Episode 17 of NTSB News Talk brings together an unusually rich set of accidents and safety insights, all centered on pilot decision-making, trim system failures, swept-wing stall risks, and the ongoing challenge of hand-flying in IMC when automation misbehaves. In this week’s discussion, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark use recent NTSB reports to highlight the mistakes, mechanical failures, and chain-of-events that continue to trap even experienced pilots. For listeners who fly IFR, rely on autopilots, or operate aircraft with electric pitch trim, this episode offers lessons that are immediately relevant.

The episode opens on an encouraging note. Max reports that the United States saw three CAPS parachute deployments in three days—Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. These weren’t all Cirrus aircraft, either; one was N163BR, a Lancair Turbine LX7, one of the fastest experimental turbine singles in the fleet. All three incidents involved engine failures on approach, and every person involved walked away uninjured. For Max and Rob, it’s another sign that whole-airframe parachutes continue to save lives and will become increasingly common as the general aviation fleet modernizes.

But the tone shifts as the hosts examine the crash of N30HG, a King Air B100 on a humanitarian mission to Jamaica following Hurricane Melissa. Shortly after takeoff from Florida, the aircraft descended rapidly and struck palm trees before crashing into a pond, killing both on board. A similar King Air pilot’s Facebook account of a pitch trim runaway and violent pitch-down event becomes an important point of comparison. While the NTSB has not yet identified the cause, the parallels highlight how aggressive and unexpected trim-related events can be—and how essential it is for pilots to know exactly where the trim and autopilot disconnects are located, especially when operating older turbine aircraft.

In the next case, XA-JMR, a Mexican registered Hawker 800XP fatal accident near Battle Creek, Michigan, post-maintenance work required a swept-wing stall test. The Hawker had been down for seven months while technicians inspected the wing’s leading edges for corrosion. Manufacturer guidance requires that a qualified test pilot perform the post-maintenance stall series. But when the crew was unable to schedule one, they elected to fly the test themselves. Moments after entering the test area at 15,000 feet, the crew transmitted in Spanish that they had stalled the aircraft and were attempting to recover—an attempt that ultimately failed. For Rob, a veteran swept-wing pilot, the lesson is clear: pilots must say “no” when a task exceeds their experience or training, especially in high-AOA testing where swept-wing handling characteristics are unforgiving.

The episode then examines several loss-of-control accidents during IFR operations. N9627X, a Cessna 210 bound for Jonesboro, Arkansas deviated around convective weather, then began a series of inexplicable turns and large speed changes before crashing in heavy IMC. A separate Cirrus SR22 accident in Louisiana involved a pilot who reported autopilot issues during a go-around, then lost control while hand-flying. Both accidents reinforce how quickly pilots can become disoriented when hand-flying after automation confusion—especially in turbulence or low visibility.

The hosts next highlight a N79338, a Mooney M20E, takeoff accident in New York involving a newly purchased aircraft with a history of contaminated fuel. Although the aircraft showed normal fuel samples before takeoff, the engine lost power at 200 feet. The CFI attempted a turn back but quickly realized the aircraft was too low, resulting in a crash into trees. Max emphasizes that turn-backs below a few hundred feet are rarely survivable, even for experienced pilots, and that extensive high-power runups should be mandatory when an aircraft has a known fuel-system issue.

Another puzzling case involves C-FETM, a Canadian-registered Beech V35 Bonanza that departed Castlegar, British Columbia, and later crashed near Mount Callahan, Nevada, in IMC at high elevation. The pilot appeared to descend dangerously close to terrain before impact. With no flight plan, no stated purpose, and deteriorating mountain weather, the accident raises unresolved questions about fuel planning, pilot intent, and IMC mountain operations.

The first NTSB final report of the episode comes from N860CA, a TBM700, that stalled during an unstable approach in Montana. Despite over 1,200 hours in type, the pilot allowed the aircraft to get high, pulled the power to idle, and ultimately stalled the aircraft at 40 feet. The TBM was destroyed in the resulting ground impact and fire. Max notes that pilots often recover successfully from unstable approaches—until the day they don’t—which is why turbine operations emphasize strict go-around criteria.

The last final report is one of the week’s most revealing: N761JU, a Cessna T210 accident in the UK caused by near-full nose-down elevator trim that went undetected before takeoff. A malfunctioning Bendix-King KFC-200 autopilot may have slowly trimmed the aircraft nose-down during taxi without the pilot noticing. With the trim nearly at the forward stop, the airplane became uncontrollable as the takeoff was rejected. The nosewheel collapsed and the airplane flipped, killing the more securely belted passenger. The report reveals poor documentation, older components not aligned with the STC, and a pre-flight test procedure that provided no clear warning to the pilot—all pointing to the importance of thoroughly understanding autopilot and trim systems, especially in legacy aircraft.

Episode 17 ultimately reinforces a common theme: pilots must stay ahead of their automation, know their trim systems cold, practice hand-flying often, and speak up when something doesn’t feel right. These accidents—whether involving swept-wing jets, turboprops, or piston singles—illustrate just how common and deadly loss-of-control, trim malfunctions, and automation confusion remain across all levels of aviation.

Max Trescott and Rob Mark explore one of the most overlooked killers in aviation: common medications that quietly impair pilots and contribute to fatal crashes. While many aviators think over-the-counter or prescription drugs are safe if they “feel fine,” the NTSB’s recent accident reports tell a different story. In case after case, pilots who ignored FAA medication rules—or failed to understand them—lost control of their aircraft, sometimes within seconds of takeoff. Pilots should read the FAA's Over-the-counter (OTC) Medications Reference Guide before taking an OTC medication.

The episode opens with a discussion of the NTSB’s recent safety recommendation involving Learjet landing-gear inspections, then pivots to a more personal revelation. While preparing a previous show, Max reviewed several fatal accident reports and realized that three of them, selected at random, shared a common factor: medication use. A fourth involved an untreated medical condition. That chance discovery became the foundation for this episode.

The first accident involves N510KC, a Piper Malibu converted to turbine power that crashed shortly after takeoff in Nebraska. Toxicology revealed Ambien (Zolpidem), a powerful sleep aid. The pilot—experienced and well-trained—appeared to rotate normally before the airplane rolled left and hit trees. Rob recalls his own experience with Ambien and how it caused amnesia: “My wife said I was talking and walking before bed, and I had no memory of it.” The NTSB concluded that impairment and overloading likely caused the loss of control.

The next accident centers on N915DV, a Cessna Turbo 206 that struck mountainous terrain in Utah. The pilot had taken cetirizine (Zyrtec), an antihistamine many pilots assume is “safe.” Yet studies show that even mild sedation can impair cognitive performance—especially at altitude. The U.S. Navy found that cetirizine increased errors during flight-simulation tests at 10,000 and 15,000 feet. Zyrtec appears on the FAA’s “no-go” list, and pilots must typically wait up to five days after the last dose before flying.

In another case, N880A, a Cessna 414 stalled after takeoff when the elevator trim was left in a full-nose-up position. The pilot had taken sertraline (Zoloft), an antidepressant that requires special FAA issuance and strict medical monitoring. He hadn’t reported it on his medical. Investigators also found other red flags: diabetes, unresolved maintenance issues, and a non-functioning tachometer. Rob calls leaving the engines running while stepping out of the aircraft “reckless,” and Max explains how unreported antidepressant use can disqualify a pilot without proper documentation.

The final crash involved N4184G, a Nanchang CJ-6A performing a flyover in Colorado. The pilot abruptly pulled into a vertical maneuver, stalled, and spun in. Post-accident analysis revealed uncontrolled diabetes with blood-sugar readings over eight times normal levels. He had previously disclosed diabetes on his FAA medical but failed to list it later—suggesting denial or complacency. Fatigue or blurred vision may have contributed to his erratic control inputs.

Across these four crashes, one lesson stands out: pilots often underestimate how medications affect cognition and coordination. Even “safe” drugs can delay reactions, dull alertness, and create false confidence. Worse, some—like Ambien—suppress the very self-awareness needed to recognize impairment. Max and Rob stress that pilots aren’t receiving enough education about FAA medication restrictions; most training programs and BFRs never address them.

They also highlight the human factor behind the data. “If you cheat,” Max warns, “the only person you’re cheating is yourself—and your family will pay the price.” Rob adds that instructors should explain not just which drugs are disqualifying, but why they impair performance.

The takeaway: check every medication—prescription or over-the-counter—before you fly. Search the FAA’s AME Guide or AOPA’s medication database, and observe all required waiting periods. Pilots pride themselves on discipline and preparation; medication awareness deserves the same rigor.

This powerful episode of NTSB News Talk turns four tragic crashes into lifesaving lessons for anyone who flies—or teaches others to fly.

In Episode 15 of NTSB News Talk, co-hosts Rob Mark and Max Trescott examine a week filled with new legislation and a series of tragic accidents that highlight recurring lessons in aviation safety and human factors.

The show opens with the Senate Commerce Committee’s new bipartisan aviation safety bill, which—if passed—would close the ADS-B loophole that allows certain military aircraft to operate without transmitting position data. Rob explains that the legislation was sparked by the midair collision near Reagan National Airport (DCA) involving a military jet and a civilian aircraft, after which the NTSB identified over 15,000 unreported near misses in the Washington, D.C. area. Max notes that while the bill’s text isn’t public yet, reports indicate it would require ADS-B In for aircraft already required to carry ADS-B Out.

Rob then recounts the fatal stall-test crash of a Hawker 800 that had just undergone heavy maintenance in Battle Creek, Michigan. The aircraft entered an unrecoverable stall during post-maintenance checks at 15,000 feet, killing all three aboard. Having flown the Hawker himself, Rob explains how rare and risky such stall tests are—especially without an experienced test pilot. Max adds that with two similar Hawker losses in 18 months, new FAA or manufacturer guidance may soon follow.

The discussion shifts to Erie, Colorado, where a JMB VL3 Evolution light-sport aircraft crashed during pattern work in extreme, sudden wind shear that tore down wind socks and caught multiple pilots off guard. Witnesses described gusts exceeding 50 knots. Investigators found the ballistic parachute’s activation pin still installed—a fatal oversight. Max explains how the startle effect and loss of fine motor control under stress can make removing such a pin nearly impossible in flight. His advice: Always pull the parachute pin before takeoff.

From there, Rob examines the Gulfstream G150 runway overrun at Chicago Executive (PWK), where a new copilot landed long and fast on a wet runway while the speed brakes were never deployed. Despite thrust reversers and hard braking, the jet slid into the EMAS barrier. Fortunately, nobody was injured. Rob and Max use the incident to illustrate how auditory exclusion—the brain’s inability to process sound under stress—can cause pilots to ignore or not even hear a call to “go around.”

Max next analyzes the Cirrus SR22 crash near Ruston, Louisiana, in which a private pilot flying an RNAV approach reported autopilot trouble and began hand-flying shortly before losing control. ADS-B data showed large heading deviations and a rapid descent from 1,200 feet AGL. Though weather looked benign, embedded thunderstorms and outflow boundaries were present. The Cirrus parachute was found undeployed. Max discusses how pilots under pressure often fail to pull CAPS when they should, particularly when they feel personally responsible for the problem.

The episode closes with a sobering case from Lincoln, Montana, where a recently licensed private pilot attempted a night landing in mountainous terrain at an airport surrounded by peaks up to 8,600 feet. With only a 9% moon, no instrument approach, and minimal terrain clearance, the pilot apparently stalled and spun while maneuvering his Cirrus SR22 near the airport. Rob and Max emphasize how combining night, mountains, and marginal weather can be deadly—and how even experienced pilots should avoid such conditions.

Throughout the show, Max and Rob circle back to key human-factor themes: complacency, startle effect, task overload, and decision-making under stress. Their closing message is direct: even experienced aviators must continually train, brief, and mentally rehearse emergencies—because survival often depends less on skill and more on anticipation and preparation. Share this episode with low-time pilots who may not yet recognize how quickly small mistakes can cascade into tragedy.

In Episode 14 of NTSB News Talk, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark analyze a series of recent NTSB preliminary and final reports that reveal how weather, fatigue, distraction, and airspeed management continue to play major roles in both near misses and fatal crashes. With their characteristic mix of insight and practicality, the two veteran aviation journalists connect the dots between accidents that could have been avoided — from runway confusion at LAX to a tragic Cessna 210 in-flight breakup in a thunderstorm.

The episode begins with a dramatic runway incursion at Los Angeles International Airport. An American Airlines A320 was forced to abort its takeoff at 145 knots when a Boeing 777 cargo jet accidentally turned onto the same runway. The controller, distracted and calling the wrong call sign several times, urged the cargo flight to “cross quickly,” which only compounded the confusion. Thanks to a quick-reacting Airbus crew and reliable communications on LiveATC.net, disaster was narrowly avoided. Rob and Max explain that high-speed rejected takeoffs are among the most dangerous maneuvers in aviation because they push brakes, thrust reversers, and pilot reflexes to their limits. They emphasize that even in this case — where no one was injured — such events underline how fatigue, communication errors, and poor situational awareness can converge in seconds at busy airports like LAX.

From there, the hosts shift to a string of recent fatal general aviation crashes, all with different aircraft and weather profiles but a common theme: loss of control in challenging conditions.

The first involved a TBM 700, N111RF, that crashed shortly after takeoff from New Bedford, Massachusetts, during poor weather associated with a nor’easter. The aircraft struck a car on Interstate 95, killing both people onboard. ADS-B data showed the plane leveled off at just 800 feet and remained below the cloud layer before descending out of control — possibly an example of a pilot hesitating to enter IMC, losing situational awareness in marginal VFR.

Next, they discuss a Beech Baron, N121GJ that went down near Williston, Florida. Three people were killed when the twin appeared to descend rapidly — over 3,500 feet per minute — just as thunderstorms moved through the area. With lightning reported nearby, the NTSB suspects weather penetration or turbulence led to the loss of control.

A third case, a Beechcraft King Air C90, N291CC, that crashed near Hicks Airfield in Texas, drew particular attention because it appeared to be a training flight. The aircraft had spent 90 minutes practicing approaches before a sudden, steep, left-turn descent at low altitude. ADS-B data showed the aircraft slowed below 100 knots, consistent with an aerodynamic stall, possibly during simulated engine-out training. Both pilots were killed. Max and Rob discuss how multi-engine training carries inherent risk, especially when one engine is feathered or throttled back. “Airspeed is life,” they repeat — a theme echoed throughout the episode.

In two preliminary reports, Max walks through additional lessons for pilots. A Sport Cruiser, N336SC, in Maine experienced an apparent engine failure, with witnesses reporting a loud pop before seeing the aircraft descending with its parachute only partially deployed. The host notes that parachute systems like CAPS are highly effective when deployed early, but once below 1,000 feet, the odds of survival drop sharply. Another case involved a Cessna 340, N269WT, departing Houston’s David Wayne Hooks Airport. After takeoff, the pilot requested to return but stalled and crashed on final approach with the gear down and flaps retracted. The NTSB found no mechanical issues. Both hosts speculate that an unnecessary return — possibly for a door warning or minor issue — can turn deadly if pilots lose focus on maintaining airspeed.

The most widely discussed final report revisited the Lake Placid crash that killed AOPA Air Safety Institute’s Richard McSpadden and former NFL player Russ Francis. The Cardinal RG suffered a partial power loss after takeoff and attempted a turn back to the runway, but stalled and crashed. The NTSB cited loss of control and improper weight and balance planning. The case reignited the ongoing debate about the so-called “impossible turn.” Max and Rob strongly caution pilots never to attempt a 180-degree turn back to the airport after engine failure unless altitude, training, and aircraft performance clearly allow it. They note that even AOPA’s follow-up video subtly softened its earlier message, changing “turning back is a viable option” to “may be a viable option.”

Later in the show, the hosts analyze an NTSB report from San Diego where a Citation 560XL, N564HV, nearly landed atop a Southwest 737 after distracted controllers forgot the landing clearance. Only the airport’s ASDE-X ground radar system — which alerted both tower and crew — prevented a catastrophe. Max points out that fewer than 75 airports in the U.S. currently have ASDE-X, though the FAA is now deploying ASDE-X Lite, a more affordable ADS-B–based version that will bring runway-incursion protection to smaller airports.

The final case involves a Cessna P210, N210JT, that broke up in flight after the pilot flew directly into a severe thunderstorm while descending toward Thomaston, Georgia. Despite having onboard radar and a lightning detector, the pilot never requested or received a weather briefing. The NTSB concluded that the pilot’s failure to avoid convective weather was the primary cause. Max compares it to the 2006 Scott Crossfield accident, another 210 that entered a thunderstorm with fatal results. Both hosts urge pilots to remember that NEXRAD radar is delayed by up to 10 minutes and that even a brief lapse in judgment near convective activity can be catastrophic.

Throughout Episode 14, the recurring themes are unmistakable: weather awareness, disciplined airspeed control, fatigue management, and pre-planning. Whether it’s a cargo 777 taxiing into harm’s way at LAX or a single-engine pilot attempting a low-altitude turnback, most of these tragedies share a common trait — they were preventable. As Max concludes, “Airspeed is life." And so is thinking ahead.

In this episode of NTSB News Talk, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark welcome Michael Graham, a current member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), for a deep discussion on the agency’s work and the broader state of aviation safety

Graham begins by clarifying the role of NTSB board members, often misunderstood as investigators. While trained in accident investigation, board members function more like the “Supreme Court of Transportation Safety,” deliberating on reports and voting on recommendations that flow from investigative teams. They also serve as media spokespeople at accident sites, coordinate with local authorities, and meet with victims’ families.

A major portion of the conversation focuses on advocacy—convincing regulators, manufacturers, operators, and associations to implement safety recommendations. Graham acknowledges that implementation can take years or even decades, citing the long struggle to mandate Positive Train Control in the rail sector. Despite delays, the board persists in pushing for life-saving changes.

The discussion then shifts to Safety Management Systems (SMS). Graham describes his advocacy for SMS across Part 135 operators, manufacturers, and repair stations, and highlights FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-92D, which now provides scalable SMS guidance for small operators and even single-pilot GA. This, he says, is a breakthrough that makes SMS practical outside of large organizations.

From his Navy background, Graham stresses the role of safety culture: open communication, willingness to accept critique, and rigorous debriefs after every mission. He encourages GA pilots to adapt these practices by critiquing their own flights, flying with peers who can offer feedback, and leveraging available flight data tools. Pilots, he argues, must move past ego and embrace constant improvement.

Graham also highlights spatial disorientation as a persistent and deadly problem. While only a fraction of GA accidents involve it, more than 90% are fatal. He recalls accidents such as the 2019 Amazon Air crash near Houston, underscoring the importance of proficiency in instrument flying. Pilots, he warns, must remain both current and truly proficient to avoid disaster.

The conversation touches on technology as an engineering control for safety. Graham sees promise in ADS-B In for situational awareness, particularly in congested or uncontrolled airspace, and advocates for broader adoption. He also points to angle of attack indicators as an underused but powerful tool for GA pilots to understand aircraft performance margins.

Additional topics include lessons from the NTSB’s General Aviation Dashboard, frustrations with slow NextGen implementation and ATC staffing, and the destruction of the TWA 800 reconstruction once displayed at the NTSB Training Center. Graham also describes his path to the board, from Textron safety leadership to a lengthy nomination and confirmation process, and the challenges of balancing safety priorities with limited agency staffing.

Throughout, Graham emphasizes that aviation safety is never static. A safe state is not permanent; it requires constant vigilance, adaptation, and recognition of new risks. For pilots and organizations alike, the lesson is clear: success comes from continuous critique, data-driven decision-making, and openness to feedback.

This wide-ranging interview provides both a candid look inside the NTSB and actionable lessons for GA pilots, safety professionals, and anyone passionate about preventing accidents.

Episode 12 of NTSB News Talk with hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark delivers a comprehensive discussion of recent accidents, preliminary findings, and final NTSB reports, highlighting recurring safety themes for GA pilots.

The episode begins with the White House nomination of American Airlines captain John DeLouv to the NTSB board, and an invitation for listeners to suggest questions for an upcoming interview with a board member.

The first accident examined is a Lancair Super ES crash near San Jose on September 12, 2025. ADS-B data showed unusual behavior, with a temporary TIS-B hex code indicating the aircraft may have suffered an electrical failure. The pilot completed odd turns, steep descents, and eventually lost control, reminiscent of a prior electrical-failure accident on the East Coast. The takeaway: system failures can snowball, and pilots should land at the first safe opportunity.

Next, the hosts review a Bonanza BE-35 accident in Denver after multiple touch-and-goes. The ADS-B track suggested reduced altitude, slower speeds, and eventually a likely engine failure. The pilot attempted a turnback but fatally crashed. Max and Rob emphasize the priority of aviate–navigate–communicate, reminding pilots that talking to ATC should never outweigh flying the airplane.

Two Cirrus SR22 accidents highlight starkly different outcomes. In Michigan, a Gen 6 SR22T ditched in Lake Michigan after an oil pressure failure. The pilot deployed CAPS, and thanks to a nearby Malibu and quick Coast Guard response, all aboard were rescued uninjured. In contrast, an SR22 in Franklin, North Carolina, crashed fatally during a go-around, illustrating how seldom-practiced procedures lead to errors with trim, flaps, and rudder control. The hosts urge pilots to rehearse go-arounds regularly.

The preliminary reports shift focus to Shelter Cove, California, where a student pilot illegally carrying a passenger crashed into fog, killing himself and injuring the passenger. The case illustrates hazardous attitudes like anti-authority and the risks of taking unqualified passengers. Another case, a Cessna 340 in Missouri, involved a fatal stall-spin during pattern entry, with eyewitnesses describing a wing drop consistent with low-speed loss of control.

Among final reports, the hosts cover a widely discussed PA-28 accident in Kentucky in which a young CFI posted on social media mid-flight before pressing into nighttime thunderstorms. Misunderstanding NEXRAD latency and underestimating storm hazards led to an in-flight breakup. In another Bonanza case in Georgia, a pilot attempted a steep turnback shortly after takeoff with the gear down, stalled, and crashed into a residential area despite a functioning engine. The accident raises questions about distraction, possible door issues, and the dangers of early turnbacks.

The show closes with the Citation 550 crash in Murrieta, California, in July 2023. Two relatively low-time pilots flew two approaches into deteriorating fog. On the second, they descended below minimums and struck terrain short of the runway. Factors included fatigue at a circadian low, unstable approach speeds, dark-hole illusions, and potential pressure to get home. Max recalls his earlier Aviation News Talk analysis, suggesting the pilots may have mistaken a nearby white-roofed building for runway markings. The NTSB ruled controlled flight into terrain.

Episode 12 underscores repeating patterns: hazardous attitudes, poor weather decisions, under-practiced maneuvers, and fatigue all contribute to accidents. By analyzing both new and final reports, Max and Rob provide actionable reminders for pilots to respect limitations, practice essential maneuvers, and make conservative choices when safety is at stake.

Max talks with Rob Mark about the latest NTSB cases and safety lessons for pilots. They begin with new details on the B-52 near miss at Minot, North Dakota, where the bomber nearly collided with both a regional jet and a Piper Archer. The tower controller, working alone without radar support, became overwhelmed and failed to advise the B-52 crew of conflicting traffic. At one point, he even issued incorrect altitude and heading clearances. Though everyone avoided contact, the case illustrates that controllers can—and do—make mistakes, making pilot vigilance essential.

Attention then turns to a fatal midair collision in Fort Morgan, Colorado, where a Cessna 172 on a straight-in approach collided with an Extra 300 turning base just after an aerobatic contest. Because of their high- and low-wing configurations, each aircraft was hidden in the other’s blind spot. The accident underscores the importance of CTAF communication, traffic scanning, and using a second radio to monitor the local frequency even while on IFR clearances.

Rob next reports on a Cessna 172 from San Jose’s Reid-Hillview Airport whose pilot declared jammed flight controls. Another pilot attempted to assist in the air, but the aircraft ultimately crashed. The case recalls earlier accidents where loose objects, like portable GPS antennas, jammed control linkages.

The episode also examines student pilot tragedies. In Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, a young student turned crosswind too soon at low altitude and struck trees. In New Jersey, a 61-year-old student in a Cirrus SR20 succumbed to somatogravic illusion, leveling off at night and descending into terrain after takeoff. Both highlight the risks of solo flight without CFI oversight and the dangers of night solos.

Further cases include a Cessna 152 overrun at night in Kansas with a pilot who fled the scene, a T-6 Texan stall/spin at Oshkosh caused by low-speed maneuvering, and a Cessna 206 crash in Alaska where water-contaminated fuel led to an engine failure.

Throughout the discussion, Max and Rob emphasize recurring themes: respect stall speeds and G-loading, always sump fuel, avoid complacency with ATC instructions, and never assume other pilots are on frequency. Their message is clear—aviation safety depends on every pilot maintaining situational awareness, discipline, and respect for physics.

In Episode 10 of NTSB News Talk, aviation safety experts Max Trescott and Rob Mark examine recent accident reports that reinforce why loss of control in flight continues to be the number one cause of fatalities in general aviation. Drawing from official NTSB accident reports and preliminary findings, they analyze crashes involving a TBM turboprop in Montana, a Beechcraft King Air in Arizona, and other cases where night flying illusions and equipment failures played a decisive role.

Rob begins with an August accident in Kalispell, Montana, where a TBM turboprop attempted to land at the city airport. Witnesses said the aircraft touched down near the approach end of the runway before veering into parked planes, sparking a fire. Incredibly, all four occupants survived with only minor injuries. Though details are still sparse, the incident highlights how quickly loss of control can occur even in a high-performance single-engine turboprop.

Max and Rob stress that while the TBM is an advanced and capable aircraft, any landing can go wrong if the pilot mismanages energy or fails to stabilize the approach. This accident serves as a reminder that precision, discipline, and preparation remain critical during the landing phase, when the margin for error is smallest.

The hosts then turn to a tragic August 5th accident involving a Beechcraft King Air 300 on the Navajo Nation in eastern Arizona. The aircraft was inbound on a medical transport flight, but before picking up its patient it crashed near the single runway at Chinle Municipal Airport. All four aboard—two pilots and two healthcare providers—were killed.

Conditions that day created a perfect storm: a density altitude of over 8,400 feet combined with gusty crosswinds approaching 28 knots, nearly 90 degrees to the runway. The demonstrated crosswind limit for the King Air 300 is 20 knots, but as Rob explains, that number is not a hard limitation—it simply reflects the strongest crosswind tested during certification. What really matters is pilot proficiency.

The Chinle crash underscores the dangers of trying to land in challenging conditions when performance margins are already compromised by high elevation and high temperature. For many pilots, especially those not flying crosswind landings regularly, the combination can quickly exceed skill level and lead to loss of control.

Rob next covers a preliminary report on a Cessna Conquest II that departed Youngstown, Ohio, en route to Bozeman, Montana. Security video showed the aircraft lifting off after a normal ground roll, but instead of climbing, it leveled off at just 100 feet and maintained that altitude until impacting trees. Both engines were reportedly running, making the lack of climb especially puzzling.

Witnesses described unusual engine sounds, but Max and Rob note that eyewitness accounts are often unreliable. The bigger mystery is why the pilot failed to climb, despite having ample power available. Possible scenarios include distraction, incapacitation, or improper handling of the aircraft. As Max points out, 80 percent of accidents are linked to human error, and this crash may ultimately fall into that category.

Max then shares insights into a Piper PA-28 crash in Needles, California, where two low-time pilots were building hours for airline transport certification. After a go-around at night, the aircraft crashed almost immediately. The conditions—dark desert terrain with no horizon—were ideal for somatogravic illusion, a common cause of accidents at night.

Somatogravic illusion occurs when acceleration tricks the body into feeling like it is pitching up, leading pilots to push forward on the controls when they should be climbing. With little visual reference and limited experience, the pilots in this case likely succumbed to the illusion. Max emphasizes that pilots flying in dark-night conditions must always cross-check instruments, especially the vertical speed indicator, to confirm a positive rate of climb.

The episode also examines two final NTSB reports. The first involved a Mooney that struck power lines near Gaithersburg, Maryland, while flying an approach in dark night IMC. Photos of the aircraft wedged into a transmission tower made national headlines. The investigation revealed the pilot was unfamiliar with his IFR-certified GPS and often relied on a handheld unit instead. Poor avionics knowledge combined with descent below minimums led to the crash.

The second report focused on a Hawaii medical transport King Air C90 that crashed into the ocean at night after its attitude indicator failed. Cockpit video captured the pilot listening to music and chatting with crew before the failure, and later struggling to control the aircraft without reliable instruments. The NTSB cited inadequate training and a history of poor checkride performance as contributing factors. The accident reinforced the critical need for proficiency in hand-flying and backup instrument skills.

Throughout the discussion, Max and Rob emphasize several recurring themes:

• Loss of control remains aviation’s deadliest risk. Even experienced pilots can miss upset cues or fall victim to illusions.
• Avionics knowledge is essential. Pilots must know their GPS and autopilot systems thoroughly to avoid confusion in high-stress situations.
• Simulator training pays off. Practicing hand-flying, instrument failures, and upset recovery in a safe environment builds resilience.
• Dark-night conditions are uniquely hazardous. Without lights or a horizon, illusions can overwhelm even competent pilots.
• Altitude and proficiency are survival tools. Whether flying a TBM, King Air, or a light single, the best defense is disciplined flying and constant preparation.

Episode 10 of NTSB News Talk demonstrates that while technology and aircraft performance continue to advance, pilot proficiency and decision-making remain the decisive factors in aviation safety. From Montana to Arizona, Ohio to Hawaii, the NTSB’s accident reports show that staying sharp, staying current, and understanding the human factors behind loss of control can save lives.

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On this episode of NTSB News Talk, Max Trescott covers the third and final day of the NTSB’s investigative hearing into the January 2024 midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. Day 3 featured Panel 4: Collision Avoidance Technology and Panel 5: Safety Data and Safety Management Systems.

The hearing opened with spatial disorientation testimony and interviews with Army pilots about Route 4 altitude protections they incorrectly believed would keep them clear of Runway 33 arrivals. NASA’s Dr. Stephen Casner explained that cockpit traffic displays can help pilots spot targets up to eight times faster than by visual scan alone.

Experts detailed ADS-B system complexities — including the two incompatible broadcast frequencies (UAT and 1090ES) — and reviewed the limits of pre-ADS-B collision avoidance technology. The UH-60L Black Hawk lacks integrated traffic displays, relying instead on iPads with Stratus receivers, which Army policy prohibits the flying pilot from using. Portable ADS-B In devices provide only partial traffic pictures unless paired with ADS-B Out, limiting situational awareness.

Discussions turned to TCAS: its nuisance alert problem, differences for helicopter operations, and why the CRJ-700 lacks a certified ADS-B In solution. The NTSB Chairwoman confronted the FAA over its 17-year refusal to mandate ADS-B In, despite repeated post-collision recommendations. The Army is now procuring 1,685 Stratus/iPad sets for priority units, but operational use will still be limited at low level.

FAA data revealed 366 TCAS resolution advisories within 10 nm of DCA from 2023–2025. Testimony noted that crews involved in RAs are typically not notified unless a deviation occurs. Panelists debated safety culture, just culture, and leadership removals at DCA Tower after the accident. A controller supervisor described the pre-accident culture as “robust,” but post-accident changes removed key institutional knowledge.

The hearing also exposed gaps in PSA pilot special-qualification training for DCA — including no information on helicopter routes or operations — and examined simulator results showing that circling to Runway 33 can double or triple pilot workload compared to a straight-in to Runway 1.

Closing testimony on future ACAS XR technology indicated it could have alerted the Black Hawk crew 73 seconds before impact, with potential nationwide deployment by 2027. Max weaves these details into a narrative showing how technological shortfalls, flawed assumptions, procedural gaps, and cultural challenges all converged in this tragic midair — and what reforms could prevent a repeat.

NTSB Docket on Reagan National midair collision

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Max Trescott plays audio clips from Day 2 of the NTSB investigative hearing on the midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. This day focused exclusively on Panel 3: Training, Guidance, and Procedures Applicable to DCA Air Traffic Control, revealing systemic issues that shaped the events leading to the accident.

A major theme was visual separation. Testimony explored the difference between pilot-applied and tower-applied visual separation in Class B airspace and the operational norm at DCA where helicopter pilots almost reflexively request pilot-applied visual separation. Experts explained how the unique combination of restricted airspace, helicopter routes, and runway configurations makes visual separation “paramount” for traffic flow, though it shifts collision avoidance responsibility to pilots. A U.S. Army pilot described the difficulty of spotting Runway 33 arrivals at low altitude, highlighting how these challenges contributed to the accident sequence.

Staffing emerged as a critical factor. The DCA tower had 19 fully operational controllers to cover 16 shifts a day, forcing position combinations such as merging tower and helicopter frequencies. Witnesses described high workload and a culture summed up by the phrase “just make it work,” raising questions about whether safety margins were being eroded. A management-level request to reduce arrival rates from 32 to 28 per hour due to safety concerns was denied, reportedly over political timing related to FAA reauthorization.

The hearing also examined miles-in-trail spacing, revealing inconsistent agreements between Potomac TRACON and DCA Tower and noting that arrivals were being fed at less than four miles apart before the accident. Conflict alert systems were scrutinized, with testimony that up to 50% of alerts are “nuisance alerts,” that could lead to controller desensitization. The Black Hawk’s lack of ADS-B Out was discussed, though radar coverage mitigated its effect on conflict alerting in this case.

Additional revelations included confusion over helicopter route altitudes, the tower’s downgrade from Level 10 to Level 9 (which resulted in new controllers being paid at a lower level than existing controllers), and an external compliance audit that found 33 areas of non-compliance—so severe the audit was halted and converted into an internal corrective action. The episode also covers the failure to conduct alcohol testing at all of controllers after the accident, contrary to the DOT’s two-hour requirement.

Max weaves over an hour of testimony into a narrative that exposes the intersection of human factors, training gaps, and systemic pressures inside one of the nation’s most complex airspace environments. The episode underscores how a combination of cultural norms, operational constraints, and safety oversight gaps set the stage for this tragic collision—and what must change to prevent future accidents.

NTSB Docket on Reagan National midair collision

Check out our other Aviation News Talk Network podcasts:

UAV News Talk Podcast 

Rotary Wing Show Podcast

Aviation News Talk