION BELOW: 126 F.4th 422
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70009
QUESTION PRESENTED:
District Attorney Doug Evans convicted Terry Pitchford, aged 18 years at the time of the
crime, of capital murder and secured a death verdict in the Grenada Circuit Court before Judge
Joseph Loper on February 9, 2006, with the entirety of jury selection and opening arguments
taking place on February 6.
After direct and collateral reviews in state court, the Northern District of Mississippi
granted habeas corpus relief upon concluding that the trial court failed to determine the
plausibility of the prosecutor
’
s proffered reasons for peremptorily striking four Black venire
members or otherwise consider the full circumstances bearing upon whether Mr. Evans
’
s
reasons for striking any and each of these four venire members was pretextual and in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the District Court ruled the state supreme court
’
s
reliance on its waiver jurisprudence improperly foreclosed consideration of pretext
under
Batson v. Kentucky
, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Judge Loper implicitly made determinations for
each of the four strikes, trial counsel waived argument of pretext, and the Supreme Court of
Mississippi
’
s waiver jurisprudence comports with
Batson.
This opinion in
Pitchford v. Cain
confirmed the Fifth Circuit
’
s disavowal of earlier circuit
jurisprudence recognizing, inter alia, that since
Miller-El v. Dretke
, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (
Miller-El
II
), capital petitioners had been unable to
“
waive[] any
Batson
claim based on a comparison
analysis,
”
Woodward v. Epps
, 580 F.3d 318, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), deepening the Fifth Circuit
’
s
split, joined by two other circuits, with the majority of courts of appeals in the application of
Batson
.
This petition presents the following questions:
1. Does clearly established federal law determined by this Court and applied in six other
circuits require reversal of a state appellate court
’
s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor
’
s
discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the
trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine
“
the plausibility of the reason in light
of all evidence with a bearing on it
”?
Miller-El II
, 545 U.S at
251–52.
2. Does Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review
arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defy this Court
’
s clearly established federal
law under
Batson
?
3. Does a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing
Batson
objections, defense
counsel efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court
’
s express assurance the issues were
preserved, constitute an unreasonable determination of facts?
GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER, UNDER THE STANDARDS SET
FORTH IN AEDPA,
28
U. S. C. §
2254
(d), THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT UNREASONABLY
DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REBUT THE PROSECUTOR'S ASSERTED
RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR EXERCISING PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST FOUR BLACK
JURORS.
ORDER OF MARCH
30
,
2026
:
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED.

CERT. GRANTED 12/15/2025
1 hr 50 min
March 30 Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-83
25-83 JULES V. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1201914
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may apply to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award. But federal courts have limited jurisdiction over Section 9 and 10
applications. In
Badgerow v. Walters
, 596 U.S. 1, 4, 9-11 (2022), this Court held that a federal
court may exercise jurisdiction only if the application establishes diversity or federal-question
jurisdiction on its face. A federal court may not exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis that
the underlying dispute, save for the arbitration agreement, would have been justiciable in
federal court.
See id
.
But what happens when a court initially exercises jurisdiction over the underlying
dispute, stays the case pending arbitration, and is later faced with an application to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award in the same case? The courts of appeals have sharply divided on
the appropriate jurisdictional analysis. Several courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit
below, have held that the initial exercise of jurisdiction creates a "jurisdictional anchor" that
confers jurisdiction over a subsequent Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate, even if
jurisdiction would otherwise be absent. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court
must establish an independent basis for jurisdiction over a Section 9 or 10 application to
confirm or vacate.
The question presented is:
Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending
arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where
jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1253, 23-1283
0 min
March 30 Abouammo v. United States
Abouammo v. United States | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-5146
25-5146 ABOUAMMO V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 122 F.4th 1072
GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
As part of an investigation into a scheme to disclose nonpublic Twitter account
information to foreign actors, San Francisco-based FBI agents visited Petitioner Ahmad
Abouammo at his home in Seattle. While they were there, Mr. Abouammo went upstairs and
emailed them an allegedly falsified document. Mr. Abouammo's only interaction with the
agents occurred in Seattle.
A grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Mr. Abouammo for (among
other things) falsifying documents with the intent to impede an investigation. The parties then
agreed to toll the statute of limitations for other uncharged offenses. On the day the tolling
agreement expired, the government filed a superseding
information
adding various felony
counts. Mr. Abouammo never waived prosecution by indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Four
months after the limitations period had expired, the government dismissed this placeholder
information and replaced it with a superseding
indictment
containing the same charges.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as
the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there.
2.
Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an
"information charging a felony" that allows the government to unilaterally extend the statute
of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-10348
0 min
March 25 Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock
Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | 03/25/26 | Docket #: 24-935
24-935 FLOWER FOODS, INC. V. BROCK
DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 753
CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce-but who do
not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross
borders-"transportation workers" "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" for purposes of
the Federal Arbitration Act's § 1 exemption?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1182
1 hr 19 min

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