What motivates a military to continue fighting even when their situation looks grim? Are certain types of militaries more effective at achieving their goals than others?  Ukraine appears to have fought better than Russia expected, while even experts on Russian forces have been surprised by the shortcomings its military has displayed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What can the current situation tell us about prospects for military cohesion as the conflict continues?  

Jasen J. Castillo is an Associate Professor and the Evelyn and Ed F. Kruse '49 Faculty Fellow in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is the Co-Director of the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy. Prior to joining the Bush School, Dr. Castillo worked in the Department of Defense's Strategy and Plans Office. Before working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he was an analyst at the RAND Corporation, where his research focused on military strategy, nuclear deterrence, and WMD terrorism. Prior to RAND, he was a consultant for the Institute for Defense Analyses. Dr. Castillo earned his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago, where he received research support from the National Science Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. His research interests include U.S. defense policy, military history, and nuclear deterrence. His publications include Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014); “Loyalty, Hedging, or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats,” Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming; “Don’t Leave Grand Strategy to the Generals,” The National Interest, October 2019; “Passing the Torch: Criteria for Implementing a Grand Strategy of Offshore Balancing,” in New Voices in Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2019); Understanding Russian Nuclear Strategy and Assessing Escalation in Conventional Conflicts, PR-3039-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, October 2017); National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don’t, PR-3191-A (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, October 2017); Will to Fight: Defining, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Tactical and Operational Military Units, PR-3149-A (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, October 2017).