The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

By Brad Neal

The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments episodes

October 14 Salazar v. Paramount Global
Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459
25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL
DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642
CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Video Privacy Protection Act
(“
VPPA
”)
contains a one-sentence liability clause. It
prohibits a
“
video tape service provider
”
from
“
knowingly disclos[ing], to any person,
personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.
”
18
U.S.C. §
2710
(b)(
1
). The statute defines
“
consumer
”
broadly to include a
“
subscriber of goods or
services from a video tape service provider.
”
Id.
§
2710
(a)(
1
). It defines
“
personally identifiable
information
”
to include information that
“
identifies a person as having requested or obtained
specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.
”
Id.
§
2710
(a)(
3
). And it
defines
“
video tape service provider
”
to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual
materials.
Id
. §
2710
(a)(
4
).

Paramount is a
“
video tape service provider.
”
Both courts below assumed as much. Michael
Salazar subscribed to Paramount
’
s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount
then disclosed Mr. Salazar
’
s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That
information counts as
“
personally identifiable information.
”
Again, both courts below assumed
as much.

The question here is whether the phrase
“
goods or services from a video tape service
provider,
”
as used in the VPPA
’
s definition of
“
consumer,
”
refers to
all
of a video tape service
provider
’
s goods or services or only to its
audiovisual
goods or services.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748
1 hr 27 min
October 13 Beaird v. United States
Beaird v. United States | 10/13/26 | Docket #: 25-5343
25-5343 BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1410410
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
WHETHER
STINSON V. UNITED STATES
,
508
U. S.
36
(
1993
), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE
FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES.
Order of May
6
,
2026
ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS
CASE, AS
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT
STINSON V. UNITED
STATES
,
508
U. S.
36
(
1993
), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS
MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.

CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?
II. Whether
Stinson v. United States
still accurately state the level of deference due to the
Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that
has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially
unconstitutional?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-10764
1 hr 56 min
October 07 Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan
Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | 10/07/26 | Docket #: 25-579
25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE V. GUAHAN
DECISION BELOW: 128 F.4th 1089
CERT. GRANTED 3/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901
et seq
., is a
comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous
waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer
permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as
follows:
1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an
application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704.
2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental-
review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq
.,
before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific
procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16613
1 hr 18 min
October 06 Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee
Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee | 10/06/26 | Docket #: 25-498
25-498 ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INV.
DECISION BELOW: 137 F.4th 1015
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is
subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his
duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent
person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately
alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific"
because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the
fiduciary acts."
Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer
, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the
context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires."
Hughes v. Nw. Univ
., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022).
The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance,
pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence"
under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan
assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark."
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16268
1 hr 3 min
October 05 Johnson v. United States Congress
Johnson v. United States Congress | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-735
25-735 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES CONGRESS
DECISION BELOW: 151 F.4th 1287
CERT. GRANTED 4/6/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Did the Veterans' Judicial Review Act strip district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized
by this Court in
Johnson v. Robison
, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), to hear challenges to the
constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans' benefits?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10682
1 hr 9 min
October 05 Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170
25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO
BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND
ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE.
SEPTEMBER
28
,
2026
:
JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.

CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly
caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global
climate.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206
1 hr 49 min
April 29 Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889
24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC.
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as
soon as patents allow."
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S
, 566 U.S. 399, 405
(2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses,
Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug
for other unpatented ones."
Id
. at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic
drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use
generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect
generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use
"actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use."
Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
, 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005).
The questions presented are:
1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the
generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the
branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use?
2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it
does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or
even mentions, the patented use?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169
0 min
April 29 Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe
Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 25-1083
25-1083 MULLIN, SEC. DHS V. DOE
DECISION BELOW:
CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A952) PRESENTED TO JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR AND BY HER REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED. CONSIDERATION OF THE
APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A999) PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO
THE COURT IS ALSO DEFERRED. THE APPLICATIONS ARE ALSO TREATED AS PETITIONS FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT (25-1083, 25-1084), AND THE PETITIONS ARE
GRANTED. THE CASES ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR
ORAL ARGUMENT.
CERT. GRANTED 3/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-2995
1 hr 48 min
April 28 Cisco Systems v. Doe I
Cisco Systems v. Doe I | 04/28/26 | Docket #: 24-856
24-856 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. V. DOE I
DECISION BELOW: 73 F.4th 700
GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 3 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1.
Whether the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied
private right of action for aiding and abetting.
2.
Whether, if ATS aiding-and-abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than
purpose suffices to show the requisite
mens rea.
3.
Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially-
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 15-16909
0 min
April 27 Monsanto Co. v. Durnell
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 24-1068
24-1068 MONSANTO CO. V. DURNELL
DECISION BELOW: 707 S.W.3d 828
GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
WHETHER THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT PREEMPTS A LABEL-
BASED FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIM WHERE EPA HAS NOT REQUIRED THE WARNING.
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'') creates a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides. The Act
preempts any state "requirement[] for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under" FIFRA.
7 U.S.C. §136v(b). For decades, EPA has exercised its authority
under FIFRA to find that Monsanto's Roundup product line and its active ingredient,
glyphosate, do not cause cancer in humans. Consistent with that understanding, EPA has
repeatedly approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning. FIFRA prohibits Monsanto
from making any substantive change to an EPA-approved label unless it first obtains EPA's
permission.
Respondent is one of more than 100,000 plaintiffs across the country that nonetheless
seek to hold Monsanto liable for not warning users that glyphosate, the active ingredient in
Roundup, causes cancer. The federal courts of appeals and state appellate courts are divided
over whether FIFRA preempts such claims. The Third Circuit has held that it does. In the
decision below, the Missouri Court of Appeals joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and state
appellate courts in California and Oregon in holding that it does not.
The question presented is:
Whether FIFRA preempts a state-law failure-to- warn claim where EPA has repeatedly
concluded that the warning is not required and the warning cannot be added to a product
without EPA approval.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: ED112410
0 min

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