Today’s episode is the second in a three-part series that examines the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for domestic social stability. 

To recap, the study considered two scenarios occurring in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also US forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. 

Joining us today are Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi. Sheena is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and visiting research faculty at the US Army War College. Jake is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Timestamps: 
[00:00] Introduction  
[02:11] Why This Matters to US Policymakers 
[04:37] Managing Social Stability During Conflict with Taiwan  
[08:01] How the CCP Identifies and Suppresses Sources of Instability
[10:44] Social Stability Organizations and Institutions  
[15:06] Domestic Pressures & Potential Party Responses 
[19:00] Estimating Public Support for Reunification 
[23:09] Scenario 3: Protracted Conventional Conflict 
[26:55] Lessons Learned from COVID Lockdowns 
[31:28] Long-Term Implications for Stability Post-Conflict 

Concern about the possibility of a Chinese attack against Taiwan has surged in recent years. Wargames and research studies have focused primarily on identifying gaps in US and allied capabilities with the goal of strengthening deterrence. A relatively understudied question, however, is the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. To address this gap, the German Marshall Fund led a study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs.

GMF commissioned four papers on these key areas. We considered two scenarios that could realistically take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.

The authors found that the costs to China of a failed military action against Taiwan would likely be considerable. We believe their findings are important and warrant wide dissemination. In this podcast, we’ll discuss the report’s major conclusions and implications. Then we’ll talk about the potential impact of a failed Chinese attempt to take Taiwan on China’s military capabilities and the possible international costs that Beijing could face.  Our next two China Global podcasts will examine the implications of a failed military operation against Taiwan for China’s economy and social stability.

Our guests today are Zack Cooper and Joel Wuthnow. Zack is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and lecturer at Princeton University.  Joel is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Joel’s paper and this interview reflect only his personal views and not those of the National Defense University, the Department of War, or the US government.

Timestamps: 
[00:00] Introduction  
[03:22] Implications for China, the United States, and Taiwan 
[06:31] Actions to Strengthen Deterrence  
[08:50] Evaluating Costs and Risks for Chinese Decisionmakers
[11:46] Lessons Learned for the PLA 
[14:05] Steps to Avoid Another Attack 
[17:14] Intensifying Frictions between Party and Military?  
[19:53] Anticipating US Intervention as a Military Variable 
[22:49] Countries and Organizations Likely to Respond to China
[25:55] Potential Diplomatic Actions and Costs
[31:50] A Treaty Alliance with Taiwan 
[34:44] Why International Costs Matter to China

Although geographically distant from Chinese shores, Latin America and the Caribbean occupy an important place in Chinese foreign policy. In the past decade, China has significantly expanded its influence in the region. The main vector of Chinese involvement has been economic, including securing access to commodities such as soybeans, copper, oil, and lithium, creating markets for Chinese companies, and deepening financial ties through trade, lending, and infrastructure investment.  

On December 10, China released a new white paper on its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, the third such document following earlier editions in 2008 and 2016. The White Paper characterizes the region as “an essential force in the process toward a multipolar world and economic globalization.” Its release came on the heels of the Trump Administration’s release of its National Security Strategy, which places unprecedented emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and asserts that the US seeks a region “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” highlighting the growing strategic salience of Latin America and the Caribbean in US-China competition.  

To discuss the new White Paper and the implications of China’s policies in the LAC for the United States and US-China relations, we are joined by Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr. Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. He previously served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as international narcotics and law enforcement issues.

Timestamps:
[00:00] Introduction
[02:07] US and China on a Collision Course? 
[04:50] Chinese Priorities in Latin America 
[08:33] U.S. Security Risks from Chinese Port Investments
[11:45] How China Uses CELAC to Advance Its Agenda
[14:27] How Latin Americans View China’s Growing Presence
[17:22] Honduras and the Republic of China
[21:22] How Beijing Might Address U.S. Concerns 
[25:09] China's Reaction to US and Venezuela 
 

Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan’s survival. Under Japan's 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan's self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister’s head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate?

Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

Timestamps:
[00:00] Introduction
[02:07] The State of China-Japan Relations Pre-Dispute
[02:49] Beijing’s Reaction and Intended Audience
[05:42] Continuity in Takaichi’s Stance 
[10:31] Why a Chinese Takeover of Taiwan is Existential to Japan 
[13:03] China’s Signals and Restraint
[16:30] Recommendations for De-escalation
[19:18] Senkaku Islands Dispute in Connection to Taiwan Dispute
[22:04] Beijing’s Potential Claims on Okinawa
[24:23] View in Japan of the US Reaction
[26:36] Takaichi’s Support in Japan

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2025 annual report to Congress. The annual report’s analysis and recommendations are a crucial source of information for Congress, the executive branch, and observers of US-China relations. This year’s report includes 28 key recommendations for Congress.  

On this episode of China Global, we have two Commissioners joining us to discuss the report, Commissioner Aaron Friedberg and Commissioner Mike Kuiken. Commissioner Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-director of its Center for International Security Studies. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, counselor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and previously served as Vice President Dick Cheney’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Commissioner Kuiken is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution and advisor to the Special Competitive Studies Project. He has over 20 years of experience shaping US national security policy, including 12 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

Timestamps:
[00:00] Intro
[1:47] China’s Role in the Axis of Autocracy
[03:22] Best Response from US and Allies?
[05:23] The Interlocking Innovation Flywheels Effect
[07:47] Made in China 2025 Plan: 10 Years Later
[10:25] Why Does Chinese Dominance Matter?  
[12:39] Policy Prescriptions for the US
[16:24] Lessons Learned from China Shock 1.0 and Preparing for 2.0
[21:09] Bipartisan Political Will on China Policy
[24:06] Taiwan as a Vital Interest to the US
[28:06] Assuaging Taiwanese Doubts in Congress
[30:17] Taiwan’s Defense Spending Debate  

On October 30, US President Trump and China’s leader Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea. It was their first face-to-face meeting in 6 years. There was a lot at stake in this meeting for the US and China, as well as for the rest of the world. In my view, the outcome is best described as a fragile truce. The path forward for US-China relations remains uncertain – greater stability and predictability is possible, but not assured. Intense competition across several domains, especially technology, is likely.

Today’s episode focuses on the Trump-Xi summit and the future of US-China relations, featuring Mr. Dennis Wilder. Dennis is a senior fellow for the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University, where he previously served as the managing director, and assistant professor of the practice in Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service. He served on President George W. Bush’s NSC first as director for China and then as senior director for Asian Affairs. He also had a distinguished career in the CIA, where he held many positions, the last of which was senior editor of the Presidential Daily Brief. 

Timestamps:

[00:00] Introduction
[1:57] Trump-Xi Summit: A Win for China? 
[09:03] Fact Sheet Discrepancies 
[14:37] Trump Administration’s China Strategy
[16:47] Achieving Chinese Exceptionalism
[19:20] China’s Confidence and Potential Instability
[21:26] Why No Taiwan Mention? 
[24:48] An Inflection Point for Greater Stability? 
[27:50] Indo-Pacific View of the US-China Relationship

From October 20-23, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum in Beijing, marking an important moment as the Party sets the direction for China’s development for the next five years. The session adopted recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, endorsing Xi Jinping’s goals of high-quality development, scientific and technological self-reliance, and strengthening national security in response to rising global instabilities. The Central Committee also announced the replacement of 11 members, the highest personnel turnover since 2017 amid an ongoing anti-corruption purge in the military. 

To discuss the plenum’s outcomes, we are joined by Jonathan Czin. Jonathan is a leading expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy. He holds the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and is a fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He previously led the intelligence community’s analysis of Chinese politics and policy making at the CIA and also spent two years as director for China at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.  

Timestamps:  
[00:00] Start  
[01:36] Why the Fourth Plenum Matters  
[03:37] Key Takeaways: Policy Continuity and Political Purges  
[05:07] Zhang Shengmin and Xi Jinping’s Military Ambitions  
[09:23] Signals and Adjustments in Economic Planning  
[11:56] Previewing the 15th Five-Year Plan  
[13:33] Xi Jinping’s Growing Confidence  
[17:42] Political Messaging and Choreography  
[20:21] Language in the Communique: “Strategic Resolve”  
[22:28] What to Expect from the Xi-Trump Summit  
[26:38] Is Beijing Worried the Summit Could Backfire? 

China’s ties with Southeast Asia states are increasingly consequential for regional stability and global geopolitics. Over the past two decades, China has become the region’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment and infrastructure financing. At the same time, China growing military presence and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have caused anxiety and have prompted a number of Southeast Asian nations to seek closer security ties with the United States and other partners.  

The Trump administration’s policies of imposing tariffs, reducing foreign assistance, and implementing stricter immigration regulations have begun to erode US influence across the region, further encouraging Southeast Asian countries to rely on each other and to diversify their relationships with external partners.    

To discuss Beijing’s evolving approach to Southeast Asia and the efficacy of its policies, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Chong Ja Ian. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident fellow at Carnegie China. Ian’s research focuses on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and US-China relations. 

Timestamps
[00:00] Intro
[01:50] China’s Tools and Objectives in SEA
[03:02] Economic Relations with SEA
[05:52] Success and Failures of Beijing’s SEA Strategy
[07:47] Regional Media and Influence
[11:40] SEA Views on China: Consensus and Discord
[14:55] Regional Strategy Post-Trump
[18:22] SEA Reactions to China Taking Taiwan by Force
[22:40] Crisis Planning and How it Could Change
[24:10] Long-Term Outlooks for China-SEA Relations 

In mid-September, while many China watchers were focused on the Xiangshan Forum, the Chinese military’s annual high-level security and defense convening in Beijing, another major annual meeting was being held by the Ministry of Public Security in the Chinese city of Lianyungang (2-2-3). The Lianyungang Forum dates to 2015 but was upgraded and renamed the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in 2022 following Xi Jinping’s launch of the Global Security Initiative. This year it was attended by 2,000 participants from 120 countries, regions and international organizations. The theme was “Shaping Global Public Security Together: United Action to Tackle Diverse Threats.”  As Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong made clear in his opening speech, China is advancing an alternative to the western-led security order. 

Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is a leading expert on Beijing’s push to reshape the global security order and promote China as a model and global security provider to developing countries. Sheena is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, and a visiting associate professor of research in Indo-Pacific security at the China Landpower Studies Center of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Relevant to this episode’s discussion, Sheena recently published a co-authored report for the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace Carnegie titled “A New World Cop.” 

Timestamps:  
[00:00] Start 
[02:30] The Global Security Initiative and Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy 
[05:22] Outcomes of the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum  
[08:50] What Do Participant Countries Gain?  
[12:23] How Do Recipient Countries Use Chinese Technologies?  
[16:12] Countries Rejecting China's Surveillance Technologies  
[21:49] China’s Rewriting of Global Norms 
[28:18] Potential Policy Responses to the GSI 

Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People’s Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China’s efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people’s struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China’s top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. 

What are Beijing’s interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama’s passing? I’m delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled Beijing’s Dangerous Game in Tibet”.

Timestamps

[00:00] Start 
[02:08] Beijing’s Key Interests in Tibet 
[04:06] Xi Jinping’s Approach to Tibet 
[07:00] Internal and External Drivers of Tibet Policy 
[08:08] Xi’s Recent Visit to Tibet 
[11:34] Infrastructure Developments and Expansionism  
[15:27] Beijing’s Succession Plans and Tibetan Reactions to a Future Dalai Lama 
[20:27] Risk of Unrest and Crackdowns 
[25:43] Implications for Neighboring States