xlr8harder writes:

In general I don’t think an uploaded mind is you, but rather a copy. But one thought experiment makes me question this. A Ship of Theseus concept where individual neurons are replaced one at a time with a nanotechnological functional equivalent.

Are you still you?

Presumably the question xlr8harder cares about here isn't semantic question of how linguistic communities use the word "you", or predictions about how whole-brain emulation tech might change the way we use pronouns.

Rather, I assume xlr8harder cares about more substantive questions like:

1. If I expect to be uploaded tomorrow, should I care about the upload in the same ways (and to the same degree) that I care about my future biological self?
2. Should I anticipate experiencing what my upload experiences?
3. If the scanning and uploading process requires destroying my biological brain, should I say yes to the procedure?

My answers:

1. The original text contained 1 footnote which was omitted from this narration.
   
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   First published:
   April 17th, 2024
   
   Source:
   https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zPM5r3RjossttDrpw/when-is-a-mind-me
   
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   Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.