Migration policies shape not only the economies of countries but also their politics. In this episode, we dive deep into how letting people leave—or restricting their exit—can have surprising ripple effects on collective action and political reform in their home countries. Yale political scientist Emily Sellars reveals why migration might weaken the power of ordinary people to organize and push for change—and why even those who leave might ultimately lose out. Could closing borders paradoxically strengthen democracy abroad? We unpack a provocative new model that challenges our assumptions about emigration and its role in global politics.

Papers discussed:

“Emigration And Collective Action”: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/704697?journalCode=jop

What if the recent crackdown on elite universities didn’t start with Trump—but with Obama? In this episode, we trace a surprising through-line connecting Obama’s Title IX enforcement to Trump’s Title VI threats. Harvard Law Professor Jacob Gersen joins us to reveal how both presidents used informal bureaucratic tools to reshape higher education—often without Congress. What does this say about presidential power and academic freedom in America?

Papers discussed:

“The Sex Bureaucracy”: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2750143

“The Six Bureaucracy”: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5199652

What if one of the most powerful tools to boost voter turnout isn’t a flashy campaign or a new voting law—but being randomly forced to work the polls?

In this episode, we explore a surprising study of women in 1930s Spain who were randomly assigned to serve as poll workers—just after they gained the right to vote. The results? A massive, 30-point increase in future voting behavior. Is this just a historical curiosity—or a window into how habit, exposure, and civic experience shape democracy?

We speak with researcher Toni Rodon about his paper Working for Democracy: Poll Officers and the Turnout Gender Gap, and unpack what this unexpected experiment teaches us about gender, political culture, and the power of participation.

Hello listeners, we're taking a much-needed spring break here at the podcast, but we want to re-share one of our episodes that has become increasingly salient. One of the defining features of the Trump administration so far is its entanglement with the courts. The legality or illegality of many of its actions are currently being decided by federal judges. Which means that judges suddenly have a lot of say over our politics. Is that good?

There is a long running debate in political science: do we get better judges by letting the public vote in elections or by giving our leaders the power to appoint them? One side says that judges should be insulated from the influence of politics and elections, focusing entirely on the rule of law. The other side says that our judges should be accountable to the public for the decisions they make in office. Who is right?

Led by the Trump administration and Elon Musk’s DOGE, Americans are debating once again how our government should hire civil servants, but are we asking the right questions? In this episode, we dive into a compelling new study on the Pendleton Act, one of the most significant bureaucratic reforms in U.S. history, which introduced merit-based civil service exams to combat corruption and incompetence. But did it work?

We speak with economist Santiago Perez about his paper “Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence From The Pendleton Act” and his surprising findings that while the reform did help hire more qualified and stable employees, it didn’t clearly improve government efficiency. Also, what unintended consequences may have emerged, such as manipulation of salary thresholds and persistent power dynamics among political appointees.

So, what can the Pendleton Act teach us about modern bureaucracy, accountability, and fairness? And could reintroducing merit-based exams actually fix today’s polarized and politicized civil service—or make it even worse?

Infrastructure in the U.S. now costs dramatically more than in countries like Germany or Croatia—without clear signs of higher quality or better environmental outcomes. Why has infrastructure spending spiraled out of control? Could democracy itself—through litigation, regulations, and empowered citizen voices—be driving costs sky-high?

George Washington University Professor of Public Policy Leah Brooks investigates why the U.S. pays so much more per mile of highway compared to other nations in her paper “Infrastructure Costs”. Brooks reveals shocking findings: from the late 1960s onward, the cost to build highways in America surged dramatically, not because of higher wages or materials, but because of legal battles, environmental reviews, and citizen demands.

In elections across democracies, we assume voters cast ballots for candidates whose policies align with their interests. But what happens when that's not the case? This week, we unpack a political puzzle from Japan: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) keeps winning elections despite voters consistently rejecting their policies.

Through groundbreaking research from Yale political scientist Shiro Kuriwaki, “Winning Elections with Unpopular Policies: Valence Advantage and Single-Party Dominance in Japan” we delve into why voters might choose candidates whose platforms they fundamentally disagree with. Is it trust, competence, or something more complicated?

What happens when a political outsider takes power and shakes up the system? In this episode, we look at a fascinating case study that reveals how leaders outside the establishment build loyalty, push their agendas, and change the political landscape.

Political scientist Renard Sexton discusses his paper “Deadly Populism: How Local Political Outsiders Drive Duterte’s War on Drugs In The Philippines”. It covers how local mayors chose to enforce (or resist) his policies, what they gained in return, and what this means for populism. Could Trump’s second term follow a similar path? And do populist leaders deliberately push extreme policies to ensure loyalty?

There’s a real-world experiment in governance happening that you’ve probably not heard about. It involves decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). These online collectives are trying to run billion-dollar enterprises using direct democracy and a controversial mechanism known as “liquid democracy”—where you can delegate your vote to anyone, at any time. Are these DAOs and blockchain experiments revolutionizing democracy—or just reinventing the wheel?

Political scientist Andrew Hall (Stanford GSB), has been studying these systems to understand if delegated voting increases participation, improves decision-making, or simply creates new forms of power concentration. What happens when participation is low, and decisions are made by a few super-delegates? 

Conventional wisdom says that a strong economy helps incumbents, while a weak economy hurts them. But new research from University of Chicago economist Lubos Pastor titled “Political Cycles and Stock Returns” challenges this idea, suggesting that economic downturns actually push voters toward Democrats, while economic booms favor Republicans.

If true, this theory could explain decades of presidential elections—and even the stock market’s historic tendency to perform better under Democratic administrations. But does the data back it up?