Nullius in Verba

In this episode, we discuss Quantifauxcation, described by statistician Philip Stark as “situations in which a number is, in effect, made up, and then is given credence merely because it is quantitative.” We give examples of quantifauxcation in psychology, including errors of the third kind. We spend the second half of the podcast discussing how to develop quantitative measures that are meaningful and bridge the divide between qualitative and quantitative observations.

Shownotes

• Statistics textbook by Philip Stark.

• Stark, P. B. (2022). Pay No attention to the model behind the curtain. Pure and Applied Geophysics, 179(11), 4121–4145. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-022-03137-2 

• Burgess, E. W. (1927). Statistics and case studies as methods of sociological research, Vol 12(3), 103-120. (Thanks to Andy Grieve!)

• Nick Brown's role in pointing out flaws in the positivity ratio.

• Retraction notice of the positivity ratio paper.

• Blog by Tania Lombrozo on nonsensical formulas in abstracts.

• Kimball, A. W. (1957). Errors of the third kind in statistical consulting. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 52(278), 133–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1957.10501374

• Type III errors: Philip Stark’s post of Deborah Mayo’s blog

• Brower, D. (1949). The problem of quantification in psychological science. Psychological Review, 56(6), 325–333. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0061802

• Guttman scales

• Wilson, M. (2023). Constructing measures: An item response modeling approach. Taylor & Francis.

• Wilson, M., Bathia, S., Morell, L., Gochyyev, P., Koo, B. W., & Smith, R. (2022). Seeking a better balance between efficiency and interpretability: Comparing the likert response format with the Guttman response format. Psychological Methods. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000462

• Bhatti, H.A., Mehta, S., McNeil, R., Wilson, M. (2023). A scientific approach to assessment: Rasch measurement and the four building blocks. In X. Liu & W. Boone (Eds.), Advances in Applications of Rash Measurement in Science Education. Springer Nature. 

In preparation for a discussion on Quantifauxcation, a reading of 'Problem-Centering vs. Means-Centering in Science' by Abraham H. Maslow (1946). 

• Maslow, A. H. (1946). Problem-Centering vs. Means-Centering in Science. Philosophy of Science, 13(4), 326–331. https://doi.org/10.1086/286907

In today’s episode, we discuss intellectual vices. How can we tell the difference between justified confidence and unjustified arrogance? How do we deal with feelings of envy or negative comparison with other scientists? What is the difference between building one’s career and careerism? And what do we do about scientists who do not care about the truth? 

Shownotes

• Azrin, N. H., Holz, W., Ulrich, R., & Goldiamond, I. (1961). The control of the content of conversation through reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 4, 25–30. https://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1961.4-25 

• Meehl, P. E. (1967). Theory-testing in psychology and physics: A methodological paradox. Philosophy of Science, 103–115. https://doi.org/10.1086/288135  

• Mitroff, I. I. (1974). Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo Moon Scientists: A Case Study of the Ambivalence of Scientists. American Sociological Review, 39(4), 579–595. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094423

• Susan Blackmore: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Blackmore 

In this episode, we discuss scientific snobbery and the ways in which it affects our interactions with and perceptions of other scientists. What are the reasons for hierarchies among different disciplines, institutions, and approaches to science? What are some ways in which snobbery manifests in science? And is it snobby to not want to present scientific posters? Enjoy. 

Shownotes: 

• Ego and Math (3Blue1Brown)

• M. V. Berry; Regular and irregular motion. AIP Conf. Proc. 15 September 1978; 46 (1): 16–120. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.31417

In this episode, we continue our conversation on the replication crisis⏤Which methodological, theoretical, and practical concerns did psychologists raise half a century ago? What has changed, and what remains the same, during the current crisis? 

Shownotes

• Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American Psychologist, 17(11), 776–783. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043424

• Rosenthal, R. (1966). Experimenter effects in behavioral research. Appleton-Century-Crofts.

• Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 309–320. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034436

• Koole, S. L., & Lakens, D. (2012). Rewarding replications: A sure and simple way to improve psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(6), 608–614. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612462586

• Greenwald, A. G. (Ed.). (1976). An editorial. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0078635

• Ring, K. (1967). Experimental social psychology: Some sober questions about some frivolous values. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.

• Ledgerwood, A., & Sherman, J. W. (2012). Short, sweet, and problematic? The rise of the short report in psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(1), 60–66.

• Barber, T. X. (1976). Pitfalls in Human Research: Ten Pivotal Points. Pergamon Press.

• Dunnette, M. D. (1966). Fads, fashions, and folderol in psychology. American Psychologist, 21(4), 343–352. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023535

• Babbage, C. (1830). Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on Some of Its Causes. B. Fellowes.

Reading of the chapter "Investigator Data Analysis Effect" from the book:

In this episode, we discuss the replication crisis in psychology which has been an important topic of discussion for the last decade. We revisit some key events from the start of the replication crisis, such as the publication of Daryl Bem's studies on precognition, the paper False Positive Psychology, and the Reproducibility Project and share personal anecdotes about how it was to live through the replication crisis.

Shownotes: 

• Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 407–425. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021524

• Ritchie, S. J., Wiseman, R., & French, C. C. (2012). Failing the Future: Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Replicate Bem’s ‘Retroactive Facilitation of Recall’ Effect. PLOS ONE, 7(3), Article e33423. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0033423

• Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant. Psychological Science, 22(11), 1359–1366. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417632

• John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2012). Measuring the prevalence of questionable research practices with incentives for truth telling. Psychological Science, 23(5), 524–532. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611430953

• Fiedler, K., & Schwarz, N. (2016). Questionable Research Practices Revisited. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(1), 45–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550615612150

• NOTE: Daniel says in the podcast the paper below is by Fiedler and Strack - but it is by Fiedler and Schwarz.

• Ebersole, C. R., Mathur, M. B., Baranski, E., Bart-Plange, D.-J., Buttrick, N. R., Chartier, C. R., Corker, K. S., Corley, M., Hartshorne, J. K., IJzerman, H., Lazarević, L. B., Rabagliati, H., Ropovik, I., Aczel, B., Aeschbach, L. F., Andrighetto, L., Arnal, J. D., Arrow, H., Babincak, P., …

• Nosek, B. A. (2020). Many Labs 5: Testing Pre-Data-Collection Peer Review as an Intervention to Increase Replicability. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245920958687

• Luttrell, A., Petty, R. E., & Xu, M. (2017). Replicating and fixing failed replications: The case of need for cognition and argument quality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 178–183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.09.006

• Simons, D. J., Shoda, Y., & Lindsay, D. S. (2017). Constraints on Generality (COG): A Proposed Addition to All Empirical Papers. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(6), 1123–1128. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617708630

• Simonsohn, U. (2015). Small Telescopes Detectability and the Evaluation of Replication Results. Psychological Science, 26(5), 559–569. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614567341

In this episode we reflect on the role of intelligence in scientist. How much does intelligence matter in science, and which other characteristics might play a role in doing good science? Do scientist need to be extremely intelligent or can anyone do science? And what is the role of stupidity in science? 

Capax Mentis roughly translates to "capacity of mind."

Smriti stupidly messed up her audio so the quality isn't great. Apologies! 

Shownotes

• Schwartz, M. A. (2008). The importance of stupidity in scientific research. Journal of Cell Science, 121(11), 1771. https://doi.org/10.1242/jcs.033340

As prologue to the next episode on how smart one needs to be to be a scientist, we present a reading of chapter 2 "How can I tell if I am cut out to be a scientific research worker?" by Peter B. Medawar from his 1979 book 'Advice to a young scientist'. Our next episode was inspired by the section "Am I brainy enough to be a scientist?"

https://www.google.nl/books/edition/Advice_To_A_Young_Scientist/3fg3DgAAQBAJ

In this episode we discuss Daniel Dennett's distinction between chess, or research worth doing, and 'chmess,'  research not worth doing. We discuss ways to determine whether our research is chess or chmess, and how to avoid being sucked into lines of research we don't particularly care about. 

Shownotes

• Dennett, D. C. (2006). Higher-order truths about chmess. Topoi, 25, 39–41.

• Folderol means 'a useless ornament or accessory', and is used to indicate something is 'nonsense'.