How have investors managed to turn Thames Water, despite its extraordinary debt, inefficiency and poor performance, into a company that offers rich financial rewards, at least for some? The roots of this began with the privatisation of water in England and Wales in 1989. At the time, the sector was in need of significant repairs to its infrastructure, and privatisation promised renewed assets and improved efficiency. Since then, with weak regulation, practices like gearing up balance sheets and extracting dividends have led some (not all) water companies to undertake financial engineering, without proper regulatory checks on balance sheets and corporate plans. To some, Thames Water appears to have prioritised financial gains, possibly to the expense of capital maintenance and the interests of customers and the environment. It has become the unacceptable face of water privatisation. Regulatory neglect is linked to broader public dissatisfaction and the erosion of the social licence to operate.

Distressed debt players have taken control, with a £3billion loan to keep Thames Water afloat and at very high interest and associated “costs”. They are planning to sell out the equity to a sole preferred bidder, KKR, for around £4 billion. This move raises serious questions about the terms and the interests of the A-class bondholders versus the public interest, about transparency and public accountability. It is likely to be profitable all round, given the value of the Thames Water regulatory asset base is around £20 billion. The irony is that it probably will not save Thames Water, and there is the possibility that it could lead eventually to the nationalisation the government has been so determined to try to head off.