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The ultimatum had expired, and yet somehow, Austria had not declared war on Serbia. What was going on?
Well, despite pushing the crisis forward with reckless abandon, the Austrian chief of staff Conrad von Hotzendorff now seemed awake to the dangers facing the country. The army would not be ready for war until 12 August, he said. This was a shock to the Germans, who continued to expect a lightning Austrian strike at Belgrade. But it did give the diplomats time to do their work.
From Britain, Sir Edward Grey believed a mediation scheme involving four uninvolved powers was the answer. He encouraged Berlin to push this idea, and the Germans did so, but only reluctantly, and out of fear of offending Britain if they did not. But the question of Russia was arguably the most important of all, and the Tsar was apparently now willing to exercise his military muscle by approving the period preparatory to war, and the mobilisation of key military districts.
This should have shown Austria that Russian intervention was highly likely, yet her statesmen continued to forge ahead. They had lost the diplomatic initiative, and they had failed to present Europe with a fait accompli. Instead, the sluggish, conditional Austrian response seemed ideally suited to diplomatic mediation. But would Austria take the easy way out? Incredibly, from Vienna, the answer was still no.
Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:
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By Zack Twamley4.7
652652 ratings
The ultimatum had expired, and yet somehow, Austria had not declared war on Serbia. What was going on?
Well, despite pushing the crisis forward with reckless abandon, the Austrian chief of staff Conrad von Hotzendorff now seemed awake to the dangers facing the country. The army would not be ready for war until 12 August, he said. This was a shock to the Germans, who continued to expect a lightning Austrian strike at Belgrade. But it did give the diplomats time to do their work.
From Britain, Sir Edward Grey believed a mediation scheme involving four uninvolved powers was the answer. He encouraged Berlin to push this idea, and the Germans did so, but only reluctantly, and out of fear of offending Britain if they did not. But the question of Russia was arguably the most important of all, and the Tsar was apparently now willing to exercise his military muscle by approving the period preparatory to war, and the mobilisation of key military districts.
This should have shown Austria that Russian intervention was highly likely, yet her statesmen continued to forge ahead. They had lost the diplomatic initiative, and they had failed to present Europe with a fait accompli. Instead, the sluggish, conditional Austrian response seemed ideally suited to diplomatic mediation. But would Austria take the easy way out? Incredibly, from Vienna, the answer was still no.
Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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