Today on Based Camp, we discuss the purpose, history, and utility of the UN and NATO. Do they make sense in the modern geopolitical landscape? Do they make sense in the face of demographic collapse?

As people who constantly rail on bureaucratic bloat and mission creep, you might be able to guess where we fall… but what do you think? We’re keen to read your opinions in the comments.

Show Notes

A typical middle-income American household is paying $337.50 annually on the European theatre and NATO-related missions via their taxes

* Per household, middle of the income distribution: USAFacts reports that in 2021, families in the middle 20% of the income distribution paid about 10,391 dollars per year in federal income tax alone.

* So for a middle‑income household paying 10,391 dollars in federal income tax, a good ballpark is about 1,500 dollars of that going to national defense in a recent‑years sense.

* And one mainstream estimate is that roughly 20–25 percent of total U.S. military spending is devoted to the European theater and NATO‑related missions (forces, bases, exercises, enablers, nuclear posture)

* With U.S. military spending around 850–900 billion dollars per year in the mid‑2020s, that implies on the order of 170–225 billion dollars annually that can reasonably be tied to European and NATO deterrence, broadly defined

* 1500*.225= $337.50

Meanwhile, what is NATO doing for us?

I vote we not only leave NATO but also leave the UN (roughly $90-100 per year is paid to the UN per tax return / tax paying household—this includes lower-income households).

Why NATO Was Created

Basically to fight commies during the cold war

* It emerged in the early Cold War as a direct response to the Soviet Union’s expansionist actions, including the domination of Central and Eastern Europe behind the “Iron Curtain.”

* Western European nations were still recovering from World War II, and the U.S. and Canada sought to deter further Soviet aggression through collective strength rather than unilateral action.

It operates within the UN Charter framework (explicitly referencing Article 51 on self-defense) but focuses on military readiness

What Nato Does

* Coordinate on defense, crisis management, and cooperative security

* Like a neighborhood watch group

* Participants voluntarily join

* They coordinate on security and defensive action

* They sometimes partner with non-members to promote stability beyond their own borders

* They meet occasionally to strategize and troubleshoot

Key functions:

* Regular consultations in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s main decision-making body).

* Joint military planning, exercises, standardization of equipment/procedures, and integrated command structures.

* Deployment of standing forces, rapid-reaction units, and multinational battlegroups (e.g., on the eastern flank).

* Common-funded activities like infrastructure, command structures, and some operations (though the vast majority of capabilities come from national forces contributed by members).

Article 5 (Collective Defence): An armed attack against one member in Europe or North America is considered an attack against all. Each member must assist the attacked party “forthwith… such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,” in line with UN Charter Article 51 (individual/collective self-defence). The response is decided individually by each member but coordinated through NATO. It applies only to armed attacks (traditionally state-on-state, but clarified to potentially include significant cyber or hybrid attacks) in the defined North Atlantic area.

* IMPORTANT: The Article 5 commitment (“attack on one is an attack on all”) is not a guarantee that NATO will always send combat troops; each ally chooses how to assist, which might be logistics, intelligence, or other support.

What NATO Does NOT Do

* Feature any concrete financial obligations in terms of contribution to group efforts

* The treaty itself contains no specific spending requirements or percentages

* spending targets are political commitments, not legally enforceable treaty obligations.

* At the 2014 Wales Summit, members pledged to aim for 2% of GDP on defence (with at least 20% of that on major equipment/modernization). All members met or exceeded this by 2025

* BUT THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROUP

* Updated 2025 commitment (The Hague Summit): Members (except Spain, which received an exemption) agreed to reach 5% of GDP annually by 2035 on “core defence requirements and defence- and security-related spending.” This breaks down to at least 3.5% on core NATO-defined defence expenditure (to meet capability targets) and up to 1.5% on broader areas like critical infrastructure protection, cyber defence, civil preparedness, resilience, innovation, and the defence industrial base. Allies must submit annual credible plans to show progress

* Guarantee that members will host bases for each other

* NATO cannot force a country to go to war or to host a base; participation in operations and basing arrangements is negotiated and voluntary.

* Maintain its own large standing armies

* NATO relies heavily on VOLUNTARY contributions from members

* When NATO runs an operation, countries voluntarily “assign” units for that mission; those forces remain nationally owned and can be withdrawn by their governments.

* Meaningfully enforce anything among members

* The treaty commitments are binding, but failure to honor them (especially Article 5) only undermines the alliance’s credibility

* enforcement relies on political consensus and mutual interest.

* Any member can legally withdraw by giving notice under the North Atlantic Treaty; NATO cannot legally forbid a state from leaving.

Examples of NATO members not contributing / helping out when asked

Post-9/11 (Article 5 Invocation, 2001)

* NATO invoked Article 5 for the first (and only) time after the U.S. terrorist attacks. Allies offered broad political solidarity, overflight rights, AWACS patrols over the U.S., and contributions to operations in Afghanistan. However, actual military involvement varied significantly:

* Many allies deployed forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom, but contributions differed in scale, duration, and risk.

* Spain did not obtain parliamentary approval to send combat forces initially and provided more limited support (e.g., later ISAF troops and hospital units).

* Other nations imposed national caveats (restrictions on troop use, such as geographic limits, prohibitions on offensive operations, or requirements for home-government approval before engaging). These fragmented command, reduced effectiveness, and increased risks for allies willing to fight in high-intensity areas (e.g., southern Afghanistan). Germany, for instance, restricted its troops mostly to quieter northern regions.

2003 Iraq Crisis (Turkey’s Article 4 Request)

In early 2003, Turkey (which borders Iraq) asked NATO for defensive assistance—Patriot air‑defense missiles, AWACS, and other measures—because it feared retaliation if the U.S. invaded Iraq.

* France, Germany, and Belgium blocked NATO planning for weeks, arguing that preparing defenses would signal that war was inevitable and undermine UN diplomacy, leaving Turkey feeling exposed and accusing allies of failing their obligations.

This is one of the clearest cases of major members actively hindering support for an ally’s security request.

Afghanistan Mission (Ongoing Caveats, 2000s–2010s)

* Once NATO took on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, some allies imposed strict “caveats” on their troops—limits on where and how they could fight—which meant that combat burdens fell heavily on a few countries (e.g., U.S., UK, Canada, the Netherlands) while others stayed in relatively safer roles.

* These caveats were widely criticized within NATO as a way for governments to claim solidarity while avoiding the riskiest tasks their partners wanted help with.

Recent Example: 2026 U.S.-Iran Conflict

Following U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran (starting February 2026), which affected shipping in the Strait of Hormuz:

* Several European NATO members, notably Spain, refused U.S. requests for basing rights, overflight, or naval support. Spain barred use of key bases like Naval Station Rota.

* Others (e.g., France, Germany) offered limited or qualified support and declined direct involvement or a coordinated NATO naval effort to reopen the strait. This drew sharp U.S. criticism, with discussions of potential repercussions for non-supportive allies.

These cases highlight how domestic politics, differing threat perceptions, legal requirements (e.g., parliamentary approval), and strategic disagreements can limit responses. NATO has no mechanism to expel or automatically punish members for such actions—decisions rely on consensus and political pressure.

The US Disproportionately Helping NATO Countries

Disproportionate US Spending in General

In 2024, U.S. defense spending was about two‑thirds of the total defense spending of all NATO allies combined, meaning the U.S. spends roughly as much as everyone else in the alliance put together.

The U.S. overwhelmingly dominates high‑end capabilities that NATO depends on: strategic airlift, aerial refueling, global intelligence/surveillance, precision strike, and much of the nuclear deterrent.

In operations like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. forces supplied most of the enabling assets and often a large share of combat power, without which European allies could not have sustained the campaigns at the same tempo.

Cold War and immediate post‑Cold War

* Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. stationed large ground, air, and nuclear forces in Western Europe (West Germany, UK, Italy, etc.) specifically to deter an attack on NATO allies by the Soviet Union; these deployments are widely seen as the core of NATO’s collective defense during that era.

* Even after the Cold War, the U.S. kept substantial forces and nuclear weapons in Europe as a “tripwire” and security guarantee for allies like Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey.

Defense of exposed allies after Russia’s actions (2014–present)

* After Russia’s seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the U.S. rapidly increased air, land, and sea deployments to reassure allies, including extra fighters for the Baltic Air Policing mission over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

* The U.S. also sent F‑16s and hundreds of personnel to Poland, moved naval forces like USS Truxtun into the Black Sea for exercises with Romania and Bulgaria, and pledged thousands of troops and assets to NATO’s Response Force as part of a visible shield for eastern allies.

Permanent and rotational deployments in Europe

* The U.S. provides key elements of NATO’s missile defense for allies, such as a radar in Turkey and Aegis ships forward‑based in Spain, plus land‑based interceptor sites in Romania and (planned) Poland, aimed at protecting European allies from missile threats.

* It routinely deploys forces to exercises and forward positions across NATO territory—from Marines in the Baltics to aviation rotations in Poland and strategic lift assets that enable allied operations—helping ensure that front‑line states can be reinforced in a crisis.

Financial and capability support that underwrites others’ defense

* The U.S. pays the largest share of many NATO common programs and high‑end capabilities used to defend allies, such as AWACS surveillance aircraft, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (Global Hawk) drones, and strategic airlift; Washington typically covers around 40–42 percent of major shared systems’ acquisition or operating costs.

* U.S. defense investments like the F‑35 program, precision‑guided munitions stockpiles, and shared airlift have been deliberately structured so that allied air forces and armies can plug into U.S. capabilities and be defended or reinforced more effectively in a crisis.

Why Not Also Leave the United Nations?

For 2026, the US paid approximately $827 million to the UN REGULAR BUDGET (based on the approved ~$3.45 billion UN regular budget). For 2025, it was around $820 million.

ADDITIONALLY, the US has been spending around $1.1–1.2 billion on UN peacekeeping annually in recent years, though actual payments have been lower due to cuts and delays

The Difference Between NATO and the UN

* The UN was established earlier (1945 vs 1949)

* It has more members (193 member states vs 32 member countries)

* Meant to prevent future conflicts vs specifically deter Soviet aggression during the cold war

* Meant to act not just through coordination on security (like with NATO) but also diplomacy, international law, human rights, and cooperation on economic, social, and humanitarian issues

What makes the UN suck

* It’s a lumbering bureaucracy with six principal organs (General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, etc.), specialized agencies (WHO, UNESCO, etc.), and the International Court of Justice

* The Security Council (5 permanent veto-wielding members + 10 elected) can authorize binding actions, including force under Chapter VII. Decisions often require broad consensus or majorities, but vetoes limit enforcement.

* NATO is elegant by comparison!

* Member countries waste tons of money paying for the lumbering bureaucracy

* Whereas NATO has no central budget for operations

The one thing one might want to replace / keep around that the UN does: Peacekeeping

* HISTORICALLY it has been helpful

* Counterfactual analyses estimate that without UN peacekeeping since the early 2000s, there would have been 3–4 more countries in major armed conflict by 2013, with up to two-thirds reduction in major conflicts possible under stronger mandates/budgets (potentially saving ~150,000 lives in one modeled period)

* Peacekeeping increases the durability of peace agreements (e.g., reducing risk of repeat war by 75–85% in some analyses) and supports institution-building.

* UN peacekeepers help maintain ceasefires, supports local peace processes, reduces communal violence, and aids demobilization/reintegration. Overall, it is described as more effective than most other known tools for managing civil wars.

* Though the UN is doing it less well now and it likely can be done better by a more specialized org

* In places like Mali (MINUSMA), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), and others, missions have struggled against active insurgencies, armed groups, and lack of political will. Some have withdrawn amid rising violence, host-government opposition, or perceptions of ineffectiveness (e.g., failure to fully protect civilians despite mandates). (See: The New Humanitarian)

* One analysis of 69 missions found ~43% fully successful, with lower rates post-2000 and in enforcement/humanitarian-focused operations. Long-duration missions see declining success

* The US could probably pend LESS than it’s obligated to pay to UN peacekeeping (1.1-1.2 billion USD), maybe just spending $1B, and be even more effective

* Plus use more of those dollar on US defense suppliers

* Note: Peacekeeping works best when there is some peace to keep or a viable process. It struggles in high-intensity wars without enforcement capacity or against terrorism/extremism

* Perhaps some AGI-driven org would be great to fill this role in the future

Appendix: NATO Articles

As published on NATO’s website

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6 1

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.3

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Episode Transcript

Based Camp - Should the USA Leave NATO_

Malcolm Collins: [00:00:00] Hello, Simone. I’m excited to be here with you today. Today we are gonna be asking the question of, is it really a sound idea and a sound investment for the United States to stay in NATO? And this is an interesting question for me to visit, and I think you to visit as well. Because during Trump’s first real rise to power, while I had these perverse ideas of wouldn’t it be so fun if he actually won-

I was still a responsible citizen. Right. And I would hear about these ideas of leaving NATO and I remember just thinking, “Well, of course that’s a bad idea because all of the blah say it’s a bad idea.” And surely they wouldn’t just say, like, they’re not being paid by NATO or something, are they? They don’t have some vested interest in pretending like NATO is an existentially important thing for America to be in.

Well, and it

Simone Collins: certainly seemed like, well, it’s the responsible thing to do. We’re all grown up now. You know, we, [00:01:00] we work together and, and have meetings where we put on our business suits and talk sternly about international problems and different- Oh my God,

Malcolm Collins: is NATO actually the kid from BoJack Horseman the businessman?

I, that is unironically NATO. But no, no. So, I saw, I saw that. And, and as time has gone on, and I wanna say, like, this has been a recent thing for me where I have revisited this question, and I was like, “What was I thinking?” Hmm. So like I wanna go into this, but we’re going to do it from Simone ‘cause she’s the one who did all the research this time.

So take us away, Simone.

Simone Collins: Right. So I wanna put things into perspective to start things off. A typical middle income American household is paying $337.50 annually on the European theater and NATO related missions- Mm ... via their taxes. That’s, that’s a lot of money. And- That’s a

Malcolm Collins: lot of money for a middle income family.

Simone Collins: Yeah. Meanwhile, what, what is NATO doing [00:02:00] for us? Like for real, actually, you know? W- what have they done for us? It seems like, I mean, it’s, it’s clear, and I’m gonna go into it we are doing, America’s doing the vast majority of the work. It’s mostly just us defending Europe and, and being like their outsourced defense in return for nothing.

In fact, when we ask for them to do us a solid, like with the war in Iran, countries, m- member members of NATO like Spain are like you can’t use, you know, you can’t use us.” Yeah, I, I wanna

Malcolm Collins: point out how crazy what Spain did. Yeah. We have a base in their territory- Uh-huh ... that we pay them to have- Mm-hmm, mm-hmm

in their territory. Uh-huh. And they wouldn’t... And, and keep in mind, Spain has said, like leaders of Spain have on multiple times said Iran is an existential threat that needs to be dealt with. Yeah. Before Trump went into this war, he called up various European leaders being like, “Are you...” Like, the, the, it w- they didn’t know that he was about to attack, but basically they were like, “Yeah, this needed to happen.”[00:03:00]

Yeah. Right? And that is what motivated him partially to do this. Mm-hmm. They then, doing a war that is fundamentally on their behalf to an extent, ‘cause they have more terrorist attacks than we do, right? Well, that depends. Yeah. And these terrorist attacks are often funded by Iran proxies. Mm-hmm.

Would not let... And, and keep in mind, we’re like boosting their local economy by having our military base in their region. Yeah. Like, they’re not paying for that. They didn’t let us refuel there, and as a result of us not refueling there and having to do in the sky refuels, American servicemen died.

Right? Like, that was some of the only people who died during this war, due to Spain’s incallcitrance on this. Yeah. Why are we paying to defend them if they don’t come help us? And I wanna go into like the bigger-

Simone Collins: Yeah, we, the taxpayers ... picture here. $337- Yeah, why am I paying for that? ... a year. And this, I mean, we, we probably, you know, I mean, like a- I’m sure a lot of the people listening to this are paying proportionally actually a lot more in like functional, like financial terms.

And I wanna,

Malcolm Collins: I actually want to, before you get into all the, the, like let’s get into like the [00:04:00] theory of this, the reasons why people say that we’re actually paying this, right? Uh-huh. So anybody who looks at this honestly is going to tell you that okay, right now NATO is a strictly bad deal for the United States.

For- Right now ... to, to understand why it’s a strictly bad deal right now is our current primary geopolitical enemies or core geopolitical enemies are- Iran, which NATO refuses to help with- Yeah ... and China, which NATO is not in a position to help with.

Simone Collins: Yeah, and it’s not about China at all. It, it’s about countering the Soviet Union.

Malcolm Collins: R- right. But the- That doesn’t exist anymore ... Soviet Union doesn’t exist. I know. So we’ll get to that in a second. Yeah. But the point being is that NATO militarily right now is completely pointless- Mm-hmm ... from the perspective of the United States. Yep. Even if... And, and people could be like, “But what if Russia attacks neighboring countries in Europe,” right?

And it’s like, what if Russia attacks neighboring countries in Europe? Suppose, and we’ll, we’ll get into [00:05:00] this, but, like, suppose Russia was not bled dry right now, did not have a failing military industry right now did not just show how catastrophically incompetent they are in a military context.

Suppose they had working nukes, and if people are like, “Malcolm, of course Russia has working nukes,” we basically know as a fact they don’t. Russia has not won a successful nuclear test since before I was born 38 years ago, okay?

Speaker 18: Sorry, correction. It’s been 36 years since their last nuclear test, so a little bit less than I’ve been alive, but still far too long for it to be plausible that they still have working nukes, especially given the geopolitical advantage they would have by showing the world they had working nukes

Malcolm Collins: If Russia had working nukes or was confident they had working nukes, they would run a test as a means to show us, [00:06:00] “Hey, we still have working nukes.”

North Korea can run tests. They do that to show us. Every other country in the world with working nukes, other than the US, who nobody doubts has working nukes, regularly does tests of their nukes, right? The fact in that we saw that Russia couldn’t even keep an airplane working or a truck’s tires turned shows us pretty hard that they probably don’t have working nukes.

So what do they have? Suppose, but I’m like, suppose they had working nukes. Suppose they did not have a depleted military right now. It’s still irrelevant for us because the maximum they would do in, in like a maximally successful military campaign is conquer Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania the Ukraine, and maybe move a bit into Poland.

Okay? And, and supposing they did all of that, one, their bureaucracy would be completely strained by this. The territories that they captured, all of the competent people [00:07:00] would flee, and land isn’t really that relevant to the current geopolitical context. What you need are tech workers and they would be the first to leave, right?

And then or like high-paying white collar workers or finance sector workers, right? Like, you don’t win a lot these days by taking over an effing potato field that you mined. Okay? And then on top of all of that, Europe would, for their own political interests, oppose this and fight against this.

Russia, economically speaking, is puny compared to the rest of Europe at this point. Europe would fight them back and at a best case scenario for Russia they’d be stuck on the Polish border and get a little bit of Polish land. Like, this is absolute best, best, best case scenario for Russia. Okay? That is irrelevant to the United States’ geopolitical security.

We do not need to worry about the USSR taking over Europe and turning it communist. In [00:08:00] fact, there is a much bigger threat of NATO countries themselves voting themselves communist or voting themselves into Islamist states than there is of freaking communist, like, like the Soviet Union taking over Europe at this point.

It is stupid. And now I’m saying, okay, but now let’s look at the reality. Russia right now does not have a big remaining population to play. They lost a war against an irrelevant backwater without a meaningful military, the Ukraine, right, at the start of this war. They have, the- their, their losses have been staggering.

Their demographic situation is worse than almost any other country in Europe, and that’s saying a lot. Which means that not only could they not for- field an army now, they’re not gonna be able to field an army tomorrow. And their freaking military is [00:09:00] full of useless junk at this point if they were going up against a real military power.

It’s just frankly irrelevant, and if the US wanted to get into one of these wars, like if Russia said, “Well, we’re gonna attack because you’re not in NATO anymore” Okay, well the US could still say, “Well, we will defend this country if you try to attack them,” and just remove our pointless spending in other territories, right?

Yeah, we, we do

Simone Collins: not need NATO to be aligned with the countries we’re aligned with. We don’t need some stu- like, like Joni Mitchell says in a song lyric, “We don’t need no piece of paper from the city hall.” Like you don’t need a, a treaty to be like, “I promise to defend you if you’re attacked.” Like, dude, if we think that Russia’s doing a bad thing and we’re trying to help out countries that we’re, we have aligned inter- interests with, we’ll get in there and we can do it.

Well, and I, I wanna

Malcolm Collins: point out, people can be like well, is that really true? You know, would America and would Russia believe that America would actually [00:10:00] stand up for these?” It’s like, yeah, well, we did for Ukraine. We sent them a ton of effing money and a ton of military supplies. That makes it ver- Like, keep in mind, people can be like, “Well, that’s not the same as telling Russia, ‘You’ll go to war if they attack.’”

And I’m like, no, it’s worse for Russia. It’s literally worse because Russia would have preferred America got involved in the war in U- Ukraine because then they would have had a reason to withdraw without looking stupid and buffoonish. But we didn’t. We just kept giving them money until they bled their own country dry to an extent that is almost comical.

That Prigozhin was able to just turn around and march to Moscow shows that it is actually the fact that nobody’s willing to attack Russia that led Russia to essentially genocide its own fighting forces and not leave protective forces within their own country like you normally would, was in a war. So okay, Russia’s not relevant.

People can then say, “Okay, well, what about Europe? In 15 [00:11:00] or 50 or 100 years, Europe could, if we are not protecting them, develop a geopolitical interest that is orthogonal to the interests of the United States.” And I’m like, bro, we’re already there. They are not meaningfully our allies anymore. If you look at the way that European countries have been acting recently, if you look at the decisions they’re making, not only are they not our allies right now, they’re not politically relevant go- They act like fascists.

They arrest people for writing things like, “Islam can be questioned,” on a wall. Germany literally, the, their citizenship voted majority for ADL and conservatives, and they froze the ADL out of power, the two parties that wanted to limit immigration, through one, siccing a secret police force after them and monitoring them just like the Nazis did.

And then two, just saying we’re basically ignoring election results. Reform won overwhelmingly in the UK recently, and do you think Reform wants NATO? [00:12:00] No. The factions in Europe that are aligned with us don’t want NATO either. So okay, not only do you have all of that, but even if Europe was our bestest of buds and really was long-term aligned with us, economically and geopolitically in the future they’re irrelevant.

If you look at their current fertility rate, the fact that they have blocked AI training on their own data, and the fact that they shut down a bunch of their nuclear plants or went on all of these green orgasm trips, they are literally the worst place in the world to run an AI company from. And that’s the future of the world economy.

So they both don’t have the demographics to make themselves work in the future, and they don’t... And people have said, “Okay, well Malcolm, what about Eastern Europe?” Like Eastern Europe, there’s this idea of like Eastern Europe combining into like a state that like opposes Western Europe. They’re like, “Do you like Eastern Europe because Eastern Europe is more trad?”

And I’m like, “No, I don’t like Eastern Europe that much.” Eastern Europe is fine. I like them more than Western Europe. I will absolutely give you that. Poland’s pretty [00:13:00] cool. Some of the other countries in Eastern Europe are pretty cool. But the problem with Eastern Europe is that it is tremendously corrupt/Catholic, basically the same thing.

And people can be like, “No,” but it’s, it’s true. When people are like, “Oh, well some Catholic countries are wealthy,” and I’m like, “Are they tremendously corrupt in spite of that?” And they’re like, “Yeah, they’re tremendously corrupt.” It’s like yes, it’s very hard to long-term do business so long as that culture has a grip within those countries.

So they can be allies, but they’ll never be allies in the way that Western Europe used to be our ally. Because when we said Western Europe, everybody knows we didn’t mean Italy and Spain. We meant Protestant Europe. That was the heart of the alliance because we had a shared cultural tradition with them.

Like everybody realizes that, right? When we’re like, “We have a shared culture with Western Europe,” nobody was thinking Italy. Nobody was thinking Spain. They weren’t. That’s why we’re mad about Latin American immigrants. They were thinking [00:14:00] England. They were thinking Scandinavia. They were thinking Germany, okay?

And I don’t think we have a shared culture with Germany anymore. So anyway, they were thinking Denmark.

Speaker 11: The one country that would be the exception here would be France. , If you want to say Ireland is also an exception here, not at all. Ireland has never really been a meaningful ally of the United States. They are a terrorist country formed in terrorism, killing children. , They, , didn’t help us in World War II.

, They’ve never really helped us in any meaningful war. , They, they are not a meaningful ally to the United States and never have been

The only reason America ever got it into its head that Ireland is a country that we should think positively of is because we accepted huge waves of migrants from Ireland, which I think was probably a mistake,, because they’ve incepted our country into thinking positively about a country that has never done anything but stab us in the back every opportunity they’ve ever gotten

A note here, I say this [00:15:00] without bias because I’m saying this as somebody with Irish ancestors. Like, my dad’s name is Michael Collins, okay? , Ireland is a terrorist state that has never been an ally of the United States and has always opposed us geopolitically

Malcolm Collins: So anyway the point I’m making here is you guys do your thing, get together. Maybe you can come up with some Catholic way of dealing with corruption, mass executions or something.

I d- I don’t know. You guys figure it out, but you’re gonna have a very hard time being relevant into the future of the global economy if you can’t handle that. And the bigger problem that the Eastern European bloc countries have is that they are not immune to the urban monoculture. It just hit their door later.

I used to think they were. I used to see all these cool gaming companies coming out of these countries, you know, like CD Projekt Red and stuff like that, and then they got eaten by woke, and I was like, “Oh, you guys aren’t resistant to this. You’re just as... Y- you know, your tech leaders are just as excited to jump on woke dick as anyone [00:16:00] else.”

So okay, that’s not relevant. And then it’s, so okay, Malcolm, if you say you need to pay attention to the countries that are gonna be geopolitically and technologically relevant in the future and economically relevant in the future, who are you building stronger alliances with? It’s like, well, you know, obviously Israel.

Oh, okay, we’re already doing that? Okay. Well, that makes sense. That’s the alliance that’s worth investing in. Where else might I invest? You know, maybe bit of Poland, bit of Turkey. You know, Japan, I think while they have terrible fertility rates, at least they have technology. South Korea has terrible fertility rates, but at least they have technology.

So those countries are, are worth investing in. Australia worth investing in a relationship in with. But yeah I just NATO is utterly pointless. There is, like, no reason to keep it operational at this point. But continue with stats, Simone. Sorry, I had to crash out on this.

Simone Collins: I understand. [00:17:00] It’s, it is ridiculous. And in fact, I mean, aside from NATO not really doing anything for us, I would vote that we not only leave NATO, but also the UN. I mean, in addition to that over $300 that your typical taxpayer is paying on NATO, they’re, they’re spending roughly 90 to $100 per year on the UN per tax return, and that’s not for, like, mid-range tax, tax-paying household.

That is, like, per tax-paying household. Like, including low income.

Speaker 3: I’m sorry, but the UN must be firm with you. Let me see your whole palace, or else. Or else what? Or else we will be very, very angry with you, and we will write you a letter telling you how angry we are.

Simone Collins: That’s astonishing, ‘cause

Malcolm Collins: that means that per mid-range household, that’s probably $350 to $600. A lot more. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. So

Simone Collins: we’re also saying- So that means for the UN and NATO, you’re probably

Malcolm Collins: paying around $1,000 a year as a middle-income American.

On the

Simone Collins: UN. Yeah. And so, a- and keep in mind, like, the NATO [00:18:00] is, it operates within the UN Charter framework, explicitly referencing Article 51 on self-defense. But it just- Withdrawal from the UN?

Malcolm Collins: Yeah, F that

Simone Collins: You know, yeah, like actually. So but let’s, let’s start with NATO and then-

Malcolm Collins: No, like look at the UN.

And people are like, “Oh, but the UN is a...” The UN is constantly putting like countries that chop up journalists as like leading their human rights councils and stuff. The UN is a- No, it’s, it, it, it’s, it’s ridiculous ... is a woke- But we’ll, we’ll

Simone Collins: talk about that in a little bit ... like list circle jerk. Let’s start with NATO.

It was, and, and this, I think it just, when you look at its creation, it’s just so obvious that it, it has run its course and it doesn’t matter anymore. It was created early in the Cold War as a direct response to the Soviet Union’s expansionist actions. There isn’t a Soviet Union anymore. I get that Russia is a little expansionist, but it’s also about to contract significantly.

Just look at their demographics. Like, the, the situation just isn’t what they’re, what it was. There is no Iron Curtain anymore. And you also don’t have Western European nations crippled by World War II. You have, [00:19:00] you know, the, the, they, they’re, they’ve matured. They are much older now. I mean, there is, there’s even some language in the UN, or sorry, the NATO charter that kind of implies that they didn’t expect it to last very long.

They’re like, “Well, after 20 years,” you know, like they, they, anyone can leave really easily. Like they were sort of just, the language implies to me that the people who wrote it thought it would be sort of a 20-year commitment and that maybe people after that would kind of walk away, ‘cause, you know, European countries would recover from World War II and they’d be fine on their own and, you know, that the Cold War would end.

And, and it did, but we just kept NATO going, and this is something that happens with many bureaucratic institutions and just general like- group based power things. They just stick around well past their, their point. But what NATO does, because I think people don’t really understand what it’s all about, is they coordinate on defense, they coordinate on crisis management, and they a- engage in cooperative security.

It’s, it’s very similar to a [00:20:00] neighborhood watch group. So unlike with the UN, where, where countries, like, pay in for this overhead of this bureaucratic structure, NATO is much more of a like, “Hey, let’s all promise to, like, have each other’s backs, and to make sure that, that we are ourselves investing in defense.”

So there are obligations of, of members of NATO to spend certain amounts of money, but the spend obligations are on their own internal defense budget. It’s not on like, “I promise to contribute this or that.”

Malcolm Collins: So

Simone Collins: even

Malcolm Collins: on- And they don’t spend it. We’re the only ones who do it.

Simone Collins: Yeah. So it’s... Well, w- we’re, we’re not the only ones.

But I’ll, I’ll get into how much exactly we’re spending. But- All right ... here are the things that they, that they do. They, they regularly meet and talk, sort of like, “Oh, you know, here’s what’s going on with defense. Here’s the strategy. What do we think?” They also do joint military planning and some exercises.

They, they will coordinate on how they deploy standing [00:21:00] forces. And then they, they sometimes commonly fund act some, some command structures and infrastructure like naval bases and stuff. So the most important thing about NATO is Article 5, the collective defense p- point which basically is like, if you attack one of our, one of the members of NATO, we consider that an attack on all of us, and we will treat it as such.

Like, we all, we all agree that, like, basically if, if you come for one of us, we’re all gonna come back at you. Yeah ... but that’s, you know, a- as, as has been demonstrated members don’t necessarily have your back. And all of this is like, it’s very non-binding. It- Well, no, hold on.

Malcolm Collins: People would say that Iran didn’t technically attack us, so Article 5...

But that’s not really relevant. It’s like you’re being an active D when we are paying to have a military base in your country that’s protecting your country and leading to the death of American service m- members over something so utterly petty as social signaling.

Simone Collins: Yes. And let’s go over what NATO- That’s not an ally we want

what NATO doesn’t do, ‘cause [00:22:00] I think that’s the bigger thing. They don’t have any concrete financial obligations in terms of, like, contributing to group efforts. So even if someone is helping you, they might do... Oh my gosh. Tex, please. They might not actually, like, help. So, For example after this 2014 summit, all members pledged to aim for 2% of GDP on defense, with at least 20% of that on major equipment modernization.

Yeah. And pretty much everyone agreed to do this. But then in 2025, there was an updated commitment at The Hague summit where members, except for Spain, which just seems to always wanna be like, “Yeah, I’m a member, except don’t make me do anything the members do,” agreed for a 5% of GDP annually by 2035 on core defense requirements and defense and security related spending.

So again, like Spain wasn’t really willing to do this, but like basically all they’re saying is, “Hey, I plan on...” I- again, if this were like a neighborhood watch group, it’s like, “Well, [00:23:00] I plan on having security cameras out, and I plan on arming my home so that I can be there to help both myself and everyone else here so that we can make sure that we’re the kind of neighborhood where criminals don’t feel safe.”

That’s kind of the, the gist of it. Yeah. But NATO also doesn’t guarantee that members will host bases for each other. NATO can’t force a country to go to war or host a base, and all participation in operations and basing arrangements are negotiated and voluntary. So I don’t really know why we need to have NATO when all of this is like on an, a, a case by case basis anyway.

Like we, we, we have no more luck approaching Spain about having a base with NATO existing or without it existing. And I almost feel like just having bilateral agreements would be more efficient and more effective because you actually have more chits in that case. You know, it’s not like, “Well, oh, like we’re grandfathered into this whole thing,” and blah, blah, blah, blah.

It’s more like, “Hey, look, I’m not gonna give you X unless you give me Y.” And it would be much more effective and I think much more efficient. Another thing that, that [00:24:00] NATO, NATO doesn’t do and the UN does this a little bit more, is NATO doesn’t have any sort of standing army. Everyone’s just contributing on a voluntary basis certain numbers of their own troops.

You don’t know what quality you’re gonna get, you don’t... You... So sorry, he’s just- Simone, y-

Malcolm Collins: don’t, don’t worry, you can barely

Simone Collins: hear him. Okay, good. I’m just, I’m trying to aim him away from the, the microphone. But yeah, like you don’t know if or when troops from any participant are going to come and help out.

It’s just kind of like, “Oh, yeah, sure, maybe like, maybe we’ll like pitch someone in.” So it’s like if, again, if we had like a neighborhood watch group, it’s like, “Yeah, like we’ll, we’ll, we’ll help if someone’s like, you know, invading your home.” But like maybe they’ll send like, you know, their, their 16-year-old son with like a, like a, a baseball bat two hours after the police have arrived, you know?

Like not very

Malcolm Collins: helpful. And- Well, like the UK, they’re trying to get their one measly ship down there. Right, exactly. The other big problem with NATO- Exactly ... is it prevents us from attacking European countries. And I think- Yes. [00:25:00] Yeah

Speaker 5: Clear them that, you f*****g c********r? Do you have any idea how f*****g busy I am, Hans Brix? Well, f**k you. Inspection? Well, inspect

Malcolm Collins: that that is something that we should be seriously considering

Simone Collins: Mm-hmm.

And there’s also just no way to meaningfully enforce anything within NATO. So again, I’m like, what’s the point? Like, we should be... I think it would just make so much more sense, especially considering the geopolitical situation that we’re all in now a- and the way that dynamics work now, to just on an ad hoc basis negotiate bilateral agreements with each individual country using various economic and social incentives trade partnerships, et cetera, like as, as bargaining chips.

It’s more efficient and effective, and I think you would get better results for any participating country. Plus you would, I think you would encourage more alignment. Like right now, a lot of countries that are in NATO and in the UN are like, “Oh, well, I [00:26:00] don’t have to actually like, be useful to the United States.

Like, I’m just gonna, I’m gonna benefit from their large, broad defense infrastructure anyway.” Whereas if we didn’t have all these assumptions associated with NATO and the UN, they would be much more likely, I think to try to be less dickish to us. So there are lots of- Yeah, they’d be less dickish

Malcolm Collins: if they didn’t w- like, if they didn’t feel they had us in their back pocket like a soul.

Yeah, they, they

Simone Collins: take it for granted and they shouldn’t. And, and we shouldn’t be responsible for defending w- sort of being the de facto security system for nations who are not paying us for it and who are not working to help us in any way who sometimes work counter to our best interests as a country, and even work with our adversaries.

It’s ridiculous. Now so there, there are lots of examples also of NATO members not really contributing or helping out when asked. Article 5 was only [00:27:00] invoked once in NATO. It was post 9/11. It was by the United States. It was in 2001. NATO invoked Article 5 after we were, you know, we were hit by terrorists, and while allies offered broad political solidarity there were some, like, limitations.

Once again, Spain did- Th- this is, this goes way back. Did not obtain parliamentary approval to send combat forces initially, and it provided much more limited support. Like they provided-

Malcolm Collins: Do we just conquer Spain? I bet they don’t have a meaningful military.

Speaker 12: So I decided to research how easy it would actually be, and Spain spends about half what the UK spends on its military. And given that due to bureaucratic incompetence, , indicative of an EU country, the UK hasn’t even been able to field a single battleship recently, , I suspect Spain is probably in a similar zone of bureaucratic incompetence, , and lack of will to [00:28:00] fight on behalf of the country at this point for people who are being systemically replaced, , as we’ve seen the Spanish government attempting to do.

, And note here in Spain it’s different from the US. There’s been politicians that have gone up and said, like, “That’s the goal of our...” , Like in the US they let this through other words. In Spain it’s incredibly explicit that that’s one of the goals. , And, and the people that they’re replacing them with don’t care about Spain either, so, you know.

Speaker 13: Quiero pedirles a las personas migrantes y racializadas que, por favor, no nos dejen solas con tanto facha. Y claro que sí queremos que voten, claro que sí. Hemos conseguido papeles, regularización ya. Y ahora vamos a por la nacionalidad o a cambiar la ley para que puedan votar, por supuesto. Ojalá, teoría del reemplazo, ojalá podamos barrer de fachas y de racistas este país con gente migrante, con gente trabajadora.

Claro que yo quiero que haya reemplazo,

Simone Collins: we really... They, I, yeah, I don’t know what’s, what’s going on with Spain [00:29:00] especially with NATO.

And then some other nations too when we invoked Article 5 imposed really severe caveats. Like, they would, they had all these restrictions on troop use. Like there were geographic limits, there were prohibitions on offensive operations, or requirements for home government approval before engaging.

And then this really fragmented command, it reduced effectiveness, and it increased risks for allies who were willing to fight in high-intensity environments. So the

Malcolm Collins: only time Article 5 was ever activated, it didn’t work.

Simone Collins: Yeah, like Germany- Like, I want to make that clear ... like restricted its, its troops to, like quieter northern regions.

They’re like, “Oh, we’ll help out,” like where there’s no serious conflict. Like, you know, like your home is being invaded and, and you’re like, “Help,” like, “They’re in the basement. I’m like locked in this closet.” They’re like, you know, “Oh, I’m, I’m going in to try to stop him. He’s trying to like raid my safe.” And Germany’s like, “Okay, I got the backyard.

I’ll, I’ll patrol out

Malcolm Collins: there.” We’re being scammed. Yeah. NATO is an active scam, but far worse than anything Israel is doing.

Simone Collins: Yeah, [00:30:00] yeah. And then there was the 2003 Iraq crisis. Turkey had its Article 4 request moment. In early 2003 Turkey, which borders Iraq, asked NATO for defensive assistance. They wanted Patriot air defense missiles and some other measures, because it feared retaliation if the US invaded Iraq.

And France and Germany and Belgium blocked NATO planning for weeks. They argued that preparing defenses would signal that war was inevitable, and then undermine UN diplomacy. And this left Turkey feeling super exposed and they accused allies of failing their obligations. So it wasn’t just the US that was sort of left feeling exposed.

Turkey felt that way too. Yeah, I actually think that, I

Malcolm Collins: think the, the country, the only country in NATO that matters is Turkey. Yeah. They have the biggest military in NATO. They are in an incredibly important geopolitical position. We would be better off just forming a better relationship with Turkey, especially because the values of Turkey aren’t even in alignment with the values of the rest of NATO.

Trump and Erdogan get along really well. Yeah. Turkey, [00:31:00] because of Russia’s actions, is increasingly being pushed into the United States’ sphere of influence. W- why not just form a NATO with Turkey and say F you to all of those European- P words.

Simone Collins: Well, and again, not a NATO. We don’t need th- It’s, it’s a group project, okay?

Anyone who’s, like, gone to some, you know, nonsense make-work university in America ha- or gone through, like, high school in America, has been subject to a group project. What is a group project? A group project is when you get given a group assignment in a class, and inevitably, like, you know, most people do absolutely nothing, and then one student ends up doing everything.

We need to just admit on a, on a geopolitical international societal level that group projects are stupid, and that in the end if you need to agree to something, you guys need to, like, you know, between two people, you know, decide, “Hey, our interests are aligned. Tit for tat, here’s what we’re gonna offer each other.

You know, here’s what we’re gonna do,” or, “We both want the same thing. Here’s how we’re gonna work together.” [00:32:00] And we don’t need these standing ongoing group agreements. They’re just stupid. Well, and,

Malcolm Collins: well, no, but the reason they would say you need the standing ongoing group agreement is for deterrence, they would say.

Simone Collins: No. Well, yeah, but you know what? It, deterrence exists if you understand, okay, nations A, B, and C are all aligned in this one di- Like, right? Like, they, all these European nations don’t like the idea of Russia expanding into Western Europe, okay? And, and neither does the United States. And I want to point out here that- So if I’m Russia, I will understand that they don’t want that, and that they will coordinate on stopping me if, if I go into that.

We don’t, we don’t need some stupid, like- But

Malcolm Collins: hold on. I wanna, I wanna make something clear for people who think NATO is like a magic wand that forces people to go to war to defend a country. If Russia decided to attack Estonia, for example, or Finland, for example the probability that any individual European nation would decide to militarily intervene [00:33:00] while NATO was still fully formed and active versus when NATO was not active, like EG if the US pulled out of NATO and NATO completely disbanded, would be about equivalent.

By this what I mean is a lot of the countries are just not g- they’re gonna be like, “I don’t want war with Russia. I don’t wanna escalate. I don’t wanna...” You know how European countries are. They’ll be like, “Yes, Article 5, but, but, but...” As we’ve seen before. Well, yeah, NATO’s

Simone Collins: historical limited effectiveness also shows that it, it, it acting as a deterrent is, is fairly feckless now.

And if they- Russia’s gonna be like, “Yeah, sure. Everyone’s gonna come and help out, huh?” And if they actually

Malcolm Collins: felt like doing something, they would do it regardless of whether or not NATO was there.

Simone Collins: Exactly. Exactly. Either your incentives are aligned or they’re not, and, and this like non, basically non-binding agreement doesn’t change anything.

In fact, the fact that it exists and is non-binding and people don’t really stick to it only makes it a bit of an embarrassment and wastes a lot of money and resources and time and, and, and, and gets in the way of making much [00:34:00] more efficient, strategic and, and short-lived but effective agreements.

So, going back to just, to rehash our, Oh wait, did I talk about the Afghanistan mission? No, I didn’t. But basically once NATO took on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, some allies employed really strict caveats in their troops. Again, like where and how they could fight, and that meant that combat burdens really fell heavily on the US, the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands, who actually had a pair of balls to like, go in and fight where it was dangerous.

Mm. And the caveats were widely criticized within NATO as a way for governments to claim solidarity while avoiding the riskiest takes. I’d be totally

Malcolm Collins: okay with us c- saying, “Well, we’ll have NATO. That’s the UK and the Netherlands and

Simone Collins: Germany.” No, again, that’s stupid. People are either aligned and they’re like, “Hey, I’m in.”

Or they’re not. Okay, sure. Or they’re not. Okay? And then, you know, we will, we will reward those who are in, who, who show through their actions that they’re helping us, right? Like, I think we’re way more likely to have, you know, fewer tariffs or whatever, like better trade arrangements, you [00:35:00] know, more, more all these things with, with countries that show up, okay?

It’s who shows up, all right? I don’t, I don’t care who’s on the list. E- everything should be based on actual actions and not on, on promises. Everything should be actions and rewards. Well,

Malcolm Collins: it’s not just that, but even capabilities. These countries, like when we saw that the UK couldn’t even field a single destroyer To help in the operation because all of them weren’t working.

Or we see other countries constantly crashing their destroyers because they keep putting lesbians in charge of them, like fricking New Zealand or what was it? They had a girl running one in, like, Norway and it sank. You know, maybe these countries are too feckless and we should look at entering a page of expansionism again.

Yeah. I think what we need to do is fix the fertility rate in the United States and then go on an expansionist crusade to reconsolidate the world under the US imperium.

Speaker 7: Are you gonna make the whole World America one day? How? Certainly

Speaker 8: [00:36:00] over over.

Speaker 7: That’s a good plan.

That’s why we named you Octavian.

Speaker 8: Don’t. Then we will kill you.

Speaker 6: Uya, there is always another way. No, please. I know how to make sure the world stays free forever. I have to make the whole world America. . I’m gonna send pure American freedom across every inch of the planet. . [00:37:00]

Malcolm Collins: Sure.

Simone Collins: But also, I just... So going back to the ways that NATO has failed us or failed in general, the, it wasn’t only Spain that completely screwed us over with, with I- Iran recently.

Another, both, basically both France and Germany had limited and/or qualified support, and they declined direct involvement or coordinated NATO naval effort to open the Strait of Hormuz. So I’m kind of glad they’re suffering due to their, their decisions right now because they were like, “You know, I don’t wanna, I don’t wanna get involved.”

And then in terms of how we disproportionately help NATO countries, despite the fact that people aren’t showing up for us just to be clear, in 2024 US defense spending was about two-thirds of the total defense spending for all NATO allies combined. We, we spend as [00:38:00] much as everyone else in the alliance put together, and the US overwhelmingly dominates high-end capabilities that NATO depends on.

All the strategic airlift and aerial refueling, and global intelligence and surveillance, and prec- precision strike capabilities and, of course, the, most of the nuclear deterrent, that’s us. Like, all the stuff that actually matters. I mean, even if people, “Oh, well, we spend this much and the, that means that we’re contributing,” we have all the, the best toys.

So that’s another really important thing.

Malcolm Collins: And after seeing what we did in Venezuela or what’s happening in Iran right now, like, our toys are good. And the only other person whose toys we’re playing with is Israel. Yeah. And this is the thing, they’re actually fighting along with us. In Iran, 50% of the ordinance dropped has been dropped by Israel.

Right? Like- And they’re not in

Simone Collins: NATO. Because look, again, a- aligned interests. Well, yeah, aligned interests for the most part. And by the way, a lot of

Malcolm Collins: people are like, “Well, Israel didn’t help us in the war in Iraq.” Okay, let’s give a few things about the war in Iraq. So there’s two important points about Israel and the war in Iraq.

One, we explicitly asked them [00:39:00] not to help us because we were concerned about that further destabilizing the Middle East to have Israel actively involved in the war. And two, Mossad put out a big report saying, “Don’t go into Iraq. It’s going to be a complete s**t show. They don’t have weapons of mass destruction.

What are you doing?” And they were right. Okay? The, the core thing in Israel was freaking right. Well, the war in Iraq was a complete waste of time. And they, they told us that. Day one they are like, “You cannot nation build there. What are you doing?” And you can look this up.

This is something that, like, people complained about at the time, that they- Yeah

were not on message, that they said, “You’re wrong about this.” And it’s because they have a high sneak stat. Look, they’ve really fucked us over a ti- I’m, like, the first to admit that, okay? But they have fucked us over less than Europe, less than the UN, and less than NATO. Right. And let’s talk, let’s

Simone Collins: go back to how we have helped Europe.

So during the Cold War, and then [00:40:00] immediately post-Cold War, we stationed large ground, air, and nuclear forces in Western Europe, like West Germany, and the UK, and Italy, specifically to deter an attack on NATO allies by the Soviet Union. And the deployments were largely seen as core the core part of NATO’s collective defense during that era.

It was just basically us being the security guard of Europe. And then even after the Cold War, the US kept substantial forces and nuclear weapons in Europe as a tripwire and security guarantee for allies like Germany, and Belgium, and the Netherlands, and Italy, and Turkey. It was, again, just this had nothing to do with them doing a solid for us.

It was just, “No, we, we, we got your back.” And then there was the defense of exposed allies after Russia’s actions. So from, like, 2014 to present, after Russia seized Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine in 2014, we rapidly increased air, land, and sea deployments to reassure all of our NATO allies, and this included extra fighters in, in the Baltic air policing mission over Estonia, and Latvia, and Lithuania.[00:41:00]

And we also sent F-16 and hundreds of personal personnel, sorry, to Poland. We moved naval forces like the USS Truxtun into the Black Sea for exercises with Romania and Bulgaria, and we pledged thousands of troops and, and assets to NATO’s response force as part of a visible shield. Like, this is a lot of money on our part.

And, and they’re just basically locally defending themselves, and we are all the way, like, we’re s- we’re sending troops all the way over to Europe, and for what? Like, to what benefit of us? And, you know, this is again, like, over $350 a year for your mid-range taxpaying family. I’m not really sure what they’re getting out of it.

Then we have these personal, or sorry, permanent and rotational deployments in Europe, and we’ve met plenty of people who’ve served on, like, military bases in Germany for long periods of time. We have key elements of NATO’s missile defense for our allies, such as radar in Turkey, and Aegis ships forward based in Spain, and land-based interceptor sites in Romania.

There’s even, like, planned stuff in Poland still that’s aimed at [00:42:00] protecting European allies from missile threats. So, so much for, like, our golden dome, which is, like, I guess still under development. Like, we’re basically building the same stuff for our European allies, and then we deploy forces for exercises and forward positions across NATO territories.

There’s Marines in the Baltics. There’s, there’s just, there’s so many more US troops in Europe right now than I even thought after looking into this And then we also have the largest share of many NATO common programs and, and high-end capabilities. Like all of our surveillance stuff, all the cool toys.

I’m not gonna go any further into this, but basically, like, I wanna get to the United Nations, ‘cause this is the, this is the, I think, bigger thing, and I don’t see the point in being a member of either of them. My larger thing is, again, like, either you’re aligned with a country or you’re not. We don’t need these blanket standing agreements, especially when countries are demographically and politically changing quite rapidly, and typically in directions that are antagonistic towards us.

And you can’t have this, like, standing agreement of, like, “Oh, we’ll always be [00:43:00] solid,” when, like, meanwhile, countries are turning b- against us, like, bit by bit. And suddenly we’re gonna be in these, like, standing agreements to defend people who actively hate us and are working counter to our best interests.

So for 2026, the US paid approximately 827 million into the UN regular budget. Just the, just the, just the regular budget. This is, like, their administrative budget, like the office stuff, okay? Mm-hmm. And for 2025, it was around 820 million. Then on top of that, the US has been spending around 1.1 to 1.2 billion on US peacekeeping.

And that is through ... I will say, to our benefit, the Trump administration is trying to, like, cut this amount, but it’s still incredibly embarrassing. To be clear, the difference between NATO and the UN, just to, to make it clear, is that the UN was established earlier. It was established in 1945 versus 1949 for NATO.

It has more members, so the UN [00:44:00] has 193 member states, like, basically all countries are- And it’s

Malcolm Collins: even more pointless.

Simone Collins: I know. For real, it is. And NATO only has 32 member countries. The UN is, is meant to basically maintain world peace. It, it’s supposed to prevent conflicts through various, like, economic and diplomatic things in addition to, like, security related efforts.

Whereas, you know, the, the NATO was really about the Cold War. Which, again, is, it just makes it seem so ridiculous. Like, NATO just seems like this short-term, like, thing on top of the UN to be like, “By the way, let’s not let the Soviets win the Cold War,” and then the Cold War ended and we just forgot to turn it off.

Yeah. It’s just so obvious when you look at it in context. And the UN furthermore is meant to not act just through coordination on security, but also through diplomacy and international law and human rights and cooperation on economic and social and humanitarian issues. So why does the UN suck?

Well, [00:45:00] first and foremost, it is a huge lumbering bureaucracy with six principal organs. There’s the, the General Assembly. There’s the Security Council. There’s the secretariat. And then it has these specialized agencies on top of it, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and then there’s also the International Court of Justice.

They just, they just kept building like, “Oh, like I need this new...” And I, I don’t know. So, we have been in New York City when the UN General Assembly convenes, and the city basically shuts down. Like the number of bureaucrats who are involved in just s- small facets of the UN are sufficient to just totally shut down entire cities.

I, I’ve never seen a s- a city shut down like New York does with the UN General Assembly. You can’t go anywhere. Like the streets are just clogged. It’s bizarre. I will say that the one thing that the UN does that I do kind of think has some value, can you guess what it is? What? It’s not the World Health [00:46:00] Organization.

Malcolm Collins: It’s not

Simone Collins: UNESCO.

Malcolm Collins: I don’t know, something related to ocean defense or something?

Simone Collins: Sort of. It’s, it’s actually like UN peacekeeping, ‘cause I was... I, I

Malcolm Collins: was like expecting-

Simone Collins: Does UN

Malcolm Collins: peacekeeping do anything meaningful? I thought that it was just massive waste.

Simone Collins: I thought so too, but historically it appears to have actually been helpful.

There are conditions on the helpfulness. So counterfactual, and, and by the way, I’m linking to sources in the show notes, counterfactual analyses estimate that without UN peacekeeping, since the early 2000s there would’ve been three to four more countries in major armed conflict by 2013, with up to two-thirds reduction in major conflicts possible under stronger mandates and budgets.

So peacekeeping- I’m pretty sure

Malcolm Collins: the UN did that study, Simone. Mm. I’m pretty sure people associated with the UN did that. That, that does not seem true to me at all. I, mm, I could

Simone Collins: see

Malcolm Collins: it. Trump stopped like 20 wars ... other, other people- Hold on. Trump stopped like 20 wars in these past two administrations.

And I think that- No, and, and I’m

Simone Collins: gonna get to that. I’m gonna get to that because [00:47:00] the, the effectiveness has gone down. But peacekeeping appears to increase the durability of peace agreements in, in instances, in various instances by reducing the, the risk of repeat war by 75 to 85% in some analyses.

This, and it, it supports sort of the like a, a post, a post-war stabilization ‘cause I, look, I mean, admit it, after, after a war- Nine out of 10

Malcolm Collins: dentists recommend who we gave money to.

Simone Collins: It, I, I think it makes sense That it doesn’t have to be the US It doesn’t

Malcolm Collins: make sense But if you have- UN peacekeepers are not a meaningful unilateral force in the way that the American troops are or American power projection I, I agree

Simone Collins: with you on that.

I agree with you on that. Just let me make my point, okay? Some sort of peacekeeper, some sort of, like, rule, rule enforcer can help maintain ceasefires, they can support local peace processes, they can reduce communal violence, and they can, they can aid demobilization [00:48:00] and reintegration. Thing, things are rough when you’re, like, winding down from a war, and I think having, like, a mod present to just, like, calm things down is helpful.

Does the mod have to be the UN? Absolutely not. In fact, the UN is doing peacekeeping less well now and it can almost certainly be done better by just the US. So in places like Mali and the Democratic Reco- Republic of Congo UN peacekeeping missions have more recently struggled against active insurgencies and armed groups and, and lack of political will.

And some have just wi- withdrawn amid rising violence. And they’re just like, “Oh, I, I can’t do it.” One analysis of 69 missions found only 43% were fully successful, and there were lower rates of successful peacekeeping after the year 2000. And in general, like, event enforcement and humanitarian-focused operations Well,

Malcolm Collins: bureaucratic nonsense, and these aren’t Americans Yeah, no, that’s the thing is I think that over time They’re not bred for [00:49:00] battle

Simone Collins: over time bureaucracies become more feckless. The UN is just too old as an institution, too bloated, too, too ridiculous, and, and too mission creep ruined, you know, too cancerous to be effective anymore. So what I think would actually be great is if the, the UN were to dissolve, at least the UN just i- is left abandoned by the US, and the UN could spend so much less than it’s even obligated to pay to the UN peacekeeping mission which is, like, $1.1 to $1.2 billion a year, which is a lot.

Imagine if the US just spent one billion. It would be even more effective in peacekeeping And it could also put more of that money into peacekeeping measures that utilize US defense suppliers. So it would be better for our internal industries and defense technology. Yeah, one of the things that

Malcolm Collins: people are like, “Well, if you withdraw from the UN, then they’ll stop buying American weapons.”

And I’m like, “Okay, then they’ll be easier to conquer later.” No, we would...

Simone Collins: No, we would be buying proportionally [00:50:00] more. ‘Cause I’m sure, like, when we pay all this money into the UN for their peacekeeping, there may be some stipulations that we set, you know, that Congress sets of, like, you have to buy this much from US, you know, based suppliers.

But we would be able to do 100% US manufacturing, like all Anduril because I love them and they’re amazing to, to do all this work instead of just, like, I’m sure, like, a ton of money is, like, lost and laundered by that stupid wasteful bureaucracy. So it would just be a lot more effective. And then, like, think about how it will be, like, post AGI.

You could have some AI-driven organization that, that manages peacekeeping and deployment of, like, enforcement drones. It just... I, I’m super ready for it to be gone. So generally, I, I see your NATO doesn’t make sense anymore, and I raise you let’s just get rid of the UN. Because the whole point is I, I, I...

There, there was a place for this. World War II, everyone was, like, beaten up, bloodied, completely weak. [00:51:00] The US was kind of okay, and the US was like, “Dude, I don’t... Let’s just recover. Look, I’ve got your back.” It was like, it was like a big brother being like, “Look, I’ll... If someone comes for you again, I’ll beat them up, okay?

Like, you’re gonna be fine.” But now our, our, our little friends have grown up and they’ve, they’ve grown into entitled, surly neets, and we need to just cut them loose. The UN

Malcolm Collins: is like a like a, like a 30-year-old living with their parent at this point. Yes.

Simone Collins: Yeah. Like, it... The, the time has passed, okay? They, they, they’re not recently bloodied and impoverished following a devastating war.

This is water under the bridge. Also, the, the Cold War is over and there is no longer a Soviet Union. None of this makes sense anymore. Beyond that, this giant bureaucratic sprawling apparatus that has grown into a bunch of tumorous, cancerous growths needs to just be excised. Even if you completely believe in the [00:52:00] concept of the UN If you really care about it, you would be like, “Oh, we’ll nuke it,” and then start it completely fresh now with technology and also, like, an understanding of current geopolitical tensions and imbalances and stuff.

Like, you would, you would start fresh and just get rid of all of the bloat that has grown over these years if you actually cared about the mission of the UN. But I personally don’t think that it makes sense to have these standing agreements. Like- So the question

Malcolm Collins: is, why is anyone fighting for this? And I think it’s, it’s, it’s a fear of change- It’s, it’s inertia

and a desire to protect the bureaucracy. It’s inertia.

Simone Collins: Yeah. Yeah, like, like- And also I think there’s this big, like, l- sort of, largely leftist view of like, “The, the, this is the responsible thing to do. We, you know, you have to let the authorities do their thing. They’re the educated ones.” You know, it’s all about, like, trust the experts, trust the science.

Yeah ... and of course, the UN, “Well, we respect the UN, we respect the World Health Organization.” When in the end, like, no. They’re, they’re not doing respectable work. They’re no smarter than anyone else.

Malcolm Collins: And, and if you wanna [00:53:00] talk about, like, the UN’s reporting on demographic collapse has been astonishingly bad.

Simone Collins: Yeah. Atrocious. Like, they-

Malcolm Collins: Truly ... they’ve gotten the numbers wrong in the exact same way every year for the past 20 years with that famous graph that we show. Every year they say, “This year it’s gonna stop.” Well, they don’t want to cause alarm. They know they’re lying. When they were reached out to by a professor at Penn, an American Ivy League institution, and he said, “These numbers are wrong.

Are you gonna update them?” And they said, “We don’t wanna cause a panic.” Mm-hmm. The UN sees it as one of its duties to replace you, okay? I’m just saying. I’m, I don’t wanna be, I’m, I don’t wanna be too spicy here, but if you’ve heard Trump’s recent thing on re-migration and all of that, the whole idea that demographic transition is a goal for certain groups.

Especially in Spain where they have come out and said, “That’s our goal.” Is that, Hillary Clinton has come out and said, “That’s our goal.” We have an episode on how she became a great replacement theorist.

Speaker 13: the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, despite [00:54:00] Trump saying he knew nothing about it, if you had read it, it’s all in there. It’s all in there. return to the family, the nuclear family , return to being a Christian nation return to, you know, producing a lot of children. Which is sort of odd because the people who produce the most children in our country are immigrants and they wanna.

Deport them. So none of this adds up. But you know, one of the reasons why our economy did so much better than comparable advanced economies across the world is because we actually had a replenishment, because we had a lot of immigrants legally and undocumented. Who had a you know, larger than normal by American standards family.

Malcolm Collins: It’s ridiculous at this point. Like, everybody knows populations are changing, and that is the goal for some individuals.

Like- Yeah ... the guy here who says he’d kill every white woman and child and is a, a mainstream leftist influencer, right?

Speaker: and make it my mission in life to murder every single white man, woman and child on the eastern [00:55:00] seaboard of the continent.

Malcolm Collins: You know, this is a real thing that a lot of them feel at this point.

Simone Collins: Yep. It’s ridiculous. Burn it down. And I love you very much, Malcolm.

Malcolm Collins: Love you too.

Oh, by the way, you got a number wrong in yesterday’s.

Simone Collins: Uh-oh, what did I get wrong?

Malcolm Collins: So there was a number of news articles that reported that Daily Wire, specifically Ben Shapiro’s show, had had an 80% reduction in viewership, but it was wrong.

It was a 35% reduction. That, we can measure on YouTube, assuming the official numbers are real. However, if you take the botting argument I made into account, the number could easily be 95%.

Simone Collins: No, from VidIQ it was 85%.

Malcolm Collins: Oh, it’s from VidIQ?

Simone Collins: Yeah.

Malcolm Collins: Okay. Well, then I wish I’d known that. Okay, then I’ll put that in the Discord.

Simone Collins: Yeah. J- tell them to look at my show notes. I, I, like, link to sources and stuff. I- Okay ... I say where I get my things.

Malcolm Collins: Okay, okay, [00:56:00] okay, I’ll put this. Okay. Note.

Simone Collins: Just look at the sh- tell them to look at the show notes.

On Substack and on Patreon. On Substack they’re not paywalled during weekdays, so... But they only show up when I outline the episodes, ‘cause you don’t do show notes. You work differently. You name files things like Stuff and, like, you know, H- How to do Thing. Ugh. I d- I really don’t know what your naming convention is.

I have no idea. I can’t predict or model it. It

Malcolm Collins: scares me. You are amazing, Simone. I appreciate how diligent you are, that you always double-check everything, and you’re- Do you have

Simone Collins: a naming convention?

Malcolm Collins: For... Yeah, just don’t name it the same thing as the last thing. So, like, if I have a folder named New Folder, then the next one is New Folder 1, [00:57:00] and then the next one is New Folder 1, and then, like, A because I happened to mash the keyboard, and that’s what I got, because that was less time than naming it New Folder 2, which would require deleting or highlighting the 1.

Oh,

Simone Collins: my God. Okay. I’m sorry I asked. Simone, don’t you know about my genius naming convention? I really don’t, because you sometimes use words. I- it’s, it’s really not consistent like that.

Malcolm Collins: I love tormenting you. You are the best woman in the world to torment. AI will probably render that.

Simone Collins: Irrelevant soon Oh So who cares?

Malcolm Collins: What, tormenting you?

Simone Collins: No Show notes? The, your naming convention thing. Oh. Like I can just say, “Find the file that’s about this,” and then it will find it regardless of titles, which is helpful.

Oh, I don’t

Speaker 14: Okay, Octavian, are you going deep in the water? Yeah, but there’s a live lobster right where I’m looking. See? Uh-oh, is it gonna eat you? No, it’s dead. Okay, well [00:58:00] then go. I saw his white claws.

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