Talking Europe

The EU believes it has an offer than can effectively counter China worldwide – its Global Gateway Investment Strategy. Jutta Urpilainen, the outgoing European Commissioner for International Partnerships, is adamant that this strategy offers long-term human development and avoids the debt traps that Chinese investment in Africa has come with. "We don’t want to create new dependencies," she tells Talking Europe. We discuss the impact that Global Gateway has had since its inception in 2021, as well as the EU's apparent shift in focus towards migration and border security, and what that means for its international partnerships.

But first, on the return of Donald Trump and what "America First" could mean for the West’s overall development assistance, Urpilainen responds: "It's very hard to predict, but I hope that the United States is still committed to multilateralism and the rules-based international order. When it comes to official development assistance, or ODA, the European Union and the US together provide around 70 to 80 percent of the global ODA. So I, of course, hope that the US stays committed to providing ODA funding."

Some have questioned the EU's own commitment to development aid, however, as an EU budget proposal suggests shifting €2.6 billion from development in order to tackle migration. "I hope that won’t be the case," Urpilainen replies. "I hope that external funding and development cooperation will be maintained in the next Multi-Financial Framework. We face many kinds of security threats. Russia is not the only one. We also have climate change. We have migration, we have terrorism. And in order to be able to address those security challenges, we need international cooperation. We need international partnerships."

The commissioner stresses that human development is a key concern for the EU.  "That's why, for instance, in Senegal, we invest a lot in vocational education and training in order to provide opportunities for young people. There are 17 million citizens in Senegal at the moment. 70 percent of them are below 30 years old. And if we look at the forecast, by 2050, there will be 40 million citizens in Senegal. Can we stop them coming to Europe by building a fence or a wall? No. The only way to stop that is to invest and support them to develop their society. We can never stop migration by building walls."

Elaborating on Europe's "offer" in Africa, Urpilainen suggests that, unlike China, the EU doesn’t want to create new dependencies. "Many African countries have very high levels of debt, and a big portion of their revenues actually goes to debt servicing. That's why many of our partners, especially in Africa, have realised that China's offer – the Belt and Road Initiative – has actually caused this kind of huge debt dependency on China. And the reason why we wanted to create the Global Gateway Investment Strategy was to have our own positive offer. We wanted to support our partners in the Global South to achieve sustainable development goals, to boost investments in energy, in transport, in the digital sector, in education and in health. Since 2021, we have mobilised up to €179 billion worth of investments. We have 225 Global Gateway flagships across the world."

Turning to the controversial EU-Rwanda critical raw materials agreement, which has led to accusations that the EU is contributing to unrest in Rwanda's neighbour, the DR Congo, Urpilainen asserts: "One of the main objectives is to improve traceability and also fight illicit [minerals] trafficking. And we believe that through our memorandum of understanding and also the roadmap which is based on that MOU, we can make some concrete improvements. I met the prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo myself here in Brussels a couple of weeks ago, and we had a very constructive and good discussion. I think it has been clear from the beginning of this unfortunate conflict in the eastern DRC, that that we don't take sides. We really are keeping a balanced approach, and we have talked to both of the parties about the need to have a ceasefire and to end this conflict".

Programme prepared by Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero and Luke Brown

There is nervousness in Brussels about the incoming US administration. That is not just down to Donald Trump's plans for Ukraine, but also because of his pledge to slap tariffs on EU goods of at least 10 percent. Trump insists that the EU will have to "pay a big price" for not buying enough American exports. That could hit key industrial sectors hard, not least car manufacturing. And officials from the European Central Bank are now warning of the damage that US tariffs would do to economic growth in the eurozone. But is a trade war inevitable, or could the two sides negotiate an off-ramp? We put the question to two MEPs.

Programme prepared by Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero and Luke Brown

In an exclusive interview, FRANCE 24 and Radio France International sit down with France's minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot, who was appointed to the job in September. We discuss France's diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, in Europe and in relation to Ukraine. Barrot addresses Donald Trump's dramatic return to power in the US and insists that US tariffs on Europe – which Trump has said he will impose – would be a "major error". Barrot says that, if Trump persists, France and Europe will defend their interests – their farmers and their industries – "with an iron will". Barrot also stresses that Europe now needs to accelerate the strategic autonomy agenda, in the face of the "global transformation that is happening now".

"The EU is the number one trade partner of the United States," Barrot states. "That is why it would be a major miscalculation for the US to slap tariffs on Europe in a massive and indiscriminate way. It would heavily penalise numerous American companies which are active in France and in Europe. And it would also penalise the American middle class, which buys a lot of products that come from Europe. So this kind of measure would hit the purchasing power of the American middle class. But if the Trump administration insists on pursuing what I call this major error, then we will defend our farmers, our industries and our trade with an iron will. What is an iron will? During Trump's first term in office there was perhaps a lack of preparation on Europe's part at the time. Back then, we were still very much in a free trade mentality. It was not the done thing to talk about sanctions, or about retaliating against unfair trade practices. But Europe has changed. You saw that last month, when Europe decided to apply tariffs on Chinese electric cars."

Asked whether Trump's victory is not the result that the EU had hoped for, Barrot says: "It's up to the American people to decide, it’s their sovereign choice. We have been working closely with the United States for 250 years. We have survived 59 American presidential elections, and we will obviously survive the 60th."

Does he think that Trump would abandon Ukraine? "I do not believe that Donald Trump will want to make gifts to Vladimir Putin, who is today weakened to the point of being forced to export the war to Asia, to get troops from North Korea in order to attack the Ukrainians," Barrot answers. "The Russian economy itself is on the verge of suffocation, with interest rates at 21 percent, labour shortages and an abysmal public deficit." Doing a quick deal that favours Putin would "enshrine the law of the strongest – 'might is right' – and it would have extremely serious consequences, not only in Europe, but everywhere else – the strongest, most aggressive powers would feel that it's safe for them to invade a neighbouring country. I think Donald Trump is too wise to go down in history as the person who endorsed the biggest land grab in our history", Barrot avers.

The top French diplomat admits, however, that Europe has a long way to go on the military aspect of strategic autonomy. "Eighty percent of our military procurement, in Europe, comes from outside the European Union," he points out. "This creates a dependency which is unacceptable, and in a sense it holds us back in our geostrategic choices. And that cannot continue as it is. This is why, as early as 2017, we were calling for our European defence industries to expand. At a time when France or Germany or Poland are increasing their defence spending, these increased expenditures have to be channelled into European industries."

We also touch on the recent spike in tensions between France and the Israeli government, following an incident in which Israeli police entered a French-owned compound in east Jerusalem, and briefly arrested two French gendarmes. In response, Barrot summoned the Israeli ambassador in France. "There are various diplomatic sanctions that can be activated, and we activated the most serious one," Barrot explains.

The French foreign minister goes on to take a hard line on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank. "We have applied sanctions on several occasions, first of all against 28 violent and extremist individual settlers. But also at the European level, where we (France) were the drivers behind a new sanctions regime targeting individuals or entities that are responsible for this settlement activity, or complicit in it. We launched two rounds of sanctions against those individuals, and we are now working on a third round of sanctions at the European level," Barrot asserts.

Programme prepared by Luke Brown, Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero and Oihana Almandoz.

The EU likes to underline that enlargement towards the east is a security priority. And indeed, since the war in Ukraine started, accession negotiations have begun with several countries, most of them in the Balkans. But in a shock referendum result, barely over 50 percent of voters in Moldova said Yes to pro-EU constitutional changes. And in another shock for Brussels, Georgian Dream beat the staunchly pro-European opposition in the parliamentary election in Georgia; a vote whose integrity the EU has called into question.

So is the EU losing the battle for hearts and minds in some of the countries that initially set themselves on a European path?

To discuss this issue, we're joined by Romanian MEP Nicolae Stefanuta, vice president of the European Parliament and a substitute on the Delegation to the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee. He sits with the Group of the Greens.

We're also joined by Bulgarian MEP Kristian Vigenin, from the Socialists and Democrats, who is on the Delegation to the EU-North Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee, and a substitute on the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee.

For all the talk of "Trump-proofing" Europe, much remains to be done, and there are now only a few short months before the former president takes office again, following his dramatic comeback and resounding victory in the US election. We speak to Pierre Moscovici, who was European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs during the first Trump presidency. He identifies three major areas where the EU is likely to face headwinds – Ukraine, trade and climate action. Moscovici is now First President of the Court of Auditors, which is the highest body for auditing the use of public funds in France. In that capacity, he addresses the challenge of reducing France's huge public deficit.

Despite the unflattering things that Donald Trump has recently said about the European Union, Moscovici remains adamant that Europe "needs to build the best possible relationship with him. The best-case scenario is that we have a polite relationship; a transactional relationship. But Europe is not going to be Mr. Trump's priority. It never was, and it never will be. And there are major risks. What would Mr. Trump do with NATO? What would he do on Ukraine? He has said that he would create peace in 24 hours. That would mean in favour of Vladimir Putin. So we need to build our own diplomacy, our own foreign policy and our own defence – not against NATO, but so that we are capable of defending ourselves."

Moscovici warns that Trump could well try to play European states off against each other. "We could expect this new administration and this president to try to play on our divisions," he says. "Trump obviously has some advocates, like Mr Viktor Orban, who is the prime minister of Hungary and one of his admirers, and also one of his idols. We have Mr Robert Fico in Slovakia. We have far right parties here and there. This US election could inspire some political forces in Europe. So Trump could try to play on that. We need to overcome these divisions."

How should Europe handle to the tariffs that Trump has promised? "If we are facing an isolationist and protectionist threat, we need to be capable of responding," Moscovici answers. "The EU Trade Commissioner will negotiate for the whole EU, but member states also have to approve a decision. We're already responding to Chinese electric cars. We might have to respond to the US as well. Let's not anticipate too much. But let’s not be naïve either."

And on climate action, what does Trump's return to office mean for Europe? Moscovici points out that Trump withdrew from the landmark Paris climate agreement, and he supposes that Trump would "probably" do so again. "Trump also says he'll dismantle the Inflation Reduction Act (President Biden's landmark climate law). In a way, that's not bad for us, because we considered the IRA to be protectionist," Moscovici says. "But at the same time, the IRA was the US’s involvement in the global fight against climate change. Again, I think we must be prepared to have a strong common response, which is not anti-American. Mr. Trump is about 'Make America Great Again'. He's about American interests. We also have European interests. And those are not a matter of left or right. We have a common interest in Europe."

Moscovici insists that, for its part, France has to tackle its debt if it is to meet the big economic, geopolitical and environmental challenges that this moment in time calls for.

"Our debt is the highest – by expense – in Europe. It represents some 110 percent of GDP," Moscovici states. "We need to reduce our debt in order to recover some room for manoeuvre. What for? Precisely for investing. If we want to be capable of defending ourselves, we need to spend more on defence. If we want to be capable of tackling climate change, we need to invest in the greening of our industries. We cannot do that if we are too indebted, because we have no room for manoeuvre. And there are other points. For example, the Draghi report, led by the former Italian prime minister and former ECB chair Mario Draghi, proposed that we could have joint borrowing, as we did during Covid. But first and foremost, we need to do our homework. That means taking back control of public debt."

Programme prepared by Luke Brown, Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero and Oihana Almandoz.

Deadly floods in Spain and in central and eastern Europe, as well as devastating hurricanes in the US, are just some of the recent potent reminders of climate change. From November 11, world leaders are huddling in Azerbaijan's capital Baku for the COP29 climate conference, with the stated goal of stepping up climate action and offering more protection to those worst affected by this global emergency. 

The COP29 is being called the "finance COP", because of the growing needs of developing countries, and that is where Europe could play a significant role.

Meanwhile, the EU is now facing a new political storm: the return to the White House of Donald Trump, who will likely re-withdraw from the landmark Paris climate agreement.

We discuss the implications with two MEPs who are taking part in COP29.

Programme prepared by Isabelle Romero, Perrine Desplats and Luke Brown.

With the US election just around the corner, is the EU prepared for what might be coming? And what does “being prepared” mean, exactly, when it comes to Europe’s defence capabilities? These are some of the questions we put to veteran French diplomat Pierre Vimont, who was ambassador to Washington during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Vimont argues that the EU needs to develop much longer-term strategic thinking, whether on Ukraine and Russia, or China, or the Middle East, or the EU’s own near neighbourhood.

Vimont maintains that, on defence issues, Europe has been lagging behind for a long time. "When Donald Trump was first elected and started with his way of doing foreign policy, which was very difficult for Europeans, the then German chancellor, Mrs. Merkel, said, 'We Europeans have to take our destiny into our own hands'. That was 2017. Seven years later, where are we? We're still struggling with that," Vimont avers. "President Macron is talking about the need for strategic autonomy and many others are saying we need to have a European defence or even a European Defence Union. But we are still very far away from this. Because it’s a huge challenge. Remember President Obama's defence secretary telling the Europeans that they have to step up their act on defence? That was in 2008! So we need to discuss among ourselves where we want to go, and how we can be a stronger geopolitical actor."

Vimont wonders whether the EU has a clear idea of what its own long-term interests in Ukraine are.

"Europeans reacted rather efficiently after the Russian military intervention," he says. "We were able to come up with the kind of military assistance that was required, as well as humanitarian and financial assistance. And we have been doing that since then. Maybe not exactly to the kind of level that the Ukrainians would like, but still, we're trying to do our best. But we also need to look further down the road. How do we get out of the current conflict? We've been stating time and again that it is up to the Ukrainians to decide, and that is true. But we could have a conversation with the Ukrainian leadership and try to put forward what our interests are in this very difficult confrontation with Russia that Europe is facing."

Does that imply negotiating with Russia and tacitly accepting its control over some Ukrainian territories? 

"I wouldn’t go that far," Vimont answers. "But I'm saying that something has been missing in the EU's foreign policy for many years, which is a Russia strategy. For the last 15 to 20 years we've been trying to come up with such a strategy, but we're pretty much divided among the 27 of us. And because we know this is a divisive topic, we prefer not to talk about it and to just brush it under the carpet. I think we cannot go on like that, sidelining debates and conversations that are difficult for us."

In essence, Vimont believes the EU is not playing enough of a strategic long-term game, even when it comes to the recent decision to impose tariffs on Chinese electric cars. "You have to broaden the scope of your strategic thinking. In other words, it's not only about tariffs; it's about how do we behave in the Indo-Pacific region, what kind of diplomatic conversation we want to have with China, or with African countries, or with the BRICs – it’s about the kind of new world order we want to set up."

Vimont insists that the EU has lost diplomatic influence in the Middle East over the last 10 years.

"Ten years ago we faced the Arab Spring revolution, and we were faced with a totally new situation compared to the kind of Mediterranean policy we had pursued before. And as we haven't really managed to deal with this Arab Spring and its fallout, we slowly became silent and we slowly disappeared from the screen. And I think we have to regain a stronger position in that region because, after all, it's it's part of the neighbourhood of the European Union," he concludes.

Programme prepared by Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero, Oihana Almandoz and Luke Brown.

It's a ritual that happens every five years, and also a test for two of the EU’s key institutions. Once all the European Commission's new members have been designated, they go through confirmation hearings before the European Parliament. The parliament gets to flex its muscles vis-à-vis the EU executive and probe beyond the niceties of designates saying the right things about their commitment to European values. Getting through these grillings is not a foregone conclusion: last time, in 2019, three commissioner-designates were rejected. We ask our apnel of MEPs what they look for in a hearing, and if they see any of the current candidates as being particularly problematic.

Programme prepared by Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero, Oihana Almandoz and Elitsa Gadeva.

We speak to one of the most seasoned players on the European stage, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic. During his eight years in office, he has experienced the latter stages of the 2015-16 migrant crisis, the Covid pandemic, and the impact of the war in Ukraine, as well as overseeing his country’s entry into the eurozone and the Schengen free-travel area. We discuss topical issues in the EU as well as in his region, particularly EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans.

We ask Plenkovic if there is a fresh impetus for enlargement, in the light of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's tour of the Western Balkans, during which she touted a €6 billion growth plan to bring the region's economies and markets closer to the EU.

"I think there is a new political momentum," the Croatian premier replies. "The biggest promoter of enlargement policies is [Vladimir] Putin. Had he not invaded Ukraine, I don't think we would have seen the transfer of the neighbouring and partnership countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia into a pool, which is called the enlargement process. Now we have many more countries who have the vocation to join and have applied for membership. So I think there is an acceleration."

We suggest that things are more complicated than that, as public opinion is not solidly behind the EU in all those countries, as the razor-thin "Yes" to EU membership in the referendum in Moldova just demonstrated.

"We have seen the influence of external forces in the debate, in hybrid warfare, in disinformation, and this often leads either to a fragmentation of the political spectrum or to a very clear polarisation. We have seen that in Moldova," Plenkovic answers. "So I think this requires even more pedagogy by political leaders. They need to be more aggressive and more clear, because it’s not easy to explain to society what the benefits [of EU integration] are. Especially in the countries that were more connected with Russia."

We ask about Serbia, which is a candidate to join the EU, and about the Serbian leadership's manoeuvring between the EU, Russia and China. "Unlike a majority of the other countries in our region, Serbia's level of alignment with the EU in terms of foreign and defence policy is between 50 percent and 60 percent," Plenkovic responds. "This means that they are playing this multi-vector approach: a little bit with Brussels, a little bit with Berlin, a little bit with Paris, a little bit with Moscow, a little bit with Beijing. If Serbia really, genuinely, wants to join the European Union, they will have to make up their minds, despite their historical ties with Russia."

We also discuss migration – a major preoccupation at the last Brussels summit of EU leaders. Asked about the controversial Italy-Albania accord aimed at sending asylum seekers in Italy to Albania, Plenkovic states: "We are reserved for the moment about this new initiative that Italy and Albania made. So far, as we understand, there are some legal issues that are difficult. So we need to see in practice how this pilot project will function. What we (in Croatia) advocate is full alignment of visa policies, because we have seen an unacceptable practice of people flying into Belgrade or to Sarajevo as tourists, without a visa requirement, and then they end up as illegal migrants trying to cross the so-called green border, for instance, to Croatia. Forty percent of the illegal migrants which are stopped by our police on our borders actually came to our region and want to enter Schengen and the EU through our border, by illegally crossing it in such a manner.”

Programme prepared by Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero, Oihana Almandoz and Elitsa Gadeva

Ask just about any EU leader who they want to win the US election on November 5, and you will hear a politically correct answer along the lines of “We will work with any US president to develop transatlantic ties”. However there is little doubt that many of them will be privately relieved if Vice-President Kamala Harris wins. She has drawn a clear line from her opponent, former president Donald Trump, on US engagement with the world and particularly on support for Ukraine. But it is not as if the current Biden-Harris administration has always been smooth for Europe: for example, the US Inflation Reduction Act and President Joe Biden’s AUKUS pact with the UK and Australia have created tensions. If Trump does indeed defeat Harris in November, could the EU still work out some sort of arrangement with him? We put this question to two MEPs.

Programme prepared by Perrine Desplats, Isabelle Romero, Oihana Almandoz and Luke Brown