On today’s episode of the China Global Podcast, we’re going to discuss the South China Sea. The past year has been marked by four intersecting dynamics: First, a sharp escalation of Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia operations, especially against the Philippines. Second, a resumption of large-scale Chinese island construction after nearly a decade-long pause; Third, increasingly sophisticated Chinese legal and administrative moves to consolidate and institutionalize its claims; And fourth, a deepening of the US-Philippines military partnership and the emergence of a broader network involving US allies and partners from Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

To discuss these trends, I’m delighted to have as my guest today, Dr. Collin Koh, who is a senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies based in Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

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[00:00] Introduction

Summits between US and Chinese leaders are important events. They provide opportunities to discuss sensitive issues, manage friction, and to identify ways to solve problems and promote cooperation where possible. A great deal of preparation usually goes into a US-China summit, involving hundreds of phone calls, virtual, and in-person meetings between US and Chinese officials.  

The May 14-15 summit in Beijing was atypical, perhaps not surprisingly since Donald Trump is a very atypical president. Today we are going to talk about the summit – the process and well as the outcomes and the implications for the US-China relationship and American interests. 

Joining us today to talk about these issues is Sarah Beran. Sarah Beran was senior director for China and Taiwan affairs in the National Security Council during the Biden administration from 2022 to 2024. She was subsequently deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Beijing. At the NSC, she led strategic preparations for multiple summits between President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. After her 23 years in government service, Sarah joined Macro Advisory Partners.  

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A currency becomes “internationalized” when it is widely used beyond its home economy for trade, financial transactions, and as a store of value. Achieving that status can lower transaction costs and exchange rate risks, while also enhancing the issuing country’s geopolitical influence. Today, the global financial system remains overwhelmingly dollar-centric, with China’s renminbi playing a comparatively modest role. Yet over the past decade, Beijing has taken steps to expand its global use, expanding offshore renminbi markets, establishing bilateral swap lines, and developing alternative payment infrastructure. 

To help us unpack where China’s renminbi internationalization efforts stand today, we are joined by Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Zoe’s research centers on international political economy and global financial markets, with a focus on China and East Asia, as well as the Middle East. She is the author of Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System? and Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Global Ambitions.  

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[00:00] Introduction 

In the 1950s, Mao Zedong described the relationship between China and North Korea as “as close as lips and teeth.” Over subsequent decades, the relationship has ebbed and flowed, alternating between close alignment and periods of strain. In recent months, China-NK ties appear to be warming once again. A series of high-level exchanges, including Kim Jong Un’s attendance at China’s Victory Day parade last September, followed by a trip to North Korea by Chinese Premier Li Qiang the following month, suggest renewed diplomatic momentum. Chinese Foreign Affairs Commission Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Pyongyang in mid-April is the latest sign of this trend.

What is driving this renewed rapprochement between China and North Korea, and what are the implications for the United States? To explore these questions, we are joined today by Andrew Scobell. Andrew is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy’s Asia Program and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His work focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy, and he has published extensively on China-North Korea relations.

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[00:00] Introduction 

On today’s episode, we’ll discuss the recent meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun, the first in a decade between a Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and a KMT Chair.

Ms. Cheng was elected party chair only four months ago, and her top priority was to meet with Xi Jinping. She has not yet visited the United States, but says she intends to do so later this year.

In their public statements, Xi Jinping and Cheng Li-wun highlighted several common themes, including opposition to Taiwan independence, support for the 1992 Consensus, shared history and Chinese heritage, that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, the importance of China’s national rejuvenation, and the need to preserve peace and promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

To discuss this historic meeting, I’m joined by Amanda Hsiao. Amanda is a director in Eurasia Group's China practice covering China's foreign policy and cross-strait relations. This episode was recorded on April 10, 2026.

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[00:00] Introduction  

On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most. 

How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? To discuss these issues, we are joined today by Dr. Erica Downs. Erica is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Her research focuses on Chinese energy markets and geopolitics, and she has published extensively on the subject.

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[00:00] Introduction 

President Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2 for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will mark the first meeting between the two leaders since they agreed to a trade truce last October that ended months of escalating tensions prompted by tariffs imposed by the United States and Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will meet Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris later this week to explore possible outcomes that could be announced during the Beijing summit. Planning for such a major summit usually takes place over several months, and is getting underway quite late, causing many observers to question whether anything meaningful can be achieved.

In the meantime, the US is distracted by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East between Iran and a US-Israel coalition. To discuss the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, we're joined today by Dr. Da Wei. He is director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and professor of International Relations at Qinghua University.

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[00:00] Introduction

The United States is once again considering military strikes to curb Iran’s nuclear activities and missile program. China has emerged as a particularly important partner of Iran, serving as the country’s largest trade partner and one of its few sources of consistent diplomatic backing. For Beijing, the stakes in the relationship extend beyond energy security, but also include great power competition with the US and China’s broader strategic ambitions in the Middle East. There are reports that Iran is close to finalizing a deal to purchase supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China. 

To unpack China-Iran relations and these recent dynamics, we are joined today by Jonathan Fulton. Jonathan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. His research focuses on China-GCC relations, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese foreign policy. 

This episode was recorded on February 26, 2026.  

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[00:00] Introduction  

Today’s episode is the third in a series of three that examine the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. The report is titled, “If China Attacks Taiwan” and it is posted on GMFUS.org.  Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for the Chinese economy.

To recap, the study considered two scenarios that could take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalates into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military are killed, U.S. intervention eventually forces China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalates into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces are degraded and eventually withdraw after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.

Our guests today are Charlie Vest and Logan Wright, who co-authored the chapter on the implications for the Chinese economy of a failed operation against Taiwan. Logan is a partner at Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s work on China’s economy and its global impact. Charlie is an associate director at Rhodium Group, where he manages corporate research and advisory work on China.

Timestamps:

[00:00] Introduction
[02:34] Key Takeaways: China’s Ambitions vs. Economic Realities 
[05:41] The Escalation Dilemma in China's Decisionmaking
[09:56] Immediate Disruptions to Trade and FDI
[13:52] Gray-Zone Military Engagement and Political Pressures
[16:48] Could Beijing Underestimate the Costs of US Intervention? 
[24:12] Policy Tools and Limitations for Economic Stabilization and Recovery
[27:19] Long-Term Economic Effects
[29:24] Impact of Social Instability

Today’s episode is the second in a three-part series that examines the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for domestic social stability. 

To recap, the study considered two scenarios occurring in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also US forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. 

Joining us today are Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi. Sheena is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and visiting research faculty at the US Army War College. Jake is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Timestamps: 
[00:00] Introduction  
[02:11] Why This Matters to US Policymakers 
[04:37] Managing Social Stability During Conflict with Taiwan  
[08:01] How the CCP Identifies and Suppresses Sources of Instability
[10:44] Social Stability Organizations and Institutions  
[15:06] Domestic Pressures & Potential Party Responses 
[19:00] Estimating Public Support for Reunification 
[23:09] Scenario 3: Protracted Conventional Conflict 
[26:55] Lessons Learned from COVID Lockdowns 
[31:28] Long-Term Implications for Stability Post-Conflict