The world’s first independent air force owes its survival and shape to its ‘father’, Hugh Trenchard. We explore how with the RAF Museum’s Dr Harry Raffal.

Described as ‘the architect and patron saint of modern air power’, Marshal of the RAF Viscount Hugh Trenchard (1873–1956) was the first Chief of the Air Staff (January–April 1918 and 1919–1930).

An army officer badly wounded in the Boer War, he was among the first British military pilots and the frontline commander of the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War.

The RAF was formed on 1 April 1918, and Trenchard set firm foundations for its survival and development, often against bitter hostility from the other Services. His administrative skills, realism, tenacity and willingness to be unpopular created an organisation that saved the nation during the Battle of Britain.

His friend TE Lawrence (Season 3, Episode 7) argued that ‘The RAF is the finest individual effort in history. No other man has been given a blank sheet and told to make a Service from the ground up. It is your single work…’

Following retirement from the RAF, Trenchard was appointed as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, where he set about a substantial reform agenda with the same single-mindedness.

Dr Harry Raffal is Head of Collections and Research at the RAF Museum. His doctorate, from the University of Hull, explores RAF and Luftwaffe operations during the evacuation of Dunkirk. He is a Committee member of the RAF Historical Society and the British Commission for Military History, and Vice-Chair of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Aeronautical Heritage Group.

The 3rd Marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732), soldier, diplomat and scholar, pioneered humanist ways to prevent or suppress insurgencies in his Military Reflections.

In his time, Marcenado was the most widely read Spanish author on war. He drew on his own rich experiences of the Spanish War of Succession to complement his erudition based on existing publications from antiquity to the Age of Enlightenment.

In a work comprising 11 volumes, he examined subjects ranging from the ethical question of whether it is right to go to war, to the leadership qualities required in a general, to the merits and dangers of battle or the recruitment of soldiers. Intended as guidance for practitioners, his work set standards in both erudition and the human approach to war. This applies particularly to his thoughts on how to prevent, contain or pacify insurgencies. Marcenado was also a diplomat charged with negotiating on behalf of his kingdom to end the Anglo-Spanish War of 1727. His writing on war thus transcends the merely military, and the greater political dimension behind it can already be discerned.

Dr Pelayo Fernández García of the University of Oviedo – our guest for this episode – is the greatest living expert on this Spanish thinker and practitioner, whose ideas are strikingly modern even for our times.

Voted Britain’s ‘greatest general’ by the National Army Museum in 2011, ‘Uncle Bill’ Slim led the XIVth Army from defeat to victory. Dr Robert Lyman tells us about Slim’s strategic leadership.

Field Marshal William Slim (1891–1970) is famous for transforming troops who had retreated almost 1,000 miles through Burma pursued by the Japanese Army into a force that emerged from the Second World War victorious. Whether in defeat – where his leadership ensured his forces maintained their order and discipline – or in the campaign that led to their victory, his men loved him, giving him the affectionate title ‘Uncle Bill’. To have achieved this is all the more remarkable given the diversity of forces under his command. A master of combined and joint warfare, his forces included African, American, British, Chinese, Gurkha and Indian troops, and his ability to integrate air into his campaign predates – but acts as an exemplar for – the relationships needed for the air-land battle.

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten stated about our subject that: “Whenever leadership is spoken of or written about, tribute is regularly paid to his supreme qualities as the finest leader of fighting men in the Second World War”. Our guest, Dr Robert Lyman MBE, agrees with this; he is a former officer in the British Army and a renowned author. His books include a biography of William Slim – Slim, Master of War (Constable & Robinson, 2004); a record of the Battle of Kohima (Kohima, 1944, published by Osprey Press, 2010); and, with General Lord Richard Dannatt, Victory to Defeat (Osprey, 2023). Dr Lyman is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

In this episode we discuss Admiral Katsu Kaishū’s transformation of the modern Japanese navy into a force that defeated the Russians in 1905.

For 200 years, Japan was largely isolated from the world. By the 19th century, as countries in Europe and North America were expanding into its neighbourhood, Japan’s military capability had atrophied. In response, the Tokugawa Shogunate created a navy in 1853 and Katsu became a naval officer. Trained by the Dutch, he became an expert in Western gunnery and commanded the Kanrin Maru on the first deployment of a Japanese warship to a Western port. There he could observe how a Western navy worked – ideas he brought back to Japan as the basis for the modern Japanese Navy.

By 1867, under the Meiji government, he was responsible for overseeing the Navy’s transition from sail to steam technology. He introduced profound changes to the Navy’s organisation, strategy and tactics, including shore-based defences, harbours, shipyards and human resource systems that allowed access to the talent needed by a more technological service. Ultimately, the foundations he laid helped the Japanese defeat the Russian Navy at the battle of Tsushima in 1905.

Commander Dr Hiroyuki Kanazawa, our first guest for this episode, serves in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, and his PhD examines the Japanese Navy in the Late Tokugawa Period (1853–1868). Dr Haruo Tohmatsu, our other participant, is Professor of Diplomatic and War History at the National Defense Academy. His PhD in Politics and International Relations is from the University of Oxford. He has published numerous works in English, including Pearl Harbor (London: Cassell, 2001) and World War Zero: The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

Lieutenant General George Flynn describes how his friend and former boss General Gray, the 29th Commandant, transformed the US Marine Corps’ warfighting, ethos and capabilities.

General Alfred Mason Gray Jnr (1928–2024) was not the most obvious choice to lead the US Marine Corps when he became its 29th Commandant in 1987, but he succeeded in transforming the Corps into one of the world’s premier fighting forces. He moved the Corps’ culture and ethos towards one that prioritised manoeuvre warfare, in which all Marines became warfighters first and foremost. His changes included new processes and equipment, but were primarily focused on the human – a conceptual transformation as much as it was a transformation of capabilities. He embraced the indirect approach from Basil Liddell Hart (Season 2 Episode 10) and John Boyd (Season 1 Episode 7), as well as William Lind’s thinking on dislocating adversary decision-making that was so effective in the 1991 Gulf War, yet he situated these inside the Marine Corps’ traditions and values.

Lieutenant General George Flynn (retd) served in the US Marine Corps for 38 years, including as General Gray’s aide in 1989–1991, as Chief of Staff at Special Operations Command and as Deputy Commander Multinational Corps Iraq, and created the Joint Force Development Directorate at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now on the Board of Regents at the Potomac Institute, he is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

NATO’s first Secretary General, Hastings Ismay, profoundly shaped today’s Alliance. Join us to discuss his legacy with his latest biographer, Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely.

Hastings (Pug) Ismay was a general who never commanded beyond lieutenant colonel, rising through the ranks as a staff officer. This brought him into contact with politicians, like Churchill, and senior military commanders such as General Eisenhower, with whom he formed an enduring friendship. After retirement from the Army, Ismay briefly became a minister before serving as NATO Secretary General, 1952-1957.

His time in office saw many challenges - the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Suez, the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64 and the death of Stalin. Steering NATO through these crises required judgement, patience and humility. His legacy is that of NATO with a strong central headquarters connecting its political and military dimensions, and organisation with a global security perspective and a Secretary General who remains the servant of the Alliance.

Our guest this episode, Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely , served in the British Army for 40 years, including in the 1982 Falklands War for which he was awarded the Military Cross, in Bosnia and Iraq. His book ‘Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway 1940’ won RUSI’s inaugural Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History. His latest book, ‘General Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay: Soldier, Statesman, Diplomat’ was published in 2024.

To conclude Season Four of Talking Strategy, we talk to long-serving diplomat, policy adviser and politician The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones.

With intimate experience of the functioning of governments and the EU, Lady Neville-Jones compares the respective organisational cultures and human side of strategy, drawing on lessons from her career.

Pauline Neville-Jones joined the British diplomatic service in 1963. She was posted in places as varied as Rhodesia, Singapore, Bonn, Washington and the European Commission. From the 1990s onwards her postings were specifically concerned with defence matters. She was head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat of the Cabinet Office from 1991 to 1994, and during that time she also chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee. Subsequently, she was Political Director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office until 1996, and in that capacity negotiated the 1995 Dayton Agreement on Bosnia on behalf of the UK.

In the final episode of this season, Lady Neville-Jones reflects on the success of the Dayton Agreement: was it ‘good enough’? Was anything better in the offing? And on relations with Russia: did the West ‘lose’ Moscow in the 1990s? Tune in to hear her advice to practitioners.

Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) is a controversial figure in Israeli politics. Revered by some as a master strategist, he is criticised by others for his failure to foresee Egypt’s attack in 1973, and then for ‘giving up’ the Sinai in return for a peace treaty.

Strategy-making can take two approaches. The first, ‘Deliberate Strategy’, is formulated and implemented hierarchically and centrally; decisions are taken by the head of the organisation, and detailed plans and instructions are issued to those responsible for implementation. The alternative model, ‘Emergent Strategy’, is characterised by its flexibility on ends as well as ways and means.

This week’s guest, Professor Eitan Shamir, is the Director of the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies of Bar Ilan University, argues that Moshe Dayan was a strategist who took the second approach. Professor Shamir is the author of a new biography entitled “Moshe Dayan: The Making of a Strategist” (2023, in Hebrew, and due to be published in English in 2024 by Cambridge University Press) and, with Beatrice, edited Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (CUP, 2017).

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Arthur Tedder was General Eisenhower’s Deputy as Supreme Commander for Operation Overlord during the Second World War. A quiet and thoughtful leader, Tedder understood the difference between war and warfare and carefully orchestrated his campaigns – including the transportation plan concerning D-Day – in an alliance context to great effect.

Tedder’s strategic leadership can be characterised as understated and thoughtful, underpinned by his ability to manage relationships with allies and experts to get the most from each. He also understood the importance of waging war economically in a way that exploited logistics capacity as a critical enabler for his own forces and as a means of weakening his enemies. Despite the Allied victory, after the Second World War he recognised the weaknesses that loomed.

This week’s guest, Air Marshal Edward Stringer, was the air component commander for NATO's operation in Libya in 2011, the Director of Operations in the UK Ministry of Defence and the UK liaison officer to the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his last role, he was Director General Joint Force Development. Since retirement, he has become an expert commentator and writer on defence, defence strategy and air power.

Qasim Soleimani was arguably Iran’s most important military leader in modern history. He moved Iran’s overall strategy from a direct approach to an indirect one of proxy warfare using non-state actors.

Born in 1957, General Soleimani rose from a humble background to become a key commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His experience of the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88 gave him a desire to avoid another high-casualty conflict. Instead, he developed a proxy war approach that was much less costly to Iran, using Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and later Hamas to put pressure on Israel and the US. Soleimani was killed in a targeted strike by US forces in January 2020, which made him a martyr in Iran.

Dr Afshon Ostovar, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School, joins Beatrice and Paul for this episode.

A graduate of the Universities of Arizona and Michigan, he was a Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, worked for the US Department of Defense, and taught at Johns Hopkins University. His book on the Revolutionary Guards examines the rise of Iran’s most powerful armed force and its role in regional conflicts and political violence.