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Sarah Moss is the William Wilhartz Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law by courtesy at the University of Michigan. She works primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of language, though in the case of this conversation her work has an important bearing on legal philosophy. Robinson and Sarah talk about her book Probabilistic Knowledge, which argues that you can know something that you believe even if you do not believe it fully, and as she quite aptly points out, “The central theses of the book have significant consequences for social and political questions concerning racial profiling, statistical evidence, and legal standards of proof,” all of which are discussed in this episode. Robinson and Sarah begin by introducing the concept of probabilistic belief before turning to Sarah’s argument in favor of probabilistic knowledge. They then turn to some applications of her work to outstanding puzzles in philosophy and law. Keep up with Sarah on her website, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ssmoss/, and check out Probabilistic Knowledge on Amazon, https://a.co/d/iobL8iZ.
Robinson’s Website: http://robinsonerhardt.com
OUTLINE:
00:00 Introduction
3:58 Math and Epistemology
7:35 What is Probabilistic Belief?
11:22 Sarah, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker
28:26 Credence and Probabilistic Belief
33:40 Are All Beliefs Probabilistic?
56:57 Probabilistic Knowledge and Racial Profiling
1:20:25 Probabilistic Knowledge and Transformative Experience
1:29:30 Statistical Evidence and Legal Proof
1:48:39 Pragmatic Encroachment on Legal Proceedings
2:04:07 Is Belief a Strong or a Weak Attitude?
2:12:39 The Preface Paradox
2:21:06 Probabilistic Knowledge and the Newcomb Problem
2:27:18 Probabilistic Knowledge and the Philosophy of Action
Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between.
By Robinson Erhardt4.7
250250 ratings
Sarah Moss is the William Wilhartz Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law by courtesy at the University of Michigan. She works primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of language, though in the case of this conversation her work has an important bearing on legal philosophy. Robinson and Sarah talk about her book Probabilistic Knowledge, which argues that you can know something that you believe even if you do not believe it fully, and as she quite aptly points out, “The central theses of the book have significant consequences for social and political questions concerning racial profiling, statistical evidence, and legal standards of proof,” all of which are discussed in this episode. Robinson and Sarah begin by introducing the concept of probabilistic belief before turning to Sarah’s argument in favor of probabilistic knowledge. They then turn to some applications of her work to outstanding puzzles in philosophy and law. Keep up with Sarah on her website, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ssmoss/, and check out Probabilistic Knowledge on Amazon, https://a.co/d/iobL8iZ.
Robinson’s Website: http://robinsonerhardt.com
OUTLINE:
00:00 Introduction
3:58 Math and Epistemology
7:35 What is Probabilistic Belief?
11:22 Sarah, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker
28:26 Credence and Probabilistic Belief
33:40 Are All Beliefs Probabilistic?
56:57 Probabilistic Knowledge and Racial Profiling
1:20:25 Probabilistic Knowledge and Transformative Experience
1:29:30 Statistical Evidence and Legal Proof
1:48:39 Pragmatic Encroachment on Legal Proceedings
2:04:07 Is Belief a Strong or a Weak Attitude?
2:12:39 The Preface Paradox
2:21:06 Probabilistic Knowledge and the Newcomb Problem
2:27:18 Probabilistic Knowledge and the Philosophy of Action
Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between.

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