Fernandez v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-556

24-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE

FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF

“

EXTRAORDINARY AND

COMPELLING REASONS

”

THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE

REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT

MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER

28 U. S. C. §2255.

 

CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce

the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling

reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that

discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the

defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In

reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the

Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered

evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity

in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were

cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth

Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to

matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by

Congress. The question presented is:

Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what

information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary

and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)

(A).

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122

GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 24-758

24-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCAL

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final

decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately

appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such

"collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and

state sovereign immunity.

The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order

denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately

appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409

Landor v. LA DOC | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 23-1197

23-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

DECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337

CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb

et seq

., and the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

2000cc

et seq

. In

Tanzin v. Tanvir

, 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an

individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for

violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical.

The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in

his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S. | 11/05/25 | Docket #: 24-1287

24-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMP

DECISION BELOW:

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED

WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET

FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.

 

 

 

CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701

et seq.

("IEEPA")

permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the

pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any

acquisition, holding, withholding,

use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or

exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or

transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any

interest[.]"

Id.

§ l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has

ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to

the executive orders challenged here.

The question presented is:

Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202

Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-724

24-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUIST

DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294

CERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court

against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York,

and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction,

arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court

agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-

court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter

of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the

district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered

the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-

removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of

appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely

diverse parties before it.

The questions presented are:

1.

Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties

must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a

non-diverse party at the time of removal.

2.

Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by

amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a

nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-808

24-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTON

DECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438

CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of

personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal

courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must

be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that

there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule

60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence

of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment

entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this

case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

The question presented is:

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set

aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-924

24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.

DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured

by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked

on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary

contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation

of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for

negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims

Act.

Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken

"federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking

Boyle v. United Technologies

Corp.

, 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the

government

for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval

forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against

the

contractor

. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth,

Ninth and D.C. Circuits over

Boyle

's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by

invoking §2680(j).

The question presented is:

Should

Boyle

be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's

combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government

contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994

Rico v. United States | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-1056

24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900

CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662

Case v. Montana | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-624

24-624 CASE V. MONTANA

DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on

less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid

exception requires probable cause.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136

Louisiana v. Callais | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-109

Background: Louisiana was ordered by federal courts to create a second majority-Black congressional district to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The Louisiana Legislature responded by passing S.B. 8, which created the required second majority-Black district. However, a different federal court then ruled that S.B. 8 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and blocked its implementation.

The Core Issue: Can a state be required to create a majority-minority district under the Voting Rights Act, but then have that same district struck down as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering? Louisiana argues this creates an impossible legal bind.

Questions Before the Court: Whether the lower court erred in finding that race predominated in drawing S.B. 8, whether the map fails strict scrutiny review, whether certain legal tests were properly applied, and whether courts should even be deciding these redistricting disputes.

Current Status: The case has been restored for reargument. The Court has ordered supplemental briefing on whether intentionally creating majority-minority districts violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

Significance: This case could reshape how states balance Voting Rights Act compliance with constitutional requirements, potentially affecting redistricting nationwide.