“Homeownership is the American Dream.” This saying is so ingrained in our zeitgeist that most Americans don't even pause to question it. However, according to the Black Knights Home Price Index, the average US home price increased nearly 80% from April 2015 to April 2023. Census data reveals that the median household income only increased by 4% during this period. Homeownership has thus become increasingly out of reach, especially for young professionals. So, how did the American Dream become an American nightmare?

In his brand new book, “Stuck: How the Privileged in the Propertied Broke the Engine of American Opportunity,” The Atlantic’s Deputy Editor Yoni Appelbaum offers a contrarian view, arguing that the crisis in American homeownership isn’t actually about cost—it’s about mobility. There are many places in America where housing remains affordable and even dirt cheap. The problem is that those affordable options are in less desirable locations, with fewer opportunities for high-quality jobs, education, and health care. Thus, young professionals continue to migrate to communities where opportunities are bountiful, but housing is not.

Appelbaum joins Bethany and Luigi to discuss how Americans got “stuck.” Why does mobility matter so much? What are the implications of reduced mobility for Americans’ faith in capitalism and the belief that our country is still the land of opportunity? If treating a home as an investment—which many of us do—means less mobility, is being “stuck” so wrong for society? Together, the three of them unpack this entangled question of mobility, homeownership, and what it means for the reformulation of the American Dream.

Capitalisn't episodes mentioned:
Shattering Immigration Myths: Data Beyond Borders, with Leah Boustan
Raj Chetty's Surprising New Insights on How Children Succeed
What Happened to the American Dream? With David Leonhardt

Read an excerpt from Appelbaum's book on ProMarket (Penguin Random House)

This week, Elon Musk—amidst his other duties of gutting United States federal government agencies as head of the “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE)—announced a hostile bid alongside a consortium of buyers to purchase control of OpenAI for $97.4 billion. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman vehemently replied that his company is not for sale.

The artificial intelligence landscape is shifting rapidly. The week prior, American tech stocks plummeted in response to claims from Chinese company DeepSeek AI that its model had matched OpenAI’s performance at a fraction of the cost. Days before that, President Donald Trump announced that OpenAI, Oracle, and Softbank would partner on an infrastructure project to power AI in the U.S. with an initial $100 billion investment. Altman himself is trying to pull off a much-touted plan to convert the nonprofit OpenAI into a for-profit entity, a development at the heart of his spat with Musk, who co-founded the startup.

Bethany and Luigi discuss the implications of this changing landscape by reflecting on a prior Capitalisn’t conversation with Luigi’s former colleague Sendhil Mullainathan (now at MIT), who forecasted over a year ago that there would be no barriers to entry in AI. Does DeepSeek’s success prove him right? How does the U.S. government’s swift move to ban DeepSeek from government devices reflect how we should weigh national interests at the risk of hindering innovation and competition? Musk has the ear of Trump and a history of animosity with Altman over the direction of OpenAI. Does Musk’s proposed hostile takeover signal that personal interests and relationships with American leadership will determine how AI develops in the U.S. from here on out? What does regulating AI in the collective interest look like, and can we escape a future where technology is consolidated in the hands of the wealthy few when billions of dollars in capital are required for its progress?

Show Notes:
On ProMarket, check out:
Why Musk Is Right About OpenAI by Luigi Zingales, March 5, 2024
Who Will Enforce AI’s Social Purpose? By Roberto Tallarita, March 16, 2024

In December 2024, Bitcoin, one of the earliest cryptocurrencies and undoubtedly the most famous, hit $2 trillion in market capitalization, bigger than Tesla, Meta, and Saudi Aramco. In this episode, Nobel Prize-winning economist and Chicago Booth finance professor Eugene Fama—widely considered the “Father of Modern Finance”—predicts it will go to zero within ten years.

Legendary investor Ray Dalio called crypto a bubble a decade ago; now, he calls it “one hell of an invention.” Larry Fink of BlackRock previously referred to Bitcoin as an index of money laundering. Today, he sees it as “a legitimate financial instrument.” Less than 36 hours after launching his own cryptocurrency before his second inauguration, United States President Donald Trump appeared to have made more than $50 billion on paper for himself and his companies. (During his first term, Trump called crypto “not money, whose value is highly volatile and based on thin air.”) Amidst this noise of crypto doubters changing tune, Fama joins Bethany and Luigi to discuss why he remains dubious about Bitcoin’s ambitions.

Bitcoin uses more electricity than many countries—around 91 terawatt-hours annually. Is this amount unsustainable? What makes its value so volatile, and what are the implications for the banking sector and our economy? If cryptocurrencies’ purpose is a reaction to an underlying distrust in financial institutions, can decentralized blockchain, the technological ledger that enables anonymous crypto exchange, fix it? Last but not least, why do supporters of a decentralized service, whose value lies in its existence outside traditional government structures, need to spend billions in lobbying to convince politicians, including the president, of its utility?

Show Notes:

1. Read ProMarket’s archives on Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.
2. Revisit our prior Capitalisn’t episode with author Zeke Faux, The Capitalisn’t of Crypto: SBF and Beyond.

The public often imagines corporations as self-contained actors that provide a set of goods and services to consumers. Underpinning this image have been ideas of ownership, rights to capital and intellectual property, and corporate responsibility to stakeholders including consumers, workers, and shareholders. But what if almost everything we are told about the essence of the firm is wrong? So writes Sir John Kay, a British economist, corporate director, and longstanding fellow of St John’s College (Oxford) in his new book, The Corporation in the 21st Century.

The book revolves around contrasts between historical conceptions of corporations, capitalism, and contemporary practices. Kay writes, “A central thesis of [this] book is that business has evolved, but the language that is widely used to describe business has not.” In the 19th and 20th centuries, firms could be defined in terms of their control over material forms of productive capital (factories, steel foundries, railways, etc.) Socioeconomic critiques of capitalism, most prominently from Karl Marx, often centered on firms’ control of the means of production. Kay contends that firms today access productive capital as a service. For example, Amazon does not own its warehouses but rents them from another firm. Kay writes that today’s corporations and capitalism “[have] very little to do with ‘capital’ and nothing whatsoever to do with any struggle between capitalists and workers to control the means of production.”

Kay joins Luigi and Bethany to discuss the implications of this evolution in firms’ relation to capital: Why is it important to capitalism that its biggest firms no longer own their means of production? Why does the language used to describe this matter? What do Apple's manufacturing facilities, Amazon's warehouses, and TikTok's algorithms tell us about our notions of business ownership? How have these changes to capitalism redefined the struggle between the owners of capital, managers, workers, and consumers? In the process, Kay, Luigi, and Bethany explore the failures of capitalism and imagine what could and should be the purpose of the 21st-century corporation.

Show Notes:

Read an excerpt from the book (published by Yale University Press) on ProMarket

In Bethany and Luigi’s closing discussion of Kay’s book, Luigi cites several articles he has published on the topic, which we have linked below for the listener’s reference. In this past scholarship, Luigi studies how a firm and its operations often intertwine with other firms to form an ecosystem, and it is only through this ecosystem that value is created. Apple and Foxconn provide one example. Legally, they are distinct firms, yet Luigi contends they can be understood as elements of an ecosystem that creates value. Hence, it is sometimes productive to think beyond legal boundaries to consider how multiple firms may compose such a value-creating ecosystem in practice. Within the Apple/Foxconn ecosystem, Apple has a significant influence in dictating terms for Foxconn. Further, if Apple has such dominating power over its suppliers, then Apple could be said to have market power that raises antitrust concerns, which are less obvious if we take the legal boundaries of firms as the correct method of conceptualizing them.

Zingales, L., 2000. In search of new foundations. The Journal of Finance, 55(4), pp.1623-1653.

Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L., 1998. Power in a Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2), pp.387-432.

Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L., 2001. The firm as a dedicated hierarchy: A theory of the origins and growth of firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), pp.805-851.

Zingales, L. (1998) Corporate Governance. In: Newman, P., Ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Lancieri, F., Posner, E.A. and Zingales, L., 2023. The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States. Antitrust Law Journal, 85(2), pp.441-519.

Daniel Ziblatt is an American political scientist, Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University, and the co-author (with Steven Levitsky) of several bestselling books, including How Democracies Die and Tyranny of the Minority. Ziblatt writes from the position that what defines strong democracies is free and fair competition for power, inclusive participation, and a package of civil liberties that make those first two conditions possible.

2024 saw voters in more than 60 countries go to the polls—and deliver difficult outcomes for incumbents and traditional political parties. This week, Ziblatt joins Bethany and Luigi to discuss the fate of democracy after 2024. They explore how big money and corporate power have destabilized democracies worldwide by interfering with the conditions for free and fair competition for power. The consequence has been the movement of voters toward political extremes, which in turn can often threaten economic growth, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Nevertheless, should we judge the strength of democracy by process or outcome? Does democracy still thrive when the people vote for undemocratic politicians and parties?

Together, Ziblatt and our co-hosts discuss how to curb global democratic decline by realigning government away from the interests of corporations or big money and back to those of the people.

Episode Notes:

Revisit ProMarket’s series seeking to understand the issues of political economy driving global populist movements during the 2024 “year of elections.”

Are bailouts the new “trickle-down” economics? Have government debt and deficits caused capitalism’s collapse—thus ending the American Dream?

Ruchir Sharma is a well-known columnist for the Financial Times, the author of bestselling books Breakout Nations and The Rise and Fall of Nations, and an investment banker who worked as Morgan Stanley’s head of emerging markets for 25 years. His new book, What Went Wrong With Capitalism, traces the roots of current disaffection with our capitalist economy to unabashed stimulus and too much government intervention. Take an example: Sharma writes that the United States federal government has introduced 3,000 new regulations in the last twenty years, and withdrawn just 20 over the same span. He likens the Federal Reserve’s constant bailouts—under chairs appointed by presidents from both parties—to the opioid crisis, in which the solution created more problems than the pain it was designed to treat.

Sharma joins Bethany and Luigi to explain how constant government intervention leads to inefficient “zombie” firms, higher property prices, housing shortages, massive inequality, and a historic government debt and deficit crisis. Together, they discuss the first step to a cure—a correct diagnosis of the problem—and how to approach the treatment without exacerbating the problems. In the process, they leave us with a renewed understanding of how “pro-business is not the same as pro-capitalism,” a distinction that Sharma says “continues to elude us.”

Episode Notes:

Link to submit papers for the Stigler Center 2025 Antitrust Conference

Revisit “Is the Federal Reserve an Engine of Inequality?”, our previous episode on modern monetary theory or the claim that debt doesn’t matter.

Revisit “Capitalism After the Crisis,” Luigi’s article for Foreign Affairs (2009), where he outlines the tensions between a pro-capitalism and a pro-business agenda. 

Also, check out ProMarket.org, our publication at the Stigler Center that he founded in 2016, with the mission of shedding light on this tension and how to ameliorate it.

A new U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is headed by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy. Its goals include administrative reductions, cost savings, regulatory cutbacks, and reducing federal spending by nearly $2 trillion. President-elect Donald Trump has called DOGE the "Manhattan Project of our time," and has indicated that DOGE will reduce regulatory burdens to firms and individuals. But is the act of cutting rules and regulations the same as cutting spending? Does it unleash the economy in a way that benefits everyone or just a select few who don't want the rules in the first place?

Right now, it’s impossible to know what DOGE will be able to accomplish, but there is another remarkably similar example we can learn from. Argentinian President Javier Milei took office a year ago with a promise to “take a chainsaw to the state.” As part of that promise, he appointed economist Federico Sturzenegger – a former classmate of Luigi's at MIT – as the Minister of Deregulation and State Transformation of the Argentine Republic. Within a year, Sturzenegger has overseen the review of approximately 42,000 laws, and as confirmed by Milei, is in "direct contact" with Musk.

Bethany and Luigi talk to Sturzenegger to understand, most importantly, what Argentina's experience might foretell about DOGE's upcoming role and impact on the United States government and economy.

For years, the world worried about overpopulation and our capacity to sustain ever-increasing numbers of people. Now, the worry is underpopulation—and recent numbers are stunning. Fertility rate is the average number of children that are born to a woman over her lifetime. According to the United Nations, this number is currently 1.64 in the U.S.: If it stays this way, in three generations there will only be half as many young Americans as there are today, holding immigration constant. In China, this number is even lower: one child per woman. Just eight countries are expected to account for more than half the rise in global population between now and 2050.

Economic theory is based on the idea of expansion, and humanity has been expanding since 1500. If that is about to change, then the very foundation of our economic theory will need rethinking.

Acclaimed author, historian, and filmmaker Sir Niall Ferguson (Stanford/Harvard) joins Bethany and Luigi to discuss why we're heading toward a global population decline and what it all means for civilization. They discuss how factors like climate change, immigration, reproductive rights, artificial intelligence, and the trade-offs women face between career and motherhood are influencing decisions to have children. What are the implications of falling birth rates not just for the market economy but also for geopolitics and intergenerational conflict? Can we reverse trends in fertility before it is too late?

While Americans rely on debit transactions for the necessities of life, most are unaware of the networks that drive those transactions, nor are they aware that one company, Visa, has monopolized debit transactions, penalized industry participants that seek to use alternative debit networks, and co-opted innovators, technology companies, and financial institutions to forestall or snuff out threats to Visa's debit network dominance.” So begins the monopolization lawsuit filed on September 24 by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) against the country’s largest card company, Visa Inc.

On one level, the case is simple: The DOJ alleges a clear violation of laws protecting markets against monopolies. But the case gets more complicated when looking at the details, in part because payment systems are mostly invisible part of the financial ecosystem. In effect, the DOJ alleges that Visa is pulling the levers of a really opaque and complex system to preclude competition and squeeze fees out of banks and vendors for itself.To understand the complexities and implications of the case, Bethany and Luigi are joined by Kathryn Judge, Harvey J. Goldschmid Professor of Law at Columbia University. Judge is an expert on banking, financial crises, regulatory architecture, and intermediation design beyond finance. Her book, Direct: The Rise of the Middleman Economy and the Power of Going to the Source (HarperBusiness, 2022), was on the long list for the Financial Times Business Book of the Year Award. Together, the three of them discuss both the surface-level and structural issues of an economy where consumers and small businesses are shortchanged on what is essentially a private sales tax on all debit-card purchases—and how to look for collective solutions when opt-outs aren’t possible.

Episode Notes: Also check out the ProMarket article “A DOJ Victory Against Visa May Not Help Merchants or Consumers” by Lulu Wang, Assistant Professor of Finance at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management.

As the United States elections draw near, everyone is wondering who will take control of Washington next. In this week’s Capitalisn’t episode, Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Brody Mullins reveals how the real winner will be neither Democrats nor Republicans. Rather, it will be the lobbyists.

Mullins is the co-author (along with his brother Luke, also an investigative reporter) of The Wolves of K Street: The Secret History of How Big Money Took Over Big Government. Brody joins Bethany and Luigi to discuss how corporations ranging from Genentech to Google participate in the invisible but massively influential lobbying industry to bend government policy toward their favor. Together, the three trace the roots and evolution of political lobbying from the 1970s to now and explore how it penetrates and leverages other spheres of society to abet its operations. How are academia and the media complicit in this ecosystem of influence operations? How has lobbying adapted to the changing attitudes of Americans towards Big Business? How might it change under either a Harris or Trump administration and beyond?

Episode Notes: Luigi mentions the transformational work of one figure in American politics who fought back against lobbyists’ substantial influence: consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Revisit our prior conversation and episode with Mr. Nader.