The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

This bonus episode of the Firepower Seminar looks at the role of Naval Gunfire Support at Gallipoli by Commander David Stevens, RANR.

What issues did NGFS have at Gallipoli?

How where targets identified and how was command and control managed?

As a secondary effort, there was to few guns at Gallipoli and the Navy attempted to make up the difference.

What was the impact the NGFS on the Gallipoli campaign and how did the terrain impact it's effectiveness?

NGFS at Gallipoli makes an early attempt at creating Joint Effects. What is the legacy for the ADF today?

Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

MAJ Daryl Kelly OAM looks at the human side of the Gunners at Gallipoli.

He looks at some of the stories of the individual Gunners who served at Gallipoli, looking at the conditions and at Gallipoli during the landing operations.

Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our discussion on the Center of Gravity with COL Dale Eikmeier.

How important is the relationship between different CoG? What impact does this relationship have for operational planning?

Does the CoG breakdown when their are multiple actors? How are they related and how does it impact in planning an operation? What is the best way to deal with the increasing complexity? Does the Centre of Gravity continue to be useful as the complexity of the environment and the number of stakeholders increases?

What is the impact of time on the Centre of Gravity? Can the CoG change over time?

We look at the application of the CoG outside of the military. Could it be used in Foreign Policy?

What are COL Eikmeier's thoughts on Moral Centers of Gravity? Are they useful in planning campaigns?

What is the future of Joint Planning? How will it change over the next 20 years? What will be the impact on a Whole of Government approach to strategy?

How will the Centre of Gravity evolve over time?

This concludes our look at the Centre of Gravity construct. Next week we will start our next major battle study as we look at the Battle of Long Tan.

We talk to retired COL Dale Eikmeier about the Ends, Ways and Means methodology for determining the Center of Gravity.

We talk about some of the problems with the Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity construct. What role do the critical factors, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities play in the discovery of the Centre of Gravity.

We discuss the new Center of Gravity definitions that are starting to be used in Joint planning and how they improve on the traditional definition.

How does the CoG construct work in a complex system?

We use the Battle of the Atlantic as an example of how the Ends, Ways and Means approach can be used to better understand the process of determining the correct Center of Gravity to target.

Is the CoG construct useful at the LT / Platoon level?

The Battle of the Atlantic between the Germans and the Allies as the Germans attempted to remove Great Britain from the war, (which required 1,000,000 tons of supplies a week!), and the US attempted to build up men and materiel in Britain to launch it's attack on Occupied Europe. Analysis of the Critical Factors shows the ways to the critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted in the most economical way.

We finish with the discussion about the war in Iraq and the choice of the CoG being the Iraqi government as an example of a CoG that is incorrect.

Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that.

We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG. This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective.

We pause to look at the role that time in CoG analysis. The CoG can change over time.

War on the Rocks had a great article on the procurement of oil in the Pacific and how a limited assessment of future critical factors can lead to issues. Who is doing a future Critical Factor analysis? What role does this have in planning?

We then look at the Eikmeier methodology. This is based on Ends, Ways and Means. The Eikmeier methodology provides a user friendly cut down version of systems theory.

1. Identify the desired endstate.
2. ID the ways that it can be achieved. (CCs)
3. List the means required to enable the CC.
4. Select the entity that can achieve the means that can achieve the endstate. This is the CoG.
5. Select critical items from the means on the list.
6. ID the critical requirements that are vulnerable.

We look at an example of Madonna deciding to be elected as President of the US. With that Endstate, we look at the ways she could achieve this and the means that she would need to be POTUS.

We look at the validity test to ensure that you have the right entity as being the CoG.

We look at the CoG example for Hannibal at Cannae. Have a listen to Dan Carlin's Punic Nightmare to get a great idea of what the fighting was like at Cannae.

We look at the Roman Army that faces Cannae and how he can defeat it. We look at how Hannibal structured his battle to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the Roman Army.

Hannibal was begged to march on Rome, but he only sent a delegation to Rome to discuss surrender. One hundred and fifty thousand males had died fighting Hannibal over 3 crippling losses.

What happened after Cannae?

How did the Roman moral Center of Gravity impact Hannibal? Hannibal has destroyed 3 operational level centers of gravity, yet he did not destroy the Roman moral centre of gravity.

Artillery doctrine was updated after some of the lessons from the Boer War.

What was the role of the artillery at the beginning of the war?

How was artillery integrated into the infantry plan? What was the preferred method of employment, indirect or direct, and why?

How was artillery organised?

What was the role of the CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) and what resources did he have?

What fire support was available at ANZAC and how was it controlled? How were adjustments made?

In 1915, radio was already in use - particularly with providing co-ordination with the Naval Gun Fire Support.

At 06:00 how many Turkish troops opposed the landing?

How long did the troops on the beach wait for Turkish reinforcements to arrive? (!)

The first battery to land was the 26th (Jacob's) Battery. at 10:30 on the 25th. How did it perform?

The Field Artillery didn't get into action on the 25th because Bridges feared that they would be captured.

How was the process for calling for fire refined to speed up the response from the guns and how did the role of artillery change as the campaign progressed?

Some of the issues faced at ANZAC included the guns themselves not being able to fire at high trajectory, the lack of field positions, with many on lower ground and the difficulty in observing fire with the observers being on the lower ground, and communications between the Forward Observer and gun line. The range was often under 100 meters between the lines of trenches. Enemy counter battery fire, machine gun fire and sniper fire also hampered the provision of offensive support.

Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Hannibal was clearly one of the best Generals in history. How could he win 3 major battles against Rome, but he wasn't able to win the second Punic war.

We discuss the definition Center of Gravity, where it came from and why it is so confusing and why Hannibal and his staff may have struggled with the concept of Centre of Gravity.

Has the meaning of the Center of Gravity been lost in translation? How has the usage of Schwerpunkt transformed over time?

The Bundeswehr now uses the term Centre of Gravity, rather than the term in it's native German.

We look at the evolution of the definition for CoG from when it was first used in US Army doctrine.

LWD 1 gives us the following definition - The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. At the tactical level, the centre of gravity will often change as the mission progresses and will frequently be determined by the interaction of enemy and friendly intentions. The approaches to defeating the enemy's centre of gravity are described as dislocation, disruption and destruction.

How does this relate to what Clausewitz was originally talking about? Is the characteristic in the definition part of the problem?

What about multiple Centers of Gravity? How does that work?

How are Centres and Gravities nested? Have a look at the example given in Levels of War and Iraqi CoGs from the 1991 Gulf War.

The relationship between Genters of Gravity at different levels of war by Strange and Iron.

What about the Center of Gravity in a Coalition? We look at the Scud Hunt was a major part of shielding the CoG of the Coalition.

Flexibility for commanders increases with the level of their command because there are more resources and greater scope to shape your enemy.

We look at the surfaces and gaps that need to be thought about and how you can shield your CoG and critical capabilities.

Would Hannibal had been better off using Joint Doctrine rather than the Army Doctrine for a definition of Centre of Gravity that he and his staff could use? We look at the Carthaginian navy, the development of the corvus and how the Romans took a land strength onto the open seas.

Finally - why did Hannibal cross the Alps?

Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

In a surprise move, we look 2,200 years to look at the Battle of Cannae, a defeat so severe that it is said that every mother in Rome mourned the death of a son. How could such a crushing defeat of a Roman Army.

In 1992 the Center of Gravity construct was introduced into LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare and it has been confusing people ever since.

What is it? How to build one to give you a list of targetable critical vulnerabilities that you can use to achieve your desired endstate.

Cannae was a double envelopment at Cannae, and has been replicated on numerous times since then.

We look at the Battle of the Trebia and also the Battle of Lake Trasimene. How did Rome respond to these crushing defeats?

How did Fabius functionally dislocate the Carthaginian Army's cavalry?

What is the difference between the tactical, operational, and strategic level? What is above the military strategic level of war?

How did Grand Strategy impact on the Fabien tactics that the Roman Army was using?

How did Varro and Paulus manage the Army after taking control from Fabius?

Hannibal has 50,000 troops, but he is faced by a Roman army 86,400. The size of the Roman Army to Gisgo was astonishing.

When it comes to unity of Command, how does having 2 consuls in command of the Roman army work?

The center of gravity is the key characteristic, capability or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. What was the CoG that Hannibal was targeting at Cannae?

Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook.

If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at the remaining principles of Manoeuvre Warfare in the conduct of the Malaya Campaign.

Percival attempted to be strong everywhere and was never able to generate enough combat power to slow the Japanese.

We look at the loss of Force Z and how it decreased the Allied ability to influence the war at sea and the sea lines of communication. The loss of Force Z created an exponentially deteriorating situation which denied the Allies the time required to

Deception was not really used well. The Allies were quite good at signalling their intentions and movements to the Japanese.

Recon Pull was well used by the Japanese with their recon in force. Success was reinforced and any slow down lead to a flanking manoeuvre, either by land or by sea.

Combined Arms Teams - why weren't the Allies able to use their combined arms teams to defeat the light Japanese infantry and light tanks? We look at what was lacking. The story of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure highlights the lack of training in the use of artillery for the Battalion COs. Employing the guns worked very effectively when the Allies were able to do it, but sadly, this happened to infrequently.

We look at some of issues that lead to the erosion of trust within the Allied battalions.

Operational Tempo - the Japanese were able to rotate troops through the front line and bring them out to rest. Some of the Allied COs were sent to hospital with sleep deprivation. This highlights the difference between the Allies and the Japanese.

Application of joint fires and effects - The Japanese did a better job than the Allies, however the Japanese didn't fully exploit their advantage that they had with regard to air superiority.

What could have made a difference in the Malaya Campaign?

Yamashita had culminated just prior to the Allied surrender of Singapore. What would have made a difference in the conduct of the defence?

The allocation of resources? More fighters (with trained pilots) and tanks. Tanks!

Ensuring that Allied supplies did not fall into the hands of the Japanese. Too many trucks, POL installations, rations, and ammunition fell into the hands of the Japanese.

We look at the moral implications in the campaign.

Lastly, we discuss the training and leadership of the Allies.

Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

In the time that we have been producing the Malaya Campaign series in The Principles of War, the Australian Army has produced a new version of the LWD 3-0, so Army Doctrine is moving faster than this podcast!

We look at the new doctrine and the application of Manoeuvre Warfare.

We look at the application of tenets of manoeuvre theory.

• Focusing friendly action on the adversary centre of gravity.
• Achieving surprise.
• Identify and prioritising a main effort.
• Utilising deception.
• Reconnaissance pull.
• Operation Tempo
• Combined arms teams.
• Applications of joint fires and effects.

We discuss how the logistics tail for the Japanese could have been the critical vulnerability that the Allies could have targeted.

We discuss the question what would it have been if the 9th Division had been in Malaya rather than the 8th Division?

Got a favourite Australian military quote? Let us know, we are crowdsourcing a list of best quotes about and by Australians.

We discuss how the Japanese were able to target the Allied moral centre of gravity and how the Asia for the Asian memes undermine the effectiveness of the British Army in Malaya.

With surprise, we look at the strategic surprise that the Allies experienced with Malaya. The fact that the Singapore strategy was well understood, especially by people like MAJ GEN Lavarack, who was arguing for a better ability to defend the country.

We look at Group Captain John Lerew and his famous signal "Morituri vos salutamus". What would cause him to signal his higher headquarters "Those who about to die, salute you."

What effect did a racial bias play in the intelligence appreciation of the Japanese capabilities, especially given the kind of operations that the Japanese were conducting in places like Shanghai.