“In America, we believe in driving on the right hand side of the road.”

Tl;dr: Beliefs are like bets (on outcomes the belief doesn’t affect). “Believing in”s are more like kickstarters (for outcomes the believing-in does affect).

Epistemic status: New model; could use critique.

In one early CFAR test session, we asked volunteers to each write down something they believed. My plan was that we would then think together about what we would see in a world where each belief was true, compared to a world where it was false.

I was a bit flummoxed when, instead of the beliefs-aka-predictions I had been expecting, they wrote down such “beliefs” as “the environment,” “kindness,” or “respecting people.” At the time, I thought this meant that the state of ambient rationality was so low that people didn’t know “beliefs” were supposed to be predictions, as opposed to group affiliations.

I’ve [...]

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Outline:

(01:29) Examples of “believing in”

(03:45) A model of “believing in”

(06:50) Some pieces of the lawlike shape of “believing in”s:

(07:17) Some differences between how to “believe in” well, and how to predict well:

(09:51) Some commonalities between how to “believe in” well, and how to predict well:

(11:32) Example: “believed in” task completion times

(14:17) “Believing in X” is not predicting “X will work and be good.”

(15:50) Compatibility with prediction

(17:25) Distinguishing “believing in” from deception / self-deception

(19:22) Getting Bayes-habits out of the way of “believing in”s

The original text contained 6 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.