In advance of the next three episodes discussing the Philosophical Psychology lectures by Paul E. Meehl, we present a brief reading from his autobiography in A history of psychology in autobiography.

• Meehl, P. E. (1989). Paul E. Meehl. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), A history of psychology in autobiography (Vol. 8, pp. 337–389). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

In this episode, we discuss objectivity and disinterestedness in science. We talk about norms, values, interests, and objectivity in research practice, peer review, and hiring decisions. Is it possible to be completely objective? Is objectivity a feature of epistemic products or epistemic processes? And most importantly, how would you objectively rate this podcast?

Shownotes

• Armstrong, J. S. (1979). Advocacy and objectivity in science. Management Science, 25(5), 423–428.

In this episode, we discuss the role of criticism in science. When is criticism constructive as opposed to obsessive? What are the features of fair and useful scientific criticism? And should we explicitly teach junior researchers to both give and accept criticism?

Shownotes:

• Babbage, C. (1830). Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on Some of Its Causes.

In this episode, we continue discussing Dubin’s 8-step method for theory building. We discuss the measurement of theoretical constructs, using logical propositions to make falsifiable predictions from theories, and the importance of specifying boundary conditions. 

Shownotes

• Jaccard, J., & Jacoby, J. (2010). Theory Construction and Model-building Skills: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists. Guilford Press.

In this episode we discussed the 8-step method of theory building proposed by Robin Dubin in his classic 1969 book Theory Building.

Shownotes

• Dubin, R. (1969). Theory building. Free Press. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/160506.html

In this episode, we discuss the barriers to cumulative science, including inconsistent measurement tools, overreliance on single studies, and the large volume of research publications. Can replications, interdisciplinary collaborations, and prospective meta-analyses help us solve this issue? Can AI solve all our problems?  And do most scientists treat their theories like toothbrushes?

Shownotes

• Opening quote by George Sarton

• Sarton, G. (1927). Introduction to the History of Science (Vol. 376). 

• Walter Mischel, Becoming a Cumulative Science 

• Dorothy Bishop - Why we need cumulative science (AIMOS)

In today’s episode, we continue our conversation about preregistration. How flexible can we be when we preregister, without increasing flexibility in our analysis? How well do people preregister, and what does a good preregistration look like? And how do we deal with deviations from preregistrations?

Shownotes

• Dubin, R. (1969). Theory building. Free Press. His full quote is: "There is no more devastating commendation that the self-designated theorist makes of the researcher than to label his work purely descriptive". 

In this two part episode we discuss the fine art of preregistration. We go back into the history of preregistration, its evolution, and current use. Do we preregister to control the Type 1 error rate, or to show that we derived our prediction from theory a priori? Can and should we preregister exploratory or secondary data analysis? And how severe is the issue of severe testing?

Shownotes

• ClinicalTrials.gov

In the first episode of 2024, we discuss the double-edged sword: reverence to authority. Should scientists respect others on whose shoulders they stand? Or should they be wary of appeal to authority? How should scientists deal with other sources of authority in science, like for example, the government or academic societies? And how can we differentiate true expertise from mere authority?  Enjoy. 

Shownotes

• Frank, P. (1956). The role of authority in the interpretation of science. Synthese, 10, 335–338.