Good Authority

Is America ready for a second act of Trump's foreign policy—this time, no restraints? In a recent blog post, Columbia University political scientist and Good Authority senior editor Elizabeth Saunders wrote about what happens when the 'madman' in U.S. politics suddenly becomes predictable. Kim Yi Dionne, editor in chief of Good Authority, reads out the article in this bonus content shared ahead of Tuesday's U.S. elections.

Despite promising to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 2015 Paris Agreement, many governments maintain low gasoline taxes or even allow citizens to buy gasoline below market prices. UCLA professor Michael Ross explains why it has proven to be so hard to move away from gasoline subsidies and, more generally, why price-based fossil fuel policies are often politically unsustainable.

Why have Elon Musk’s politics hurt Tesla? In a recent blog post, UC Irvine political scientist and Good Authority contributor Michael Tesler wrote about how Elon Musk is alienating the consumers who are most likely to buy electric vehicles. Kim Yi Dionne, editor in chief of Good Authority, reads out the article in this episode.

Martha Finnemore, recent winner of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, discusses the critical role of norms in international affairs. She explains how norms develop, what they are and are not, and how they shape international relations. She also highlights how norms influence current issues such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence.

University of Minnesota professor Tanisha Fazal discusses her new book, "Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War." In the book, she highlights how modern advancements in military medicine reduce American fatalities but lead to underestimations of war costs, which have long-lasting impacts on veterans, their families, and the U.S. Treasury. Dr. Fazal joins Good Authority to discuss the shifting ratio of wounded to killed, unforeseen expenses such as Civil War pensions, and how the U.S. can more effectively estimate the financial costs of wars.

The first presidential debate takes place tonight. As you probably know by now, Biden and Trump agreed to this June 27 debate and a second one on September 10. They are not going to do the usual three debates overseen by the Commission on Presidential Debates in late September and early October.

Of course, the big question is: In a year of remarkably stable polling, could this debate actually change the state of the race? This is a more complicated question to answer than usual – and we can blame this new debate schedule.

What the previous research says

In August 2012, I wrote a piece summarizing the political science literature on the presidential debates from 1960-2008. Here’s a one-sentence summary: Debates have moved the polls but they have rarely decided the election.

There are two big reasons why. First, the debates took place later in the election season and there weren’t many undecided voters at that point. Second, it has proven tough to “run the table” and win all the debates so convincingly that the winner received a durable benefit. Typically, the candidates have fought to a draw.

By contrast, the party conventions have had larger effects, on average. They have typically occurred earlier than the debates. And because the conventions no longer experience much drama about who’ll be the nominee, they have become infomercials for that candidate. By design, no debate tends to be that one-sided.

Not much about the 2012 debates changed those conclusions, I argued after that election. Mitt Romney did gain a few points after the first debate, but Barack Obama did better in the last two and the end result was basically a wash. There weren’t big debate effects in 2016 or 2020 either, or so we found in our books on those elections.

What’s unusual in 2024

But this year’s schedule creates the potential for something different.

For one, the first debate will take place quite early. There should be more undecided voters than there will be in October. And we know that Joe Biden has work to do rallying Democrats and Democratic-leaning voters. If Biden “wins” the debate – I use scare quotes because these judgments are always subjective – it could boost his standing within the party even before the Democratic convention.

Then there is the Republican convention from July 15-18 and the Democratic convention from August 19-22. This will allow us to observe the potential impact of each. In some years, like 2020, the party conventions are so close together that you can barely see any impact of the first before the second one kicks in. But note also that party conventions have had smaller effects in recent elections.

The second debate on September 10 will also take place earlier than the first debate typically has. So, once again, there could be potential for the polls to move. Moreover, convention bumps sometimes decay and either candidate could benefit from a highly publicized victory in the September debate.

But then… there will be almost 2 months until Election Day. That’s plenty of time for any impact of the final debate to disappear, or another late-breaking event to override the debate’s impact.

It’s also worth noting that Biden has already reserved more time for televised advertising in the fall than Trump has. If those ads have an effect – and there is evidence that advertising can have a small effect – then that could be the ultimate deciding factor in a very close election, not a debate that occurred weeks or months earlier.

In sum, for a long time the presidential campaign calendar followed a pattern: summer party conventions followed by fall debates. That’s what the political science research has studied.

In 2024, we’ll get to study something different – with less predictable consequences. 

For further discussion on the 2024 debates, listen to my conversation with Good Authority Editor Erik Voeten. 

In the last few years, militaries have carried out coups in numerous African countries, including Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad and Mali. Does this signify the beginning of a much broader continent wide “coup epidemic?” Or are these coups mostly affecting especially weak states that face specific challenges? Where is democratic resilience strong and where is there a risk of continued democratic backsliding?

A Good Chat on Africa

Good Authority’s Africa experts Ken Opalo and our editor-in-chief Kim Yi Dionne joined me to discuss these issues. Ken is an associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the author of the substack An Africanist Perspective. Kim is an associate professor at UC Riverside and the co-host of the podcast Ufahamu Africa.

Both Ken and Kim contributed to a recent issue of the Journal of Democracy on Africa. Ken’s essay highlights that Africa’s coups were concentrated in countries with weak state capacity and that were facing security threats and/or political dysfunction. Therefore, he believes these coups are unlikely to spread across the continent. Kim’s essay explores a democratic success story – Malawi – highlighting the importance of domestic checks and balances for democratic resilience.

Our conversation delves deeper into the themes and content of these essays. We discussed the role of security threats, economic distress, African regional organizations, and outside assistance from the United States and China. We also talked about the upcoming South African elections and the rise of economic populism on the continent.

John Sides and Michael Tesler recently published a piece on Good Authority asking how much trouble Joe Biden is really in for the 2024 election? Our podcast episode kicks off with that big question, then delves deeper into what opinion polls in March can tell us about the November elections. We talk about how much it matters that both candidates are pretty well known, whether the encouraging news on the economy can help Biden, and whether Democrats’ strong performance in the 2022 and 2023 elections gives the party some hope.

We also explore some currents underlying recent trends in public opinion. Is there really a looming racial realignment in American politics? Why don’t consumer sentiment and presidential approval ratings go hand in hand anymore? Is there any change in political independents? What types of issues might favor Democrats and Republicans? And what are good campaign strategies for both sides?

John has written books about the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections. Michael was a co-author on the 2016 book and has also written extensively about elections at 538, the Monkey Cage and elsewhere. Listen for a deep dive on what to expect over the next few months.

Hear our conversation using the audio player below. You can also subscribe to our podcast on Apple Podcasts.

Political scientist Simon Hix has developed a forecasting model that predicts a sharp right turn in the upcoming European elections in June. This includes a big increase in the number of seats for far-right parties in the European Parliament but also an overall shift away from the left.

Simon and I talked about why we can expect such a big increase in support for far right parties, where it is happening (pretty much all over Europe), and what the consequences might be. Echoing the last episode of this podcast with Dan Kelemen, we discussed whether and how Europe’s center-right parties may or may not form coalitions with the far right.

This type of shift has wider implications

The clearest consequences of the sea change in political power may well be for environmental issues and climate change. As I have written earlier on Good Authority, the far right appears to be attracting new voters based on its opposition to environmental regulations and energy transition policies. The recent farmers’ protests in several European countries are just the latest example. 

Simon predicts that environmental policies that narrowly passed just recently would not be successful in the next European Parliament. This may matter beyond Europe, which is often seen as a leader on green policies.

Finally, we discussed some of the foreign policy implications. The European far right is quite divided over Russia and Ukraine. They also have different views on NATO and whether European states should increase their common defense efforts – an issue that looms large with the possibility of a new Donald Trump presidency.

The well-documented rise in right-wing populism has spawned no end of explanations. Are voters' preferences shifting? Do populist candidates capitalize and build on existing sentiments? This reading of an article by John Sides explores the recent paper by political scientists Oren Danieli, Noam Gidron, Shinnosuke Kikuchi, and Ro’ee Levy, which presents an interesting new angle on why populist parties across Europe have experienced a surge in electoral support.