There's a myth that authoritarian leaders don't have to worry about public politics: arguably they have to worry all the more. Spinning off from the recent bizarre criminalisation of the mythical 'international LGBT movement' and one or more raids on gay clubs, I unpack how I think Putin's political 'offer' to Russians will emerge over the months leading up to presidential elections: social conservatism, a warfighting nation rather than a nation at war, a scapegoated country, but also a 'normal country.'

The Denis Volkov article I mention is here.

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Has hell frozen over? Left Front leading light Leonid Razvozzhaev is backing the inclusion of ultra-nationalist Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin in unofficial 'people's primaries' for presidential opposition candidates. How is the Russian left different from the West's, and why does this make 'red-brown' alliances with the nationalists more plausible and worrying?

And after the break, how some of my writings have been interpreted of some kind of signal of Western willingness to make a deal over Ukraine, and why it's both dangerous and illuminating that every Russian is a closet Kremlinologist.

The article from Top War I discuss is here, my writings in the Sunday Times (for those of you who subscribe) are collected here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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After looking at a few recent news stories that caught my eye, on everything from the Ministry of Happiness to a surprisingly subversive economic plan, I look at four conventional wisdoms about Putin. He knows what he wants and it never changes. He doesn't have to care about public opinion. He needs the war to go on for ever. He can't be negotiated with. It's not, in my opinion, that they are all outright wrong, but two of them are, and two need more nuance. Without understanding that, we condemn us all to the current status quo so long as Putin is in the Kremlin -- at the very least.

The events I mentioned are at De Balie in Amsterdam on 20 November (details here) and Pushkin House in London on 4 December (details here).

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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What can we learn from the ugly anti-Semitic riot at Makhachkala airport? Officially sanctioned, foreign-inspired subversion, a symptom of state failure or societal anti-Semitism? I don't think any of these capture the significance of the incident, but instead it highlights some fundamental challenges for Moscow, and reasons why the North Caucasus is almost uniquely problematic for the regime.

The Moscow Times article by Almut Rochowanski that I mention is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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In what sounds more like a scene from Armando Ianucci's Death of Stalin, an anonymous Telegram channel tells us Putin is dead, his body stuffed into deep freeze while Patrushev takes over. Credible? Not really, but that doesn't stop many Western media outlets running with the story. So, why this fascination with Putin's health, why does it matter, and what do I think would happen, if Putin really did die in office?

As a natural follow on, in the second part, I look at PM Mikhail Mishustin's chances of being the successor: his best asset may be his very lack of allies...

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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Alexei Navalny has posted a list of 10 questions he thinks all movers and shakers in the Russian (opposition) political scene ought to be asked ahead of the 2024 presidential elections. His questions, and his list of those whom he thinks should answer them, and an interesting bid to remain politically relevant - but also tell us something about his thinking.

On the other end of the political spectrum, uber-hawk Nikolai Patrushev has written an article (available in Russia and a PDF here) which is the best encapsulation yet of his conspiratorial worldview and his idea of how Moscow can assemble a "The Rest vs the West" political coalition. He's wrong.

Two very different men, with very different worldviews. But are there also some telling similarities in their manifestos?

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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A quick and early episode looking at what roles and goals - if any - Russia has in the current Hamas-Israel war. The bottom line is that Russia was not behind the terrorist invasion, doesn't really know how to respond, is putting out different and even contradictory messages and yet will taken whatever advantage from it that it can.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. 

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The Russian police are increasingly under pressure. The National Guard is getting into the mercenary game. There is talk (probably empty) of Wagner being reconstituted under Evgeny Prigozhin's son Pavel. These three apparently separate developments all point to the way Putin is not learning the lessons of past mistakes.

In the second segment, another profile of a potential successor to Putin: the fixer-technocrat with the 'Cheshire Cat' smile, Dmitri Kozak.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

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The easy cliche that the Ukraine conflict may become a 'forever war' is a convenient notion for Putin - it may help dismay his enemies, and provides an organising principle for 'late Putinism.' To paraphrase the SF game Warhammer 40,000, in the grim darkness of the present, there is only war.

Yet, of course, no war last forever and, in particular, Russians themselves don't seem to be buying this notion. Even government pollsters suggest only a small minority are really enthused by the war - and not even they embrace the idea of war eternal for it's own sake.

I also indulge myself with the first segment in an occasional series of 'Why Everything Bad is Britain's Fault' (at least as far the Kremlin is concerned).

The Fedorov interview I mention is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. 

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Is Kadyrov dying? If so, who might replace him - and what may this mean for Russia. If Chechnya again becomes unstable, will Putin be faced with a choice of losing in Ukraine or in Chechnya?

In any case, Kadyrov was one of the first and most successful of Russia's 'conflict entrepreneurs,' able to monetise the threat or actuality of war. The invasion of Ukraine is creating  a whole slew of new conflict entrepreneurs, who will represent not just a constituency with an interest in continued conflict, but also may be being nurtured as the state looks to find a new support base.

The BBC report I mention is here, and the podcast on the Rosgvardiya and its business empire is episode 11, here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. 

Support the show