This Means War

Big contracts are being let for new aviation systems. From the B21 and FLAA in the US, to FCAS and Tempest in Europe, 6th generation air platforms are all the rage in government investment decisions at the moment. Dr Justin Bronk wonders whether these can make a difference to a much more challenging environment than has been assumed in Western capitals. The airspace over Ukraine is a deadly environment. The air defence capabilities on both sides makes flying a precarious proposition for anyone who enters the realm of mutual denied airspace. This has significant implications for everyone from force designers and military planners, to infantry companies and cartographers. If stealth, penetration, and survivability have become the key facets to air power in high intensity conflict then – according to Justin – we can do more with older platforms provided we start to buy back some of the risk that has accumulated in air forces across Europe since the peace dividend was taken.

A really capable combined arms force can have a disproportionate impact on a small war. It can have much less effect in a large one. Discussing his article on Wars in a Fishbowl, Amos Fox talks to Peter about why Battalion Tactical Groups from the Russian army have had little success in Ukraine when all their experiences over the previous two decades had told them that BTGs were the sure-fire route to success. How you learn lessons, and understanding that rarely do lessons have permanent residence across every conflict, seems to be as important as identifying them in the first place if you want to design a force with greatest utilty across conflicts. It's not just evident in how Russia learns lessons though.

When Svechen and Hamley were writing about the operational level of war, it is doubtful they envisaged the number of staff and headquarters that would result from their musings. Their reason to exist is often purported to be scale, complexity, or pace in war today but this might all be just hype from academics and their acolytes. Remove the operational level staffs and processes, says Wilf Owen, and militaries can become leaner, smarter and less bureaucratic. He might just have a point.

The use of missiles – of every variety – around the world has been increasing over the past 5 years. Whether targeting critical national critical infrastructure, economic targets, military bases and units, capital ships, or for signalling intent, missiles seem to be playing a greater role than previously (and not just in Ukraine). Peter talks to Tom Karako, Director of the Missile Defence Project and a senior fellow at CSIS, about the latest trends, lessons, policy and challenges in all things missile related. The whole thing seems to hinge on production rates – and increasing those isn't just as easy as turning the handle. More to come on this topic in future episodes.

Peter is joined by Dr John Hemmings, a Senior Director at the Pacific Forum in Hawaii, to talk about what might have been missed in the Indo-Pacific while we have been busy watching Russia get whooped in Ukraine. It looks and feels more like a Cold War in the Pacific (between China and the USA), than simply a state of non-peace. Beyond the furious diplomatic negotiations to prevent sway states from aligning with either side, there is a darker side to China's attempts at alliance building and covert coercion happening on Pacific Islands and around the parliaments of smaller states. Building a coalition to contain China's interpretation of their 'manifest destiny' may no longer be possible, but deterring Chairman Xi still might be. So, with an inability for American to fight two major campaigns on different sides of the world simultaneously before 2040, others will have to step up if they want their societies to continue to operate in a way their populations have become used to.

Peter talks to Professor Alessio Patalano about whether the naval aspects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine offer anything new to navies as lessons or tactics for the future. Given the experiences of Pacific navies with PLA(N) coercive activities in the past 20 years, the different interpretations of Maritime Security to Europeans and their counterparts elsewhere in the world have become rather stark. Indeed, even in force design terms non-European maritime forces have tended to retain a Balanced Fleet (of capabilities) whereas those in Europe have cut and divested themselves of military capabilities viewed as having no utility today. It could be a decision they come to regret.

According to the report of a conference of great strategic brains during October 2022, the world will look pretty ugly in 2035 - in national security terms, let alone across societal evolution. Between Chinese exceptionalism, what-remains-of-Russia's military and Moscow's unbridled imperialist ambition, a North Korea with strategic reach, a meddling and strategically important Iran, and the extraordinary climate change effects across Africa and South Asia, military forces are likely to broken by the sheer scale of commitments they face - certainly in their predicted forms. Between now and then, there might be just enough time to make some critical corrections and place democracies in a state where they can at least face the tasks yet - as Professor Julian Lindley French explains – an absence of political leadership, ambition, strategy and vision will be our undoing. In having to decide between health security, economic security, and national security far too few political leaders across Europe, America and like-minded democracies seem to ready to make the difficult decisions.

Whilst the battles in Ukraine have evidenced the tenacity and stamina of Ukrainian forces, their success in defence and offense is determined by the Ukrainian General Staff. As a team steeped in Soviet fighting doctrine, they have executed the whole spectrum of military planning and execution (termed 'operational art') that few could replicate: certainly not the Russian generals who seem to have forgotten their own way of war and how to fight well. Underpinned by a trust in Ukrainian tactical leaders, their soldiers, as well as a deep insight of their adversary, how this team have commanded should be a salutary reminder to other commanders about what it takes to fight, and to win. Peter talks to soldier-scholar Mick Ryan about what will be worrying them next, and what observations we can make now about operational art for the future.

Despite a shared ideology loosely based around communism, and perhaps a similarly hopeful interpretation of Mackinder's Rimland theory, China and Russia don't have much in common. Even their equal desire to see the USA undermined by weakening the linkages to Europe comes apart in vying for control of Central Asia. As Theresa Fallon explains to Peter, the reality of a 'No Limits' relationship is starting to hit home in Beijing as the invasion of Ukraine becomes a much more drawn out affair than was promised by Vladimir Putin. From rewriting history, to a death by numbers, the conversation covers elite capture and the competition for influence that each of the parties is trying to gain. Fascinating, if a little confusing!

Ships being sunk by sea mines, undersea pipelines blown up, and a fragile maritime infrastructure are all underplayed risks to the Wests' daily business: yet they are also very contemporary events. Peter talks to Rob Wilson about who is responsible, how they did it, and how this might all play out in the longer term. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that these vulnerabilities are clear attack vectors for adversaries but the question is whether governments will make the necessary decisions to mitigate the implications of such threats, or will they continue to ignore the risks and leave their states open to catastrophic failures in our supply, communications, and data exchange protocols? The era of Sea Denial may be returning: it doesn't feel like we are prepared for the consequences.