China Global

In today's episode, we'll examine the state of EU-China trade relations after a pivotal few weeks that may shape how Europe deals with China for years to come.

Europe's trade deficit in goods with China reached roughly 360 billion euros last year, nearly a billion euros a day, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called the imbalance structural and unsustainable. Against that backdrop, three events stand out. On October 5, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent a joint letter to von der Leyen urging a tougher response, including a rapid-action trade instrument. It was a striking shift for a Germany that has long been wary of confrontation with Beijing. On October 8 and 9, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao held trade talks in Beijing that produced 16 outcomes, including an understanding to curb Chinese exports of hybrid vehicles through a 350,000-vehicle annual quota. And on October 15 and 16, EU leaders met in Brussels to decide what comes next.

Is the hybrid deal a genuine breakthrough or a pressure-release valve? Does it do enough to prevent a second "China Shock," or will Chinese carmakers simply build in Europe instead? Could tools like the EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument, or its proposed faster successor, ever be used against China? And how will relations between Beijing and Brussels likely develop going forward. I am joined today by Finbarr Bermingham, Chief Europe Correspondent at the South China Morning Post, who specializes in geopolitics, geoeconomics and EU-China relations. He has spent the last five years reporting from Brussels and around Europe on rising bilateral tensions, Europe's place in the shifting world order, diplomacy, trade, and EU politics.

Timestamps:
[00:00] Introduction
[02:26] Outcomes of the Agreement  
[04:46] Trading Import Volume for Localization?  
[08:20] "Made in Europe" for Chinese Hybrids
[09:16] Unilateral Actions and Ultimatums
[13:16] A Kill Switch for Unfair Trade Practices
[19:32] Measuring EU Unity and Fear of Retaliation
[25:12] Beijing’s Hardline Signals – A Shift to Accommodation?
[29:13] On Transatlantic Coordination
[31:23] What to Watch for a Durable Rebalancing

In today's episode, we'll examine China’s ambitions in the Arctic and the growing importance of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region. 

The Arctic is undergoing profound change. Climate change is reducing sea ice coverage, creating new opportunities for shipping, resource extraction, infrastructure development, and military activity. Russia views the Arctic as central to its economic future and national security. China doesn’t border the Arctic, but it is a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and has increasingly sought a role in Arctic governance, scientific research, shipping, and energy development. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has transformed Moscow's relationships with both Western countries and Beijing, raising new questions about the future of Arctic cooperation and competition. 

How aligned are Chinese and Russian interests in the region? What are the prospects for commercial development along the Northern Sea Route and elsewhere in the Arctic? And what challenges and opportunities do these developments present for the United States and its allies? 

To help us understand these issues, we're joined by Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist in China Studies at CNA and Distinguished Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. She is one of the leading experts on China's Arctic policy, Sino-Russian relations, and the geopolitical implications of a changing Arctic.

Timestamps: 
[00:00] Introduction 
[01:49] How China’s Interests in the Arctic Have Evolved  
[05:04] Which Arctic Actors are Receptive to a Larger Chinese Role?  
[08:19] Unpacking China-Russia Cooperation 
[13:33] Russian Invasion of Ukraine Impact on Chinese Involvement 
[15:32] Benefitting from Northern Sea Route 
[19:40] Arctic Energy Cooperation 
[22:47] How US Asian Partners View Arctic Security and Governance
[24:51] Shifting US Policies and Priorities in the Arctic 
[26:04] What to Watch in the Arctic 

Expectations for the 3rd Trump-Xi summit since Trump returned to power were modest, and the meeting delivered limited concrete outcomes: a two-month extension of the trade war truce, lower tariffs on some US and Chinese goods, an agreement to talk more about AI risks, two pandas for the Atlanta zoo, and a potential MOU between the US and Chinese militaries on crisis prevention and management. 

As I wrote in an analysis of the summit, Xi Jinping came away with a larger diplomatic and strategic win. He was greeted personally by President Trump upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base and hosted for a lavish White House dinner. Those optics can be displayed to the domestic Chinese audience as evidence that China is now a peer of the United States, and its leader Xi is a peer of the US president, Donald Trump. 

Summits are rare opportunities to advance policy agendas, and this meeting fell short. The two leaders reportedly talked for about 90 minutes with consecutive interpretation. In my view, the leaders of the world’s two largest economies failed to seize the opportunity to discuss how to address bilateral, regional and global challenges: AI risks, technology competition, Taiwan, China’s rare earth exports, and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The result was a summit that preserved the fragile stability in the US-China relationship without addressing the broader challenges that make it so consequential. 

On today’s episode, we’ll talk to a renowned Chinese scholar about his perspective on the summit and where U.S.-China relations may be headed next. I'm pleased to welcome Dr. Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and one of China's leading scholars on U.S.-China relations. 

Timestamps:  

[00:00] Introduction 
[02:32] Competing Views of a New Framework 
[05:19] Will a Warm Reception Lead to Changes in Chinese Policy?
[10:18] Will the Fourth Period Effort Last? 
[14:02] Barriers to Bilateral Dialogue 
[18:07] Comparing the U.S. and Chinese Readouts 
[21:24] Beijing’s View of a Military-to-Military MOU 
[25:41] Greater Chinese Confidence = Greater Restraint 
[31:17] Trump and Xi on Taiwan 
[36:58] Lai Ching-te and Cross Strait Integration 
[40:20] What Can Be Achieved In Between 

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Chinese foreign policy has become significantly more assertive. More than a decade ago, Xi moved away from Deng Xiaoping's approach of "hiding capabilities and biding time" and embraced what he calls “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.” Since then, China has adopted a more assertive presence on the world stage, placed greater emphasis on relations with the Global South, taken a tougher approach toward Taiwan, and reorganized its foreign policy apparatus around Xi’s personal leadership and priorities. 

Understanding this transformation – and more fundamentally, understanding what Beijing wants – has become a central question for China-watchers and policy makers. What are China’s ambitions as it emerges as a global superpower? 

A new book offers an answer that differs in important ways from many previous analyses. The book is titled “China's Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping.”  Its co-authors are Steve Tsang, Professor of China Studies and Director of the China Institute of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and Olivia Cheung, a Lecturer in Politics at King’s College London. On this episode, we have Steve Tsang with us today to discuss the book, his assessment of China’s global ambitions under Xi Jinping, and what those ambitions mean for policymakers.   

Timestamps: 

[00:00] Introduction 
[01:52] A Sinocentric Party-State Realist Analytical Framework  
[07:14] Tianxia in Chinese Foreign Policy 
[09:45] Xi Jinping’s Growing Ambitions  
[13:42] The Role of the Global South  
[16:59] What Accepting Chinese Preeminence Looks Like  
[19:57] Taiwan and the China Dream  
[25:48] China First Policy as a Hindrance? 
[28:25] Using the Built-In Stop Button

Artificial intelligence is emerging as both a powerful source of competition between the United States and China and an area where the two countries may have a shared interest in reducing risk. Washington and Beijing have sharply different views about technology, national security, and governance, yet they also face some of the same potential dangers from increasingly capable AI systems—from cyberattacks and biological threats to unintended escalation and the loss of human control over critical decisions.  

With U.S.-China talks on AI expected to take place ahead of the Trump-Xi summit later this month, a pressing question is whether the two countries can carve out practical areas of cooperation even as they compete intensely over the technology itself. What could realistically be achieved in those talks, where do American and Chinese concerns about AI risks converge or diverge, and can the two sides keep discussions about risk reduction separate from the broader struggle over technology and export controls? 

To unpack those objectives and what a credible outcome might look like, we are joined by Mark MacCarthy. Mark is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Governance Studies program's Center for Technology Innovation and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches on the governance of emerging technology, AI ethics, and privacy. He is the author of Regulating Digital Industries: How Public Oversight Can Encourage Competition, Protect Privacy, and Ensure Free Speech. He also recently co-authored an article on how the US and China can cooperate to reduce urgent AI risks, which you can find on the Brookings website. 

Timestamps: 

[00:00] Introduction 

Thirty years ago, the People's Republic of China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, Beijing has frequently invoked UNCLOS to support its maritime claims and legal positions, while advancing interpretations of the Convention that many other states –but not all – reject. 

This June the China Institute for Marine Affairs under the Ministry of Natural Resources marked the 30-year anniversary with an extensive report providing Beijing's interpretation of UNCLOS, including its account of the 2016 arbitral award that found China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea as lacking a legal basis under the Convention. 

To examine the PRC’s evolving interpretation of UNCLOS and Chinese maritime activities, and how both are being used to advance Chinese interests, I’m joined today by Dr. Peter Dutton. Peter is a Senior Research Scholar in law and senior fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Previously, he held several positions at the U.S. Naval War College, including as director of the China Maritime Studies Institute. He served in the US Navy for more than 40 years in several capacities, including as a Judge Advocate and naval flight officer.  

Timestamps: 

[00:00] Introduction 

China's growing use of economic power for strategic and political purposes has become one of the defining features of international competition. Beijing is no longer simply using trade and investment to promote economic growth—it is increasingly deploying a sophisticated toolkit of laws, regulations, export controls, market access, infrastructure investment, and technological standards to advance its broader geopolitical objectives.  

In today's episode, we'll explore how China's approach to economic statecraft has evolved, how effective it has been, its impact on Chinese foreign policy – especially relations with the United States -- and what governments around the world can do in response. I'm delighted to be joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, one of the leading experts on Chinese foreign policy, including its use of economic statecraft, to help us unpack these important issues.  

Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He served seven years in President Obama’s NSC first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia.

Timestamps:

In today’s episode, we’ll examine the state of Europe-China relations and the trajectory of the EU’s policy toward China at a pivotal moment.

The EU-China relationship has become increasingly complex and contentious. The growing trade imbalance is among the top priority issues: The EU had a record trade deficit in goods with China of 360 billion Euros last year. China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine also remains a major concern. At the same time, uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship has prompted debate across Europe about strategic autonomy, de-risking, and whether the EU should recalibrate its approach toward Beijing. We'll discuss the outcomes of the recent European Council meeting, debates taking place within Europe, and what we should expect in EU-China relations going forward.

To make sense of where EU policy toward China is headed, we are joined by Noah Barkin, Visiting Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Senior Advisor at Rhodium Group, and author of the fantastic Watching China in Europe newsletter, which you can read on Substack.

Timestamps:

On today’s episode of the China Global Podcast, we’re going to discuss the South China Sea. The past year has been marked by four intersecting dynamics: First, a sharp escalation of Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia operations, especially against the Philippines. Second, a resumption of large-scale Chinese island construction after nearly a decade-long pause; Third, increasingly sophisticated Chinese legal and administrative moves to consolidate and institutionalize its claims; And fourth, a deepening of the US-Philippines military partnership and the emergence of a broader network involving US allies and partners from Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

To discuss these trends, I’m delighted to have as my guest today, Dr. Collin Koh, who is a senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies based in Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Timestamps:

[00:00] Introduction

Summits between US and Chinese leaders are important events. They provide opportunities to discuss sensitive issues, manage friction, and to identify ways to solve problems and promote cooperation where possible. A great deal of preparation usually goes into a US-China summit, involving hundreds of phone calls, virtual, and in-person meetings between US and Chinese officials.  

The May 14-15 summit in Beijing was atypical, perhaps not surprisingly since Donald Trump is a very atypical president. Today we are going to talk about the summit – the process and well as the outcomes and the implications for the US-China relationship and American interests. 

Joining us today to talk about these issues is Sarah Beran. Sarah Beran was senior director for China and Taiwan affairs in the National Security Council during the Biden administration from 2022 to 2024. She was subsequently deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Beijing. At the NSC, she led strategic preparations for multiple summits between President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. After her 23 years in government service, Sarah joined Macro Advisory Partners.  

Timestamps: