American interest groups are increasingly lining up behind the Democratic or Republican Party and trying to build coalitions within those parties rather than across them. But historically, that has not been the most effective method to bring policy change. Jesse Crosson finds that interest groups are increasingly taking positions on issues outside their areas of expertise in an effort to unite their partisan coalitions. They are facing pressure to toe the party line, but it might prevent the broader coalitions they need to build to pass legislation.

How did Americans become politically divided on culture war topics like guns, abortion, women’s role, gay rights, and environmentalism? The common story is that it took polarizers from the top: politicians and activists associated with each party moved the public to their respective sides. But Neil O’Brian finds that the culture war followed America’s racial realignment  because racial attitudes were always tied to other cultural issue views in the American public, well before they were emphasized by the parties. Once the parties divided on race, they brought culturally liberal voters to the Democrats and culturally conservative voters to the Republicans. And that combination of issue attitudes and alignments largely mirrors patterns across the democratic world.

Trump has promised to remake the federal bureaucracy in his own image and go after his political opponents and the media in his 2nd administration. But there are signals that public protest and civil society mobilization are subdued. How much do we have to fear further democratic backsliding under Trump 2? Brendan Nyhan finds expert consensus on many reasons to be concerned but also evidence that experts were too pessimistic about the likelihood of bad actions the first time.

When Kamala Harris became the Democratic presidential nominee, an outpouring of excitement among Indian Americans foretold potential gains for Democrats among Asian Americans, the fastest growing minority group. But Asian Americans neither turned out in record numbers nor moved toward Democrats. In fact, Indian Americans moved toward Trump. Janelle Wong has followed the trajectory and diversity of Asian-American voters. She does not see a realignment in the making but does see significant moves rightward and divergence across country of origin subgroups. This adds to the evidence of racial dealignment, but also the complexity of American racial categories.

President Trump has made his picks for his second term cabinet more quickly and the transition is more organized and ready for Executive Branch action. Will hopes and fears of an executive reinvention be born out or will the difficulties of the first term show their face again? David Lewis finds that Trump’s first term choices did not go over well with career civil servants but that there was not as much change as sometimes implied. Heath Brown went in-depth into the last transition from Trump to Biden and foresees problems ahead from chaotic transitions and the major ambitions of Trump’s second term appointees. They are both looking ahead to more radical shifts in Trump’s second term, with more appointees at odds with the agencies they are directing.

Analysts previewing a second Trump administration say he will now have unchecked power, with compliant administrators and courts. But there is a long history of presidents using executive actions to claim more power than they have—with the bureaucracy surprisingly resilient to oversight and reinvention. Kenneth Lowande finds that unilateral presidential action is often used for credit claiming rather than substantive policy change. The charade works in the short term, generating media coverage and group support, but it may undermine public faith in the long term due to unmet expectations. Trump's first term was full of executive actions with media frenzy that amounted to much less in practice.

In this live episode of The Science of Politics, panelists examined the class, race, and gender dynamics that shaped the 2024 election. The panel features Tom Edsall, Amanda Iovino, Patrick Ruffini, and Ruy Teixeira. Did the election cement a class realignment of American politics? Did Republicans peel off minority voters based on changing perceptions of the GOP as a working-class party? And how did these dynamics interact with the growing gender divide in voting?

Polls missed the 2016 election outcome and did even worse in 2020 on the margin, underestimating Donald Trump again. Should we believe the polls this time? What have pollsters changed? Have they overcorrected? In an era of one percent response rates for phone surveys and opt-in Internet panels, should we even talk about them in the same way? Michael Bailey finds that our theories about random sampling don’t really apply anymore. And weighting with larger samples does not solve our non-response biases. Brian Schaffner finds that weighting on several factors has increased, likely helping pollsters avoid undercounting Trump supporters. They both say survey research is important to get right but that the solutions are not obvious.

Pre-election polls show Black voters moving toward Donald Trump in 2024, even though he is now running against Kamala Harris. And Trump did gain a bit of margin among Black voters in 2020 compared to 2016, though he still loses nine out of ten. Should Democrats fear more attrition among Black voters this year or is it just a mirage from bad polling? Christopher Towler finds that Democrats made a lot of gains among Black voters this year by switching from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris. He says the gender divide may grow this year, but he thinks Black voters will come home to the Democrats. But Idan Franco finds that some Black voters support Trump because of their racial attitudes, not in spite of them. In other research, he finds similar trends among Hispanic voters, where immigration attitudes make some more likely to support Trump.

In the last 12 years, academic language about structural inequality made its way to media and popular discourse, leading to conservative critiques of “wokeness.” But how much really changed beneath the surface in our elite institutions? Musa Al-Gharbi finds that wokeness has peaked after it was the product of socio-economic trends in the professions. But he says it was mostly surface-level, visible in social norms that distracted from underlying economic realities.