In this episode, Antulio J. Echevarria II discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Can NATO increase the risks and costs of war for an adversary without unduly raising the alliance’s own? Can the alliance strengthen the credibility of NATO’s extended deterrence through a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war”? 

Keywords: risk-benefit models, cost-benefit models, military risk, political risk, Russian deterrence, risk aversion, self-deterrence, deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, proxy warfare

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m in the studio with Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II.

Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College and the editor in chief of the US Army War College Press, which includes Parameters. He’s held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy.

He’s the author of Weaponizing Risk: Calibrating Western Deterrence, which was published by the US Army War College Press in July 2025.

Welcome to Conversations on Strategy, Dr. Echevarria.

Antulio J. Echevarria II

Thank you. I’m pleased to be here.

Host

I’d like to start with understanding risk in strategic thinking. You introduce the idea of weaponizing risk. Please explain how risk-benefit models differ from traditional cost-benefit approaches.

Echevarria

Traditionally, cost-benefit models are designed to persuade an adversary, an aggressor, [or] potential aggressor, that the costs of a particular action are going to outweigh its benefits. The problem has always been that we don’t necessarily know where the cost ceiling is for that adversary, so we don’t know how far we have to go in order to dissuade them from doing the action we don’t want them to take. And the other problem is we don’t really know how much they value that particular object or piece of territory that they might be after.

We do the best we can with our intelligence analysis, and we develop a model that we hope will work. Where, opposed to risk-based deterrence models, risk-benefit models actually allow us to go right at the heart of what an aggressor regime values most, which is its political survival. So, we step back, look at the calculations and, instead of trying to drive up costs in terms of economics or military materiel destroyed and personnel loss, we look at what about this particular situation will pose a direct threat to the regime and its political survival.

Although every regime has a cost ceiling—Putin, for instance, certainly does, but it may be a lot higher [than we expected], as we have seen in recent times—the Russian cost ceiling is much higher than it is for the West and certainly for Ukraine. So, we need a method to get around just a basic cost-benefit approach. So, the risk-benefit approach does help us do that because we have to answer our own question, which is: Are the costs we are about to impose, or threatening to impose, really going to get at the heart of what the regime actually cares about? If so, how long will it take?

Host

I’m glad you brought up Putin and Russia. You suggest NATO’s support for Ukraine amounts to a form of proxy warfare. How might NATO better leverage this proxy relationship to strengthen its deterrence of Russia?

Echevarria

NATO’s best bet is a strategy of deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment really kind of reinforces the entire dynamic, or cycle, of a cost-benefit model. We already discussed its shortcomings. But deterrence by denial helps us the most because if the regime can’t take that thing that [it] is going after, it can’t conquer Ukraine, for instance, then it puts its political survival at risk because strategic failure is a threat to any political regime, but especially autocratic [ones].

We have a lot of literature on this. So, strategy of denial by strengthening—the language of the day is to “porcupine it up.” So, “porcupining up” Ukraine or Taiwan or another threatened territory—is one way to, I think, increase extended deterrence.

Now, what we want to do is not just impose costs on an invader or an aggressor but actually defeat their attempts to take over that particular country or its administration, its government. It’s all about imposing defeat, and NATO can do that by mobilizing its political might, its industrial might, [and] its military might in terms of hardware. It won’t really have to put troops on the ground, so that’s a benefit. But it can, in a way, fight a war without going to war, so to speak—so, wage war without going to war. And that’s the best of all scenarios. So that’s what I’m arguing.

NATO, in a way, backed into a proxy war situation with this conflict. But, imagine if it had been better prepared, if the infrastructure had been in place already—the material infrastructure as well as human infrastructure—so you could maintain a flow of materiel, you could move right into rapid training scenarios, provide other support, intelligence support, for instance, right at the get go. Had we been able to do that, for instance, we would have strengthened Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and we would have started weakening Russia earlier on and we would have maybe started to push it towards its cost ceiling faster.

Host

Russia invading Ukraine was not a surprise, right? NATO and Europe could have been better prepared in all the ways you just mentioned.

Echevarria

Right. That’s true. It was not a surprise, but it was still a shock in a way because the preparations we had put in place since 2014 were more a line of hybrid warfare. If you look at what the money was invested in, the US and the Europeans gave support to Ukrainians to bring their defense spending on par with Poland’s and Norway’s [and] others who took the Russian threat seriously. But, a lot of the literature, a lot of the analysts, were talking about another wave of hybrid sorts of attacks.

What came as a surprise was this full-scale invasion, basically what we would call today a large-scale combat operation, that we were not really prepared for. And, had we taken deliberate steps early on, I think we would have seen, perhaps, a different outcome. Now, we might not have still deterred Putin because leaders do make poor choices at times, and he might have wanted Ukraine so badly that he had to attack anyway. But, we would have had Ukraine in a better position to defend itself, [which is] the bottom line. And, again, we would have maybe moved Russia towards its cost ceilings faster. I mean, you could do everything right in the deterrence world and still fail to deter a determined aggressor, but everyone knows this, it’s pretty much common knowledge across the field.

Host

Recommendations. What concrete steps could NATO take now to strengthen its credibility with regard to extended deterrence?

Echevarria

Some immediate steps: I think it could revise its strategic concept, for instance, as well as its political guidance for defense planning. If we include more strategy-of-denial language, and we start talking about the kinds of assistance we are going to be prepared to give to Ukraine throughout a run-up to a conflict again, and throughout the conflict, that sends a message to Moscow that it’s not going to be a cakewalk, that maybe they would want to think twice about this before launching into it.

The other thing we can do—and should do—is to revise the operational documents that NATO has, its foundational ones, for example, the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations and the Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. Both of those assume that NATO is the one that’s going to be doing the fighting. That is not necessarily the case. We may be aiding someone else who’s doing the basic fighting. So, we should begin to talk about how we would do that more efficiently moving forward. We should work those kinds of scenarios into our general defense plans, we should war-game out in advance different alternatives, and so on, [including] courses of action. We should do all of those things. We can do those concretely right now. Those are my recommendations for immediate steps.

Host

Thank you for making time to speak with me today, Dr. Echevarria. It’s always a pleasure when I get to chat with you.

Echevarria

My pleasure.

Host

Listeners, you can read the monograph at press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/981. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode of Conversations on Strategy, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews select authors of The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence: The Next Stage of Terrorism and Warfare, a book written in partnership with NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). The authors discuss their respective chapters, which include topics such as how terrorists use large language models, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) as a weapon, and the future of AI use in terrorism and counterterrorism.

Keywords: AI, artificial intelligence, terrorism, counterterrorism, large language models (LLM), technology, security, privacy, ethics

Brennan Deveraux (Host)

You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m your host, Major Brennan Deveraux. Today we’ll be talking about the newly released book, The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence: The Next Stage of Terrorism and Warfare. I’m joined today by some of the book’s authors, and we’ll be exploring some of the findings and broader implications of the analysis. I have five guests with me.

The first is Dr. Tony Pfaff, the director of the Strategic Studies Institute. He was the project director and contributing author to the book. The second is Dr. Sarah Lohman, a University of Washington Information School faculty member and Army Cyber Institute visiting researcher. Her chapter of the book is entitled “National Security Impacts of Artificial Intelligence and Large Language Models.” The third is Dr. Gábor Nyáry. He’s a research professor at the National Public Service University in Hungary. His chapter was entitled “The Coming of the Techno-Terrorist Enterprise: Artificial Intelligence and the Tactical, Organizational, and Conceptual Transformation [of] the World of Violent Non-State Actors.” The fourth is Dr. Thomas Spahr, the [Francis W.] De Serio Chair of Theater and Strategic [Strategic and Theater] Intelligence at the US Army War College. His chapter is entitled “Raven Sentry: Employing AI for Indications and Warnings in Afghanistan.” Finally, Colonel Christopher Lowrance [is] an associate professor in the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department at the US Military Academy. He coauthored a chapter with Dr. Pfaff entitled “Using Artificial Intelligence to Disrupt Terrorist Operations.”

For my first question, Dr. Pfaff, I’d like to look to you. If you could tell us about the project as a whole, talk a little bit about the relationship between the Strategic Studies Institute and NATO that led to this project and just a little bit about bringing the team together.

Tony Pfaff

Thanks for that question. This project was a yearlong collaboration between us here at the Strategic Studies Institute and the NATO Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). The intent was to explore how emerging artificial intelligence technologies are capable of—or have the potential to—transform both terrorist operations and, by extension, counterterrorism strategies. The COE-DAT initiated the project with the aim of not simply [performing] an academic exercise but producing actual insights for NATO, partner nations, [and] anyone involved in the counterterrorist enterprise.

As the lead editor and project manager, we built [an] extremely competent and interesting multinational team of experts, who came from a variety of backgrounds, bringing together academic researchers, military practitioners, legal scholars, and so on. And, everyone brought in their own unique lens, whether it was technology, law, strategy, or on-the-ground experience, which, I think, makes this volume somewhat unique and, when taken as a whole, [it] provides a fairly comprehensive picture particularly useful to practitioners and policymakers on how terrorism might evolve, given these technologies, and what we can do about it.

Moreover, while I wouldn’t consider the book technical in nature exactly, we did try to ensure there’s enough information about how the technology works to demystify it so that practitioners could more easily assimilate its findings into what they were doing. [This] joint effort was not only about researching on the weaponization of AI by terrorists, I think it also—kind of going to the last part of your question on bringing the team together—has been [part of] a series of projects we’ve worked [on] with the COE-DAT that has strengthened our institutional relationships between us and our NATO partners and, hopefully, is fostering a deeper dialogue between the community of scholars and practitioners that we hope to connect through this volume.

Host

Thanks for the big overview, sir. If we could transition now to the chapters, Dr. Lohman, I’ll look to you first.

Your chapter was on the impact of artificial intelligence on large language models (LLM), and you talked about some vulnerabilities and the potential for exploitation. Can you talk to us a little bit about the threat, what it could mean to the Defense Department, and how large language models could work [and] maybe even provide an example without getting overly technical?

Sarah Lohmann

Sure, thanks so much for having me.

What we know, Brennan, is that large language models and their platforms are being used by terrorists for hate speech and recruitment, impersonation, and also creating malicious code for cybercrime. And I just want to back up here a second and define that LLMs are actually a subset of generative AI, which most of us are familiar with due to ChatGPT. It basically uses that natural language processing to understand and generate human-like language outputs.

But, when you look at the most recent studies and a lot of what’s going on in the world in terms of how terrorists are using those large language models, we saw evidence in interviews with tech and software companies based on hundreds and hundreds of pages gathered up by the House of Lords that showed that these kinds of threats, including inciting terror, are going to continue to increase through 2027.

But actually, what keeps us up the most at night is how those models can be used to attack critical infrastructure or military and civilian logistics in order to facilitate their own terrorist operations. The study actually showed that catastrophic risk, which could cause, for example, 1,000 fatalities or damages close to $13 billion, are less likely till 2027, but can’t be ruled out.

One example of an LLM failure linked to services, which could be catastrophic, is, for example, water purification or electricity turning on that could trigger an outage across critical national infrastructure if the LLMs were not properly segmented from their operating systems, or if those systems were not cyber secured. An especially sensitive issue for the military could be if LLMs linked to a port or a train system, aviation, or manifest, for example, were hacked. So, LLMs are incorporated into those infrastructures specifically to update those systems in real time. That’s why we have them there. They make our lives easier. They help us reroute planes if there’s bad weather or they help us update the weight of a train load. They help us sync which cargo has been shipped from a port or what materials are needing to be transported from one base to another.

I just want to give you one specific example. Let’s just take the example of a military manifest. One of the top 10 vulnerabilities for LLM applications is called prompt injection. Basically, that essentially manipulates the system and responds to the prompts with malicious inputs that overwrite those system prompts.

I want to give you an example of how one of my students, Chris Beckman, was able to do this LLM demonstration to illustrate prompt and reverse prompt injection to show the dangers. Now, you don’t have to be a specialist to understand this. You have to imagine a military manifest could be directing a truck to deliver petroleum to a specific base, but a hacker could change the contents of the truck to explosives by responding to the LLM prompt that they are the admin. Now, this is obviously not something that any of us could do, but he was able to demonstrate it by going in and training those prompts differently. They can then change the destination of the truck with reverse prompt injection by running code remotely and accessing a plug-in to that with the result being that the truck is now delivering explosives to, for example, terrorists in the nation’s capital.

Those are difficult attacks to prevent, which is why it’s always critical that LLMs be segmented from their critical infrastructure operating systems and only be given access by authorized users.

Host

That’s great and rather terrifying.

Lohmann

Yes, indeed.

Host

So, your lens is very much on terrorism, and [how] we think about defending ourselves and somehow addressing these threats. Can you talk a little bit about the potential implications of this beyond terrorism as we look at great-power competition, even actual conflict with a nation that’s much more capable than, say, a terrorist or non-state actor at manipulating these LLMs? And, is this potentially something we should be looking at not just defensively but as we look at warfare extending beyond our conventional domains? As we talk about cyber soldiers and artificial intelligence, is this something that you see as being an aspect of a future war?

Lohmann

Absolutely, and it already is. We already know that Microsoft and OpenAI, the inventor of ChatGPT, have announced that countries like Iran and North Korea, Russia, and also China are using generative AI for offensive cyber operations. Specifically, those countries used LLMs for early stage attacks to compromise networks and to conduct influence operations. But, in the contested or competitive environment that you’re talking about, Brennan, where you have NATO adversaries [that] have ownership of ports or of a major supply chain process, or they may be renting satellites, or they may be performing contract work for shipping. In that case, the LLM can be poisoned to open an additional vector of attack for adversaries to weaken military strength, and they can do this, specifically, by hacking the water purification large language model, for example, so that those troops are supplied with polluted water or [by hacking] another LLM in the supply chain so that troops do not receive their supplies on time. Or, they could have their navigation tools be spoofed or taken offline. This, in turn, can weaken our power to project or interrupt a mission.

Host

Well, that’s fascinating. It really makes you think about the technology not just for what it can do, but how much we [have] become reliant on it.

If I could transition to Dr. Nyáry, your chapter looked at what you call the techno-terrorist enterprise—so, not necessarily what terrorists are able to do with artificial intelligence, but how having the tool of artificial intelligence, and tools like it, are able to shift, kind of, how operations are done in a broader sense and what you call a “revolution in terrorism affairs.” Can you talk to us a little bit about them?

Gábor Nyáry

Thank you, Brennan, for having me.

You know, my idea was very simple, and it came from an ancient article I read two years ago. It was something very funny because it was a small article about hackers hacked by other rival hackers. And what they [revealed] was something both funny and very frightening—very threatening. It was a big Russian cybercriminal group and tens of thousands of their internal documents had been published. And, it became clear that they were–and they are–organized like a big techno company like Microsoft. They have their own HR (human resources) department. They are planning how employees can go to vacation. They are really just like big companies. I said that it was at the same time funny because it was really something very unusual.

But, it was immediately clear, for me, at least, that maybe this is one of the points of the real danger. Because, as Dr. Lohmann has talked about, the usage of artificial intelligence can be considered from different angles.

Using AI by terrorist criminal groups as a weapon, therefore, the tactical use, is obviously the most public, the most well-known. We consider it something very serious, and it is. It’s also a two-sided coin, [when] artificial intelligence [and] LLMs [are] used as weapons. And, artificial intelligence, LLMs, became targets of terrorist attacks. Sara was talking extensively about this later option. This is something very serious. But I was thinking of the following thing: Maybe this is very serious. This will be very serious, but it’s only the tip of the iceberg because when someone can use artificial intelligence on a higher level, on a strategic level, then it [becomes], really, a force of transformation—something that can really transform the usual terrorist groups, terrorist operations, and make them deadly efficient, efficient like big techno companies, and it’s a real possibility.

I was considering two things as the starting point of my reasoning. One was the nature of artificial intelligence. If it’s general technology, then it means that it will be adopted into every segment of our societies or, let’s say, societal operations. The other thing [that] was also important [was] the nature of terrorist organizations. What we know from the experiences of the past, let’s say 50 years, [is] that they are very, very capable, and they are very open-minded. They’re just really quick to adopt technologies, the cutting-edge technologies.

What my hypothesis [was] is that the meeting of this technology with the openness of terrorist organization[s] can make it a real danger on a strategic level. It can transform them into, like, terrorist corporations. They can be really deadly in the network sense as well.

Host

Great. I really liked the kind of shift on perspective, and it made me look at the organizations differently, especially coming as a uniform wearer looking at terrorist organizations through the global [war on terrorism] versus in this business model.

If we extend those ideas to some broader implications, do you think that this business-like structure is going to make it more difficult to hold terrorist organizations accountable, for example, finding leadership, or even just legal justification to engage them, to hold them accountable for actions? And, are there implications of this framework on more deliberate state-sponsored activities as we look at some state-sponsored terrorism or even just gray-zone operations?

Nyáry

Definitely yes.

Everyone who is working in or researching security issues just became aware of a phenomenon which is, let’s say, a blurring of boundaries between civilian, military, [and] [criminals, and terrorist]. My narrower field is cybersecurity, and it’s an absolutely new feature that criminal organizations working in the field of cyber are just making at least a tacit cooperation with state actors. It’s not necessarily based on written agreements, but they are working together very closely. There is a very close cooperation between [states] or state actors and non-state actors, criminals, [and] terrorists. So, I’m quite sure that it will be the case in the usage, the adoption, of artificial intelligence technologies in the hands of malicious actors.

Host

Thank you.

Dr. Spahr, if I could transition over to you. Your chapter really takes this from the theoretical to the actual operational experience, and you talked about using artificial intelligence in Afghanistan for indicators and warnings and, really, as a predictive tool. Can you talk to us a little bit about that chapter, kind of how you used the system, the software that you guys worked [on] and developed, and some of the organizational challenges you came across employing it?

Tom Spahr

Yeah, absolutely, Brennan. Thanks.

Before I start, I want to just build on something that Gabor Nyáry just said. He called it “the tip of the iceberg,” and what I was working on was 2020, right? This was early. And, I would argue it is coming now. It is coming fast. To use the term that Mustafa Suleyman, the CEO of Microsoft AI, quoted, he calls it “the coming wave.” It is coming. It is coming quickly, and, like he said, [it is] the tip of the iceberg.

But what I did—what I was a part of, rather—in 2020, late in Afghanistan, was we built a very simple algorithm to try to help ourselves—as we were getting smaller because we saw the writing on the wall that the US was leaving Afghanistan sometime in the near future—and our Afghan partners, after we left, to try to just become more efficient in their analysis and in their indications and warnings, potentially in their targeting, but, initially, just for indications and warnings. And, what we were trying to do was to help them to detect when an attack on a provincial or district center was likely to come.

We did this using all open-source information, understanding that they didn’t have secret clearances, so we couldn’t use classified intelligence. So, we were looking at things like commercial satellites, which were becoming more and more available; news sources; [and] social media reports. And we built—working with a civilian company, who we contracted through [the] Defense Innovation Unit—a very simple algorithm that we could gather this information together and get it in the right format, which, usually the hardest part was getting the data formatted, and then feed it into the algorithm. And, what it would do is highlight anomalies. We had years and years of histories of attacks on provincial and district centers to train it on, and then, we could feed it current information on it, and it would highlight areas where there was anomalous activity. For example, if the lights were on in a mosque that was historically used at the time of an attack and they were on at 10 o’clock at night, which was not normal, that might trigger the threshold and raise it higher.

We also would look at things as simple as environmental factors. We knew the Taliban didn’t like to attack when it was cold out, right, or when it was too hot. We knew that they generally liked to attack when the illumination was between 40 and 70 percent—not too dark, but not too light, either.

So, we could look at all of those things and, when you put them all together, it’s basically doing analysis like a human would do but just doing it much more efficiently. And then, the more we used it the better it got because it had a machine learning capability. By the time we got this up and running and left the country it was starting to be very useful for some of our analysts—not necessarily telling them an attack was coming but telling them where to look because of some anomalous activity—to focus their analysis, to focus their limited collection [of] resources. And this worked, in my opinion 1) because we had a unique of some people with experience with it [and] 2) we had the motivation. We needed to find a way to become more efficient as we got smaller and as we were handing off to our partners. And then, finally, just the command culture [made a difference]. You know, working for commanders who were willing to take risks, willing to tolerate [risks] and dedicate resources to this was important.

Host

Thank you, and I appreciate you sharing your personal experiences on that. As we look to the future, to your knowledge, has the Army continued experimenting with your organization’s lessons, particularly as we’re shifting away from, or have shifted away from the global [war on terrorism] [and] more towards great-power war, great-power competition, and these near-peer adversaries? And then I’d ask, kind of similar to the other chapters, do you think that there’s a potential applicability beyond terrorism? So, if we look at a conflict like what’s going on with Russia and Ukraine, or a potential future conflict with China, is there an aspect of this predictive nature? To your point, it wasn’t necessarily predicting an attack but helping to prioritize assets. How do you think that would help a command team on the future battlefield?

Spahr

[To answer] your first question, yes, absolutely. We’ve continued to develop this—it’s hard to trace directly, but some of the ideas have certainly influenced the development of some of the command-and-control systems [and] targeting systems, we’re using now (like the Maven Smart System, like the Army’s intelligence data platform) that are using cloud-based technology, looking at large data to try to draw trends to, again, make us more efficient and help us visualize the battlefield better.

Beyond terrorism applicability, absolutely. And, we are building these things out and, I, personally, don’t think we’re going fast enough. I think we need to push harder as we look at the wars in Ukraine and the war in Gaza. Our adversaries and our partners are employing artificial intelligence. It’s clear that they are, and we want to be on the front edge of that so that we can control this potentially dangerous technology. Just like with nuclear weapons, to have a seat at the negotiating table to put governance and controls around them, you gotta have the weapon, [and] you gotta have the capability. I do think it’s important that we continue to push on this. And from the intelligence perspective, which is my specialty, we need AI simply to manage the massive volumes of data in the environment today. With the advent of the Internet, there is so much data available that we simply can’t keep up if we don’t employ an artificial intelligence. I like to say it’s not a luxury anymore. It’s a necessity that we develop these capabilities just to do what we need to do to remain situationally aware and to provide our commanders with the intelligence that they need.

Host

Thank you. [There is a lot] to take in there as we look at that future battlefield. If I could transition now to a counterterrorist lens. Colonel Lowrance and Dr. Pfaff, you two wrote a chapter together about disrupting terrorist activities. Can you talk to me a little bit about how you framed the terrorist attack cycle and then just your perspective on AI for counterterrorism?

Chris Lowrance

Sure, thanks, Brennan. [I] appreciate the question.

One thing Dr. Pfaff and I did is we took an approach of first starting with the typical terrorism cycle process that they go through. It is pretty well-known in the literature that terrorists go through an attack cycle. And so, could we use AI, specifically looking at each stage of these attack [cycles], and then potentially apply it to find patterns within the data that we could potentially collect and tap into with this terrorist cycle? Just to, kind of, give you some examples here: As you know, there’s obviously the ideation kind of motivation stage of, let’s say, terrorist ideation formation. But then, can you potentially promote your own narrative or counternarrative to a terrorist cell? Other triggers might be associated with logistics and deployment, for instance, and could we potentially have AI agents picking up on those types of signatures and recognizing those as flags?

But, this starts to get fairly complex because if you start to look at each stage independently, you’re getting a vast amount of information and data. And so, it’s starting to kind of make sense and put the pieces together across this vast amount of data.

One thing Dr. Pfaff and I proposed is to look at this kind of as a multitiered approach with AI, where AI could be narrowly focused on each stage. So, [think of] more custom AI agents looking for particular flags [or] indications and warnings, if you will, of activity that could be concerning, and then elevating that up a level to another AI agent that’s operating at a, like, I’d say, a meta level that then could look more holistically across all of these potential indications or warnings that we might be receiving of an impending attack to help disrupt that.

Pfaff

Where I’ll pick up on this because, Chris, I think, got the major highlights. But, just to, sort of, help understand how what we were talking about might be applied, in the chapter, we talk about the 217 [2017] Manchester Arena bombing where people had known in advance, including law enforcement, that this individual had expressed extremist views and had done other kinds of acts that could be associated with extremist behavior, but nobody actually connected the dots. Frankly, for humans, when you have a number of the dots, but maybe not all of them, it can be very hard to distinguish between someone expressing their opinion to someone who is actually radicalized and someone who is actually radicalized enough to act on it and commit a terrorist act. As Chris pointed out, the idea here is to use AI to pick up on—using large amounts of data—combinations of behavior that might otherwise seem benign on their own or even in some level of combination, and then, proactively give law enforcement something to investigate, hopefully, in a way to disrupt the attack.

Now, the way I just expressed it should probably scare just about everybody because to get that kind of information and to combine it means collecting a lot of data on a lot of people in ways that are certainly going to raise privacy and other kinds of concerns. If we’re going to go this route with counterterrorism applications, we really do need to confront early on the ethical questions, particularly those associated with surveillance and privacy, in order to ensure that people trust the system because none of this works on the scale that we’re talking about if people in general don’t trust it. For them to trust it, they’re going to have to believe that it’s taking their interests into account and is not going to act in their disinterest unless they are actually in the process of committing (or associated with) terrorist attacks. So, I think that’s another thing that the chapter tried to bring out is [that] this sounds great, the technology certainly is there, but we’ve gotta figure out what the boundaries are.

Lowrance

And just to kind of complement what Dr. Pfaff mentioned there, obviously, there’s this tension between, let’s say, security and privacy, right? Naturally. And so, obviously, you’re going to have potential abilities to have some sensors, some ability to collect data, but then when does that maybe cross a boundary of, let’s say, some kind of overreach that crosses some kind of boundaries with privacy?

But, the other point I want to make here is [about] the multiple modalities of the data. So, we’re talking about information of data that is in text form, potentially, and social media forums. It could be chat channels in social media—that’s voice. It could be a database for purchases of particular types of chemicals, for example, or it could be immigration, customs control, or border enforcement type of, let’s say, data—even cameras, potentially. So, we’re talking about lots of different forms of data.

But, with the progression of AI right now, especially in the form of multimodal generative AI, it really becomes kind of a game changer in the sense of actually sorting out and trying to make sense of all these different modalities of the data. And especially now as we’re starting to see more and more transition from generative AI to agentic AI, these are more independent, more autonomous AI agents.

And then, as Tony mentioned, feed, let’s say, some indications–or triggers or flags–up to a higher level, then you can really have this agent look for these patterns across multiple different modality types of databases and, hopefully, put those pieces together to make sense and give a clear indication of any potential attacks.

Spahr

Brennan, can I chime in on that? Like they were both saying, and coming back to what I was saying, there’s just so much data right now. We can’t keep up if we don’t use AIs. And this question of collecting on the citizens, that’s not really a new question, right? That’s something we’ve been struggling with for years. However, there are new capabilities that make it even more prevalent. What I think the big question, though, is how the human fits into this and that relationship with the AI. [This is] probably a little beyond the scope of this book, perhaps a future project, but [we need to address] the question of human in the loop. Where does the human go? Because there’s so much data, it’s moving so fast [that] the human will not be able to keep up in time, and I think that’s the question that we really need to continue to explore and think about.

Host

I think the ethical rabbit hole can take us down in some really interesting conversations, and I’m also fascinated with where the human fits in. Some of my personal research is looking [at] exactly that, and, I know some other people’s [research] at the War College [is] as well. But one thing, gentlemen, in your chapter that really just popped [out] to me when I was reading it is when you talk about the terrorist narrative. And you do it at two, kind of, parts in the cycle, the first recruiting and the second exploitation. And, it’s the exploitation I’m really interested in.

As we look at the environment, we’re in with viral videos, fake news, deep fakes, [misinformation]/disinformation, what [kinds] of challenges do you think the Western government faces in controlling or influencing this narrative? Is this aspect even feasible in the current environment of distrust in echo chambers?

Lowrance

Thanks, Brennan. I can take the first attempt at this, but great question.

And, I think you’re right. You highlighted the really challenging area of this space right now. When you look at the proliferation of deep fakes, even synthetic audio, AI-generated narratives, it really starts to become overwhelming to a degree. And so, how do you kind of make sense of this? So, I think control is really, really a challenging problem.

However, can you still work to counter a terrorist narrative? Absolutely. Can you promote your own positive narrative that would undermine their type of narrative? Certainly. But again, one thing that Tony and I did in this chapter is kind of look at proposing some ways to, like you said, attack this challenging area. And one popular thing on social media right now is [that there are] a lot of chat room discussions and things like that. And again, going back to the modality of data, can you have AI agents that, obviously, can be powered by a large language model listening and potentially trying to make sense [of discussions]? And, a lot of times I relate this back to [what] the old typical human would do if they were working for a counterterrorist cell for the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], for instance. It takes human intelligence, right? It takes someone listening in, getting tips, getting information, trying to make sense of this.

Now you’re going to be augmented with AI, right? So, now you’re going to have potentially agentic AI agents that can work on behalf of a human agent, a human counterterrorist operator. And so, now that you can really make sense of the noise a little bit better, ideally, with this additional augmentation from these AI agents. But, it does become quite difficult. Going back to [these] kind of ethical boundaries, let’s hypothetically say that you have an AI agent that is trying to infiltrate a cell, right? So, that AI agent has to take on a persona that is one of a terrorist. And so, does that agent potentially start to propagate or promote terrorist ideologies and so on? And so, that would definitely raise a lot of eyebrows, and rightfully so, a lot of ethical questions and boundaries. And so where do you kind of go with that? But then I relate it back to the typical FBI agent. They would take on probably, you know, a terrorist ideology temporarily just to mask themselves and to try to fit in and infiltrate. There’s a lot of challenges in this space. But Tony and I, we alluded in our book chapter some potential ways to tackle it.

Pfaff

I think where I’d pick up is that one of the things that [comes] from terrorist youth online [is] how they’ve gotten very sophisticated at shaping narratives—because they’re not just spreading messages, they’re manipulating perception in real time. They’re getting people to act, even without any other kind of contact, often with viral content designed to inflame and divide. Meanwhile, I’ll go back to [an] earlier point I was making.

Particularly democratic governments are often operating under legal and ethical and normative requirements that sometimes feel constraining but, I would say, they don’t need to be. And I’ll pick up on a point Tom made and disagree. So, I’ll just push back just a little bit. We may have raised the question about the boundaries of surveillance and AI in its use, but I don’t know that we have effectively wrestled with it yet. We’re still using predictive policing algorithms and recidivism algorithms we’ve known to be flawed. Now, as Tom pointed out, it is all about the human–machine teaming aspect of it [because] with those algorithms, we have developed rules to compensate for their flaws. But even that compensation needs to still be examined.

Given the scope and scale of where AI can go, I think there’s still a lot to be done, particularly in the practical and policy side, on ensuring that we have the kind of trust we need to keep it operating and to make it work.

Finally, we talk a lot about how AI can help disrupt extremist propaganda and how AI tools can monitor extremist forums [and] detect content before it spreads widely. But, as we also point out, there’s no magic algorithm for identifying terrorist content on the Internet. In other words, context matters. Machines are not always able to handle the kinds of nuances that humans can. And, what might look like radical content to an algorithm might just be dissent or even satire.

Is it feasible for us to influence the narrative? I think so, but not by trying to control it [because] that’s neither realistic nor desirable. Instead, we need to look at the other side. That’s where I’ll come back to my earlier point. We need to focus on building credibility, working with trusted messengers, and building trust among the public that we are trying to protect in applying this technology.

Host

As we get to transition here, [we are] kind of cutting it close on time. [I] think we’ll move forward. I could have this conversation all day. I found it really fascinating and [there are] definitely some strings to pull on [for] my personal research as I look at not just how neat AI can be but some of those vulnerabilities of the tool and how we can use it going forward, both through a Defense Department lens and a broader lens for just understanding the world.

As I look to the final question, I’d look back to you, Dr. Pfaff. I’d ask you to take off your chapter author hat and put on that project director hat. [Are] there any final thoughts you want to share with our listeners about the book or its broader research implications?

Pfaff

Thanks, Brennan.

I don’t know that I have a lot more to add. I think this discussion has gone really well, and I think it’s illuminated a lot of the issues, concerns, and information that those in the policy community need to have in order to move forward with understanding and implementing AI solutions to terrorist problems. But, it does seem that we are entering a new era of conflict, and as some of this discussion has also illuminated, not all the terms of reference, not all the boundaries have been settled.

And so, as we expand from guns and bombs, so to speak, to algorithms, synthetic media, and misinformation campaigns, terrorists are already experimenting with these tools, and the question is: Are we ready? Now, the book itself doesn’t offer any definitive solutions, but it does lay out a framework for thinking about how to apply AI in ways that are both effective and ethical. It tries to show how AI can disrupt terrorist operations across the range of their planning cycle and also highlight the importance of human oversight, legal boundaries, [and] international cooperation. So, if there was one takeaway, I would say it’s AI implementation and application aren’t just a technical issue, it’s a strategic one. We’ve got a lot of room to build more policy around how we’re going to implement it.

And finally, what I think this project also illuminates is that the way forward is working together across institutions, which sends a powerful message that we are not approaching this problem in isolation but [are] trying to build a shared understanding with shared norms that we can move forward with effectively.

Host

Thanks, sir. As we close out, I would challenge the listeners, if you found this interesting, check out the book. Again, it is titled The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence: The Next Stage of Terrorism and Warfare. It’s free to download on the NATO website, and a link will be included with the podcast [show notes].

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Additional Links: Thomas W. Spahr, “Raven Sentry: Employing AI for Indications and Warnings in Afghanistan,” featured in Parameters 4, no. 2 (Summer 2024) https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss2/9/

In this episode of Conversations on Strategy, Mr. Patrick N. Kelleher and Brigadier General Ronnie D. Anderson Jr. discuss the importance of logistics and readiness. They recommend senior leaders shift their perspective on these topics to keep up with changes in the strategic environment and evolutions in technology. Kelleher and Anderson also discuss the role of resilience for modern logistics and new innovations and their effects on the force.

Keywords: logistics, readiness, strategic environment, senior leaders, resilience, modernization, commercial partners, technology, AI, alliances, sustainment

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m talking with Mr. Patrick N. Kelleher and Brigadier General Ronnie D. Anderson Jr. today.

Kelleher is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Materiel Readiness, where he serves as the principal adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense Sustainment.

Among other notable achievements, he served 24 years on active duty in the Marine Corps.

Anderson is the director of the Contested Logistics Cross-Functional Team at US Army Futures Command. He previously commanded Joint Munitions Command.

Welcome to the show, gentlemen.

Brigadier General Ronnie D. Anderson Jr.

Good morning. Thanks for having us.

Mr. Patrick N. Kelleher

Good morning. Thank you.

Host

Let’s talk about logistics and readiness. Mr. Kelleher, you opened a recent LinkedIn post with the line “logistics is strategy.” Please explain what that means in the context of the current strategic environment.

Kelleher

The current strategic environment is obviously, you know, for those that follow it, very different than an environment in which we have operated for the last 25 or 30 years and more similar to the environment of World War II. And so, I think what that necessitates is the imperative to think about how we approach our strategy a little differently.

In the past, I think we had the latitude to design a strategy and then determine if it was logistically supportable, or simply turn to the logisticians and say, “This is what we’re going to do. Support it.”

I think now our strategy must be predicated on achievable logistics at its foundation. And so, where in the past, maybe, logisticians weren’t as involved as much as we probably should have been in developing a strategy. I think now, logistics should drive the strategy, and we should not even consider any strategic objectives or a campaign plan without first determining logistics feasibility, given the challenges in the environment—which, as I said, [are] very different [from] where many of us have fought in counterinsurgency operations for the last 25 or 30 years. So, at the macro level, that’s how I would describe it.

Host

General Anderson, how do you see that concept playing out on the ground or in Joint planning environments?

Anderson

Thanks.

First, I would say that I believe Mr. Kelleher’s premise, his post, and what he just laid out is absolutely correct, and it’s supported by what we’re seeing in our global military history happening right now. Many nations can project power. We’ve seen Russia in Syria. We see North Korea in Ukraine. China is starting to reach beyond its first island chain. But the United States is the only country on the planet that can project power anywhere on the globe in 12 to 72 hours and sustain that force indefinitely. That is our strategic advantage. But it can also be a strategic challenge, as Mr. Kelleher said.

So, every strategy has to be rooted in supportability. I also believe that that’s why contested logistics today is so important. Our adversaries know that our ability to project and sustain power on the globe is our strategic advantage, and they are rehearsing in the Pacific and across Europe to challenge our strategic advantage.

Host

Mr. Kelleher, you made a reference to World War II and needing to update how we view logistics. Are there any specific misconceptions that you think senior leaders still hold about the role of logistics?

Kelleher

I wouldn’t characterize them necessarily as misunderstandings or misperceptions. Many senior leaders in the Department of Defense, myself included, have served over, you know, the last two or three decades in an environment where we have not been contested, where we have been able to dominate in three domains. Now, we find ourselves challenged in five or six domains, depending on how you want to list out the domains.

And I think that that is a paradigm that, while people nominally acknowledge, you know, in the words that they say, I don’t think has necessarily been internalized because too many senior leaders have been conditioned, frankly, by logisticians, who have never failed, to have an expectation that logistics will not fail. But, because the environment has changed so dramatically, there may be a misperception [about] the fundamental logistics capabilities that we have and the degree to which we will be able to leverage them and the degree to which we have the capacity and capabilities writ large—the depth and resilience—that will be necessary to support the next fight, which are well beyond the depth and resilience that we needed for the last 20 or 30 years, because the environment is so profoundly different.

And I think that’s sort of the cognitive dissonance, if you will, that might exist. Although people talk about the importance of logistics, I’m not sure how much that has been truly internalized, as manifested by the investments that are being made into logistics to compensate for the logistics debt that we have incurred over the last 20 or 30 years.

I mean, I think the good thing is, as you look at where the spending curves are going over the next couple of years, the trend lines are good. They’re getting better. But it’s still, I would argue, not where we need to be to compensate for the deficiencies nor the shortfalls or the compromises, [and] the tradeoffs we have made with logistics capabilities over the last 20 or 30 years.

Host

Can logistics posture alone shape adversary decision making even before conflict begins?

Anderson

I got the pleasure of serving at the CENTCOM (US Central Command) headquarters when [General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.] was the commander there. It was entirely obvious how behaviors in the region changed based on posture. One of the things that I think about now, especially in the context of the Indo-Pacific, is what would happen if we either covertly or overtly deployed THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), PrSM (Precision Strike Missile), long-range hypersonics and then just announced to the world, “Hey, look, we have this capability, and we’ve postured it forward?” Even for an exercise, right? And then we can make a strategic decision at that point to see whether it stays in position or if we bring it home and we just make a show of our ability to deploy something, get it there, demonstrate its potential, and then bring it home. It would be very important, and it would be a great lesson learned for us to observe the insights from our competitors’ behaviors when we do that.

It was completely obvious every time a carrier strike group arrived in the Persian Gulf how our adversaries changed their behaviors. When we demonstrate the ability to respond to a hurricane or a flood or an earthquake in the Middle East, our ability to sustain those things logistically and have boots on the ground in a very short order, it changed the behavior of those people competing and wanting to counter our influence in the region. And that happens in every part of the globe every time we demonstrate that capability.

Host

Turning to readiness, Mr. Kelleher, you’ve said logistics underwrites both readiness and resilience. How are we modernizing sustainment systems to keep pace with current threats?

Kelleher

Readiness equates to our ability to fight and win. Posture is a manifestation of our ability not just to deliver kinetic effects but to endure and continue to deliver kinetic effects. And so, posture is a manifestation of what I’ve written about—the logistics deterrent effect that General Anderson was just referencing. When our adversaries understand that we have the ability to endure, on top of our ability to deliver kinetic effects—to punch them in the face, and then to continue to punch them in the face—over time, as manifested by how we have our capabilities represented by posture throughout the world, I think those are sort of the foundational capabilities as [to] how readiness contributes.

Now, what I would say in terms of systems, maybe we could talk about this from a technological perspective and the application of artificial intelligence to help us make better decisions, the application of artificial intelligence to enable us to be more predictive. But I would also say that we’re rethinking the ecosystem of sustainment in a broader context to equate from a regional perspective—and so, that regional posture, coupled with a more deliberate systemic approach to regional sustainment that incorporates partners and allies; their military and commercial capability; [and] our commercial capabilities, coupled with our posture, coupled with logistics support arrangements that we already have in place with other countries, coupled with things like the state partnership program that the National Guard runs—and so, weaving that together in a logistics ecosystem that builds on posture to enable us to have a system, if you will, to support operations, to support operations from a forward perspective, as opposed to having to bring things back to CONUS [the continental United States].

Anderson

And can I pile on to that with some of the experience that Mr. Kelleher would have had while he was still in uniform? Most of us in uniform can relate to just being able to sustain Afghanistan. In all of the really rocky relationships—the on again off again between the US and Pakistan—there were multiple occasions where, in Central Command and at the highest levels of our government, we would have to plan multiple air routes to get air deliveries into Afghanistan. We had to do the same thing with ground distribution into Afghanistan and out of Afghanistan. So, we developed the Northern Distribution Network that went through the Caucuses. So, the ability to have multiple ports of entry and multiple ports of exit and having a robust distribution network helps us endure wherever we are.

So, we had distribution coming from the United States. We had distribution coming from Europe. We had distribution coming from the Arabian Peninsula. And we’re doing the same thing. It’s very exciting to see these things being built out now in the Pacific, where we, from the homeland, are experimenting with different ports of embarkation on both of our coasts. We’re exercising those. We’re establishing a robust go-to-war capability.

We have invested a lot in our power projection platforms and increasing their capability for air operations, rail operations, [and] road operations. All of those are happening, as well as all of our partners in the Indo-Pacific and INDOPACOM, in all of the investments that they are doing with exercises to test each of our ports [and] to test and improve our airports—or our partner nation airports, I should say—and then forward-building distribution hubs and networks all across the Pacific. Those are the things that are going to build us not only readiness but readiness through resilience, as well.

Host

I’d like to ask you to speak a little bit more about that. How, if you can share any specifics, is resilience built into logistics today?

Anderson

If you have a very fragile supply chain like we saw during COVID-19, where a multitude of extremely important parts, pieces, or components are coming from one chain, that becomes very brittle. It’s like a very, very hard piece of metal that does its job very, very well. It’s sharp, and it is precise and it’s accurate. But when it gets dinged, when a very, very hard piece of metal gets tested and twisted, it can shatter. What we really have to have is a piece of metal that is durable. And that is resilience of supply chains—and that is by having multiple distribution hubs and multiple distribution networks and multiple modes and nodes.

So, in the air, on the sea, across ground, when we get there, leaving from multiple ports and arriving at multiple ports, that is going to be resilience.

Host

Talk to me a little bit about commercial partners. How do we balance organic logistics capacity with the commercial partners aspect?

Kelleher

Obviously, the administration has prioritized reinvigorating the defense industrial base. I like to remind folks that the defense industrial base is comprised of two different aspects—the organic industrial base, which my office is responsible for, and the commercial industrial base. To General Anderson’s point, the investments that we’re making in the commercial industrial base build depth and resilience. We expand the number of suppliers. We have more options to produce things more quickly. And the same is true in the organic industrial base. We now have the opportunity to potentially leverage private capital and forge a closer relationship between organic industrial-base organizations and private equity in ways that we haven’t done before to achieve a mutually beneficial relationship where we can accelerate capability expansion in the organic industrial base, you know, let through capital investment by commercial entities. And so, they get production capacity potentially more quickly because they’re leveraging existing industrial facilities, and we get capability more quickly and at lower cost, possibly because we don’t have to invest in capital equipment.

I think the other aspect is the balance, from a regional perspective, of how we leverage global commercial capabilities, perhaps more effectively. Again, thinking about things regionally, many of our commercial partners operate global networks. Our ability to tap into those global networks, via established partnerships, to think about those partnerships in a different way, to enable a more mutually beneficial supporting relationship in locations outside the United States, is a way to more effectively achieve regional support capabilities and closer ties with commercial partners.

There’s a lot we could talk about in terms of how we leverage and balance commercial capabilities, but I’ll leave it at those two macro thoughts.

Host

I’d like to build on that a little bit and ask about technologies or potential policy shifts that might be moving the needle.

Kelleher

From my perspective, the evolution of technology is going to be foundational. General Anderson is in the middle of driving the Army and the Department to accelerate our adoption of technology. I will tell you, some of the things that we’re doing is incorporating the use of artificial intelligence to leverage the data foundation that the Department has established over the last couple of years in a more effective way. I challenge my team to really operationalize our data by applying artificial intelligence. And so, we are in the process of doing that. We’ve got a couple contracts. And so, we’re going to start looking at departmental level data with new technologies in a way that I don’t think the Department has leveraged data before. The services are doing great stuff, but they are looking, obviously, at service data.

Our ability to leverage technology to look at departmental data will provide more insight into the readiness drivers, the readiness degraders, that are impacting capabilities across the board [and] across multiple services. You know, obviously, our AI will enhance our ability to be more predictive about what we need, what parts we need to order, our demand planning, where and when to put things, [and] how and when to move them.

Our ability to leverage data at echelon will enable commanders to leverage the foundation, again, that we have, but to be more effective in decision making because they have greater visibility into and the tools to access and leverage data via AI. I mean, the good news is those things are underway. I mean, we may be nascent in our application of AI, but the Department has a really good data foundation now, I think, that is really going to enable us to accelerate those capabilities.

Host

General Anderson, I would love to hear, from your command perspective, what innovations are making the biggest difference for war fighters?

Anderson

I will say that in the last couple of weeks, I have got to observe some really exciting capabilities that’s really going to enable the AI in the data use and analytics that Mr. Kelleher just laid out. I think earlier this year in Project Convergence Capstone 5, we worked with the PMs (program managers) so that we were able to get real-time data off of a tank so that we could communicate in real time on the fuel consumption, the ammunition consumption, and when a tank had a maintenance fault that was going to be a problem.

 So, having that data feed commanders in real time, they [the commanders] can shift their focus. They can change their tactical decisions or operational decisions, or at a grand scale, the combatant commander can change the campaign very, very rapidly based on all of this data being aggregated. We also just saw a capability where the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet, a large portion of it down at 1st Armored Division, has been instrumented so that it can collect data in real time. And, as vehicles enter back into their motor pool, data such as the speed of the vehicle during different segments, any maintenance faults—and it would be maintenance faults that our normal manual processes would not be able to see—it  can tell you that a sensor is going bad instead of “hey, this thing is no longer working.” So, those kinds of capabilities across our war-fighting and our sustaining systems are going to provide us better data at the ground level. And as that better, cleaner, more organized, and labeled data gets consolidated and democratized, we will be able to make AI machine-learning-enabled decisions at machine speed from the tactical edge, all the way back through depots and into the supply chains, so that we can continue to improve our readiness on a day-to-day and our readiness in a campaign fight.

Kelleher

So, some of these things, you know, as we adopt new technologies may, may, necessitate policy changes. But, I would offer, for those that are listening, we should view policy as an enabler and not something that is restrictive. I think too often when we are thinking about new technologies, new capabilities, we view policy through a lens of what we can’t do as opposed to what policy can enable us to do. A lot of times I’ll hear people say, “Well, you know, the policy won’t let me do A, B, and C.” But when I ask what volume, what page, what chapter, what paragraph [is holding them back], we tend to lose a degree of specificity.

One of the good things about being at OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) is that between my office and my colleagues here, we own all the policy. And so, when we do encounter, as General Anderson talked about, policy obstacles when they’re trying to do things at the tactical edge, I challenge people to send us what page, what chapter, what line, what paragraph needs to change, and what does it need to be so that we can help you—the folks at the tactical edge—do their jobs more effectively when and if policy is actually an obstacle as opposed to a perceived obstacle.

Anderson

The Army Materiel Command and the Army Headquarters is really doing exactly what you said. So, there are policy constraints about advanced manufacturing repair parts, and they have absolutely gone after improving those policies so that [when we need] a part that has a lead-time of somewhere from six months to two years, we can get that part manufactured through an advanced manufacturing technique, whether that’s machining or 3D printing, and we’re able to qualify those as temporary repair parts so that we can get our piece of equipment back into the fight. And then we will continue to pursue the permanent solution. And, I think the Army has really made huge strides in that in the last 45 days.

Host

Army-specific, it seems like, is coming right along. How are we ensuring these innovations scale across other services?

Kelleher

Between my office and organizations like Industrial Base Policy and Research and Engineering, for things like advanced manufacturing, I mean, we collaborate at our level to identify best practices across the services—you know, things that work based on individual efforts. And then, it’s a deliberate effort to share information across the services. So, when we identify things, or folks like General Anderson’s team identify things that work, as those percolate up through deliberate assessments that we execute, we can then elevate and share those best practices across the Department. And then we can help prioritize them and advocate for resources for the things that work well. And, the flip side is sharing information across the Department for things that don’t work so well. You know, one part of innovation is to try a lot of, but not all of them are going to work. And so, we want to know when things don’t work, as well, so we can share those best practices across the Department. Again, between my colleagues in Research and Engineering and Industrial Base Policy, we are all sort of taking the same focus where we can elevate [and] advocate for things and for resources, particularly.

Anderson

In the requirement space, it is inherent that we have to go to the other services to make sure that if we’re going to develop something that’s going to be a Joint solution that we’re nested. But there are so many experiments going on right now. We’re working with the Marine Corps on a cargo UAS (unmanned aircraft system). We’re working with the Navy on developing an autonomous resupply vessel. The Air Force has taught us a lot about predictive logistics in terms of getting operational data or maintenance data off of a platform. So, all of the services have really been working well together in that space as well.

Kelleher

One of the things that we are pursuing in a deliberate fashion, from our perspective, is policy to enable reciprocity of both the qualification and certification of parts and the qualification and certification of the manufacturing process that produces those parts. And so, when the Army, as General Anderson was talking about, produces a part and approves it for form, fit, function application on a Humvee, other services don’t then have to go through that same approval process because what the Army has done is sufficient.

 And that’s an aspect of policy that we are going to work on to provide that top-down guidance so that we can save time across the Department where we’re not continually reinventing or having to recertify things that services have already done. And, the same would apply for manufacturing processes. So, if I have a process using this material, this machine, these conditions, produces this widget, and the Army says it’s good to go, it should be good to go across the Department, as opposed to each service continuing to have to do their own certification.

Host

Do we want to talk about the role that allies play in integrated sustainment innovation?

Kelleher

We must incorporate partner and ally capabilities—not just logistics, but war-fighting capabilities across the board. There are a lot of different efforts underway to enhance our ability to do co-production, enhance our ability to do co-sustainment, [and] enhance our ability for interoperability of weapons systems and munitions.

 And so, I think there’s a lot of good efforts going on there because there is the general recognition that we cannot do it alone, particularly from, as we think about the logistics perspective, our ability to leverage partner and ally capabilities will be one of the foundational elements, or is one of the foundational elements, of a regional sustainment approach.

Host

We’ve talked a little bit about policy, about innovation. What are the tangible effects of these changes for the men and women on the ground?

Anderson

We’re starting to see the effects on our equipment fleets. And, when our equipment fleets have higher readiness, then our soldiers have better training outcomes. When we have better outcomes, we have more lethal forces that are available to deploy. And we are seeing the effects when we are going into our combat training center rotations in preparation for an operational rotation.

 And, all of those things are really starting to make the decision calculus today look different for a commander as it has in the last, probably six to seven years. So, when a commander is weighing their strength against their determined enemy, they’re able to make decisions with better data, with better foresight of the data and their readiness, and with better-trained soldiers and better ready equipment.

Kelleher

From the Department’s perspective, [I will] weave together a lot of things that we talked about. Depth and resilience in your supply chain, plus capabilities to overcome contested logistics like the distribution network, a robust distribution mesh network that General Anderson talked to, plus posture, enables a regionally oriented sustainment, which then produces readiness at the point of need, which enables maneuver, which, at the end of the day, maneuver enables us to fight and win. And so, I think when you look at the totality of the logistics capabilities that we have talked about, it produces more effectively our ability to fight and win.

 And then, the flip side to that is that ecosystem that I just talked about has a deterrent effect in and of itself, which manifests that our ability to fight and win is, in and of itself, a deterrent against war to begin with.

Host

What are the on-the-ground indicators of good sustainment?

Anderson

For me, it’s operational tempo that a commander is able to press against an enemy, and it’s the reach—so, the amount of distance that a commander can actually push his force or push his or her opposing force back into their battle positions. That is a fantastic indicator of your sustainment tail enabling the tooth that is out there getting the war fight to the enemy.

Kelleher

I would 100 percent agree. I mean, our ability to fight and win, maneuver, predicated, as General Anderson said—tempo and reach—and the degree to which the network that we have talked about enables that is how you can measure success.

Host

What’s one thing that the Department, or the public, still underestimates about the role of sustainment?

Kelleher

As we develop strategies, we have to take a hard look at whether or not the logistics required to support that strategy is actually feasible in execution. And so, instead of developing the strategy in the absence of logistics feasibility, we develop a strategy that is informed by, and directly derived from, logistics feasibility assessments, which arguably hasn’t been the way that we had necessarily thought about strategy in the past because we have not been contested in ways that we are going to be in the future.

And then, I think the other aspect that is important to really think about is the logistics deterrent effect that manifests through a robust, resilient, network architecture with depth capability that an adversary will assess and factor into their calculus as to whether or not to go to war to begin with.

Anderson

And, ma’am, my point would be readiness is expensive. And, we all acknowledge that. But if we are not postured to prevent a fait accompli, the US and our allies and partners will lose, or we will pay in blood. If we can’t get to the fight, sustain the fight, or transition to a reestablished balance after the fight, we will continue paying that debt in blood.

However, if we build the capacity and the capability to project and sustain our forces that our competitors know they cannot defeat, we can shift the calculus to, hopefully, prevent a conflict altogether. And, I think that’s something that a lot of people don’t think about when they think about logistics and sustainment.

Kelleher

Investment now, even if not as efficient as we might like it to be, is certainly more effective than waiting until conflicts start, and we have to pay a much higher price.

Host

What a great note to end on. You both have been very generous with your time today and I thank you. I enjoyed this very much.

Listeners, for more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, Colonel Michael Shekleton, and Colonel Clayton T. Manning on the recently published Strategic Questions Research List (SQRL). They discuss the contents of the SQRL, how it differs from previous years’ compendiums to the Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment, and how it can be used by students during their research.

Keywords: Strategic Questions Research List (SQRL), research, academics, research questions, sponsors, Strategic Research Requirement

Major Brennan Deveraux

Hello, you are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, [the] US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

My name is Major Brennan Deveraux. I work at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). I will be the guest host for this podcast on our Strategic Questions Research List (SQRL) and all associated podcasts for the Strategic Estimate.

I’m joined today [by] three guests. The first is Dr. [C. Anthony] Pfaff, the director of the Strategic Studies Institute. The second is Colonel [Michael] Mike Shekleton—my boss—the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department (SRAD) here at SSI. And then, Colonel Clay Manning, a professor at the US Army War College’s School of Strategic Landpower (SSL), as well as the director of the Strategic Research Requirement (SRR).

Dr. Pfaff, I’m going to start with you today. The Strategic Questions Research List, also known around the War College as the squirrel (SQRL)—fun name—can you tell me a little bit about what it is, why it’s important, and why we’re having this conversation today?

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff

It’s a great question. And I guess [I will share] a little bit about the history of the name: In the before times, we often relied on something called the Key Strategic Issues List, also known as the KSIL, that was both loved and hated by various entities, both here at the War College and abroad. Part of the problem with the KSIL was that it wasn’t well aligned in any given year with the requirements of the service and of DoD (Department of Defense) in general. So, it had gotten abandoned, and we had started using just the Strategic Estimate, but then we kind of discovered that we still weren’t properly aligned with the field. And so, the SQRL became our effort to do that, as we would reach out to major commands, agencies, and others who we would consider our stakeholders, and ask them what their resource priorities are.

We came up with the name because Research Questions List is RQL (Urkel), and that was right out. Strategic Research Questions List was SRQL (circle), and we certainly don’t want any more of those around here. Then, it was Strategic Questions Research List, which is a little awkward to say out loud, but it does form the acronym SQRL, and chasing squirrels is always fun.

That’s how we got the name. And, it’s our effort to be as aligned as possible with the national security challenges that we’re facing in ways that are interactive in using it. Unlike the KSIL, [in] which you sort of drop the [questions] on the researchers, who are the students, this is [an] interactive process where we help shape the questions so that they’re easier to use and then have a mechanism and a venue for providing the feedback from the research back to the field. That’s what we’re trying to do here.

Back over to you.

Deveraux

I like the name. I think it’s catchy. It’s easy to remember. Although, as you recall, I was very nervous the first time we said it in a big meeting and made sure I kept saying Strategic Questions Research List.

Quick follow up for you, sir, on the SQRL. Who’s it for? Is this just a War College product, a PME (professional military education) product? Who are we getting this out to? And are the sponsors, those customers, are they looking for anything specific? Are they looking for giant theses? Strategic long papers? Does that vary by command?

Pfaff

We’re trying to be as flexible as possible. So, there’s room for all the above that you just talked about. Now, in some cases, [with] these questions, there’s not a lot of research behind them, so there’s the opportunity to do some groundbreaking work. That’s going to take longer. That’s also part of the interactive process is that we help build expectations, both for the sponsor and for whoever takes on the question. There may be some things that take a while that require the full year or so to get done. However, what we got this year was a clear demand signal from the field for shorter turnaround things and responses. And so, we do have some formats—that, for those of you who take on these questions, we’ll provide you—that allow you at least to get an initial response out back to the sponsor in order to, kind of, fill that need, particularly where there is already a lot of research already done.

Now as far as who it’s for, pretty much anybody who is in the community that does research for the DoD, these are questions that they could take up, and we hope to get this promulgated out to a lot of those agencies. However, a major focus is getting [the questions] out to the student community so that they get to do two things. One is that just reading the list, you get a feel for what the DoD cares about right now, which may not only inform the [kinds] of projects you take on while you’re here but should [also] inform how you interact with your other courses.

So, a short response here to wrap it up [is], basically, it’s for anybody who can use it. If you do use it, we would just ask that we are also included in how you provide any feedback to one of the sponsors.

Deveraux

Great, thanks. I’ll transition over to Colonel Shekleton. We had questions last year—in fact, we had a bunch of questions last year. We didn’t have the catchy name. That’s not all that’s changed. Can you talk to us about the shift in how this product has grown from last year’s version to this year’s version?

Colonel Michael Shekleton

Absolutely, Brennan, Thanks for that question.

Last year we had 101 questions. This year we have 100 questions. So, at the surface level, it may look very similar. Where the big change is, is [that] last year we had 11 organizations that provided questions; this year we had 43. And so, there’s a couple of ramifications from that. First off, with having that many organizations but the same [number] of questions, it means that what we’ve got from these 43 different organizations are their top two or three or so priority questions. And so, in other words, the command was able to put their thumbprint on, “Hey, we would love if the War College and—more broadly, the research community—could look at this challenge, look at this issue.” The participation and the focus [is a big difference] that really marks this year’s SQRL [with] the KISL of years past.

The range of organizations that provided us questions include the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and so, most of the principal officials at HQDA provided questions. We also got [questions] from the four-star Army commands, the Army service component commands, the combatant commands, as well as a handful of other Joint and Army commands. We think we have a really good range of organizations that provided questions.

What this now affords to the students and the faculty is that most of them should be able to see themselves in the SQRL, whether it’s [that] they’ve got relevant experience from previous assignments that allow them a unique window or insight into trying to address the question and provide recommendations, or, it may align with a diverse range of professional interests. We think we have a pretty good starting point to help facilitate research over the next year.

Deveraux

As we’re doing the research, whether that’s a faculty member, a student, or to the earlier point, just a[n] interested Defense Department researcher, someone who just wants to tackle one of these problems, is there any sort of feedback loop? How are we getting research back to those customers? We talked about this being an iterative process when the questions are coming in. Are we iterating continually as we’re working through this? [Are] there opportunities for that dialogue?

Shekleton

Brennan, absolutely.

Prospective researchers can reach out to either myself or to you. For those who are listening to this, if you look at the back of the Strategic Estimate, on the back cover it’s got a list of the entire team that contributed to the Estimate, whether as an author or [someone] helping to put it together, and you’ll find [Major Deveraux’s] and my name, Colonel Shekleton, on the back. And so, for those of you on the DoD network, you’re able to reach out directly using the global address list.

For those who may be at an academic institution or somewhere else where you don’t have access, there’s an ability on the Strategic Studies Institute website to write to the Institute. And, that e-mail traffic would be funneled to us, and then we can link you up with the command and, specifically, the point of contact (POC) for the command’s question.

We collected these questions over the past several months. For example, when students start taking these questions up in earnest, later in the year, the strategic context may have shifted a little bit. And so, the question that an organization asked in the springtime may be slightly different in the fall. And so, by having that conversation with the command, it allows the command to refine—“Hey, here’s what we’re looking for, and if you could shift a little bit to this”—that will provide maximum value to the command and for the student, as well as for faculty members that are able to link up with these POCs at the commands. It allows you to understand the context for why the command’s asking the question. They may be able to provide some additional details. And with that, the researcher who is trying to address the challenge, the question, will be able to provide something better in return. And so, we’re really happy that we’re able to try to facilitate this loop to where you can refine questions, and then, when the researcher’s done, to provide some of those recommendations back to the command for their use.

Deveraux

I think it’s great, yeah, the refinement—but one really important point is those recommendations going back are going back to an audience who is already looking for them. It is not an unsolicited e-mail. It’s [as if the commands are saying] “I would like to see this.” So, you’re getting research to a targeted audience, and you may be affecting a planning team. You may be affecting a command.

Shekleton

We recognize—and again, just like commands may refine the question that they would ask someone to research—researchers, as [they] start pursuing and looking at things, they may have their own refinements. And in fact, for us, answering the exact question is less important than actually helping to facilitate and establish those relationships, especially among faculty here at the War College or at other professional military education institutions to where it may have started with a SQRL question this year, but then there’s this running dialogue across a range of topics to where faculty members can bring their expertise to bear to help out commands. And so, we’re excited not just for the SQRL but for the broader ecosystem this could potentially create.

Deveraux

Yeah, I think that’s a good point, and it creates good dialogue because the questions, and we did our best to refine them, aren’t leading necessarily to an obvious answer. I like to joke, “don’t ask questions you don’t want the answers to.” The command might not get back the path they were necessarily looking for. They’re going to get back, potentially, a hard look at a problem set or a reframing, and that can create good dialogues moving beyond the question and research.

OK, so, it’s for everyone, and that’s great, but we’re here today at the War College. So, if I could, Colonel Manning, I’d like to turn [the conversation] over to you and talk specifically about the War College students coming in and their Strategic Research Requirement and how the SQRL fits into that.

Colonel Clay Manning

Yeah, absolutely. I appreciate that, Brennan.

One of the things that we look at with the Strategic Research Requirement is that it is truly the only research requirement that the students have here at the War College. I mean, they take a fair number of classes and courses over the course of the year, but every one of those courses gives them a topic, tells them essentially what they need to research and what they need to write about, whereas the Strategic Research Requirement is really the true research area for the student to take advantage of and to take the lead on, right? And that’s what we want them to do. We want them to come in [and] take the lead on a particular topic.

They get to identify the topic. They get to research that particular area. They get to find gaps in the research. They get to make recommendations toward that particular area. And so, what it’s really intended to do, especially the Strategic Research Requirement, it’s intended to give the students time to take a step back and think about a topic. And that’s a pretty big significant emotional event for most of our students here because they have not done that in a long time. But if they can take a step back, come up with a topic, identify a topic, think about the challenge, that is, dive into that challenge, and then, ultimately, make recommendations on that challenge, that’s what we want them to do.

The SQRL comes in and allows them that opportunity to choose a relevant topic that is of interest to them and that is a priority to the force, [which is] something that at times we have struggled with at the War College. Students come in and they want to find something that they’re intelligent on (or believe they’re intelligent on) and [believe] they can come in and just write about it, but, at times, that’s not really hitting the mark of what we really need in the force, right?

With the SQRL, we’re allowing them to come in, find something that is a priority for our commands out in the world, but also complete a requirement that’s necessary for them to graduate here at the War College. So, the SQRL itself is allowing them to pick topics that are very relevant to today to the force that they’re a part of. And that’s what we wanted to see.

Deveraux

I know that the Strategic Estimate as a whole, which is a narrative and a question list, went out to the incoming class for next year. So, I know that they’ve at least had a chance to look at it, and I know you give a great brief on the Strategic Research Requirement to the student body. If I’m a student, I’m sitting there and I’m looking through the list and I’m perusing through, and a couple questions are popping out to me, what’s that next step? Who am I talking to? What’s my timeline?

Can you just talk to me a little bit about the “OK, hey, I’m excited about question X. Where am I going from here, and am I already behind the power curve?”

Manning

We try to set aside time over the course of the year for these students to dedicate [themselves] to research. They’re going to get notified and oriented to some of the things that they’re doing over the course of the year here in just a few weeks. We’re gonna come in, [and] we’re gonna do an orientation the first week or two of the course, and that will be some of their first notifications of, “Oh my gosh, I have this research requirement due.”

And then towards the end of the month of August, I’ll jump in there. I’ll talk to them about the Strategic Research Requirement [and] talk to them about key milestones within the year. And that will be their jumping off point. Candidly, they’ve got a lot of things that they’ve got going on the first month or so of class. We’re not gonna ask them to really jump in and dive into the Strategic Research Requirement until after that first month. So, right into early September is when these guys will start looking at these topics and spending that time identifying the topic and [identifying] those advisers that they want to work with over the course of time. And that’ll run us right up to one of the major milestones that we have for the Strategic Research Requirements, which is right around our first week in October. And that’s that first milestone. And that’s when they've really identified a topic. They’ve identified a topic [and] they’ve identified the project adviser who’s going to help them through the course of the year on that particular topic.

That’s a key milestone. That’s where I really want them in that month of September: diving into the SQRL, looking at those topics, looking at those ideas, coming up with potential topics or branches or sequels to that topic that they’ve looked at so they can start running that to ground over the course of the next year.

We’ll have a few other milestones that come up through the year. That’s fine. That keeps them on track, but, ultimately, that gets us to the end, which is milestone four, right at end of March. So, 31 March we’ll be jumping in and completing that research requirement. Most of the time, they’ll be diving [into] the SQRL here in early- to mid-September.

Deveraux

Great. And whether it’s at the beginning of the process, throughout, or at the end of the process, whether it’s the student or their project adviser, if they want to tie into that command and they don’t already have that built-in relationship, we’re definitely here to support to do that dialogue we talked about.

I’m going to transition us to the SQRL itself—as we look at the questions—because if you’re not holding this in front of you, it’s a little ambiguous. I put my hands on all 100 of these questions this year, really dove in. And a couple stood out for various reasons. One in particular I’d like to highlight that popped for me was out of SOUTHCOM (United States Southern Command), and it was question number 62, “China’s Military Projection in Latin America.” I don’t have any experience at all with that area. I’ve never done any research there, and it wasn’t that it was South America or Latin America. It was the idea to me that China’s not a regional problem. And we talk about that, but we don’t really apply it well, and I’ve been talking with the China Landpower [Studies] Center here about looking at China a little bit differently and might pursue a project next year, looking not to answer specifically SOUTHCOM’s question, but to take that question, more broadly, to a couple other regions and say, “Hey, what is China doing?” or “What does a conflict with China mean for these different regions?”

I’m curious if, as you guys looked through—because I know you’ve had a chance to look through the SQRL as well—if any questions really popped to you and, if they did, why?

And I’ll start over here with Dr. Pfaff.

Pfaff

Thanks Brennan. Yeah, actually a number popped out. I’m gonna, kind of, talk about two. I tend to focus [on and am] interested in a lot of the emerging technology questions. There’s a number of them in the SQRL that should suit anyone’s tastes, however, the first one I kind of focused on was number 72 [73], “Risks [Associated with] AI.”

I like the way it was framed because there’s a lot of urgency in adopting AI technologies on a very wide range of things as fast as possible. At the same time, there certainly is an awareness, a justifiable awareness, regarding the ethical implications of use of those technologies. There’s also a lot of conversations about trust and on what basis do we trust these technologies? But, what you see less of is an understanding of how the integration of these technologies exposes the vulnerabilities that, if we don’t examine that, we may not otherwise see. One that’s known deals with prompt injects. [If] somebody can get access to your system, they can inject prompts that cause the system to do things that you don’t want it to do, like divulge information. Or, if this is [a] supply [chain] management kind of system, it could end up corrupting output. Little things like that can expose us to bigger vulnerabilities that I think [are] kind of important.

And I also thought that question 99, “Emerging Disruptive Technologies,” was also an interesting one. And one thing I’d highlight there is in doing that kind of research, often the most disruptive technologies are not the most advanced. The paradigm example [is] portable hard drives. Back in the [1980s], all the hard-drive manufacturers made big, fast hard drives. Somebody came [up] with a small, slower [hard drive] with limited memory. But because it was portable, it revolutionized the market, and if you weren’t making those, you weren’t making the other ones either. What’s that look like for military technologies? And that’s where things like directed energy weapons might serve as an example where—and I do think we talk about this a little bit in the Estimate—you may not need a directed energy weapon (a fully capable one) of, say, knocking out an aircraft or destroying a vehicle or something like that. It just needs to be good enough that it affects some attribute within the combat operating environment that gives you an advantage, and that can be done often with lower technologies, lower costs, and figuring out what those are and how to take advantage—and also not be vulnerable to them, I think—are kind of useful and very interesting questions to take up.

Shekleton

What I’d like to do is jump in and offer two questions. And the first one that I would highlight ties into what Dr. Pfaff was just talking about, and that’s question number 3, the “High-Low Capability Mix.” It’s from the Secretary of the Army. That one is looking at how do we continue to leverage exquisite American technology—so in other words, quality—while at the same time folding in lessons from Ukraine and elsewhere around the globe to where quantity is once again providing a unique quality on the battlefield. That one I think is a really cool one that is kind of a crux that: Is warfare changing? And how do we make sure that we stay with it and hopefully stay ahead of that? That one, while I’m super excited about it, I may not have the requisite expertise, so I’ll let someone else jump on that one.

The one that I will jump on and actually do research to help answer the question is number 16, titled “Military Personnel Exchange Program.” And in this case, my last assignment was as the chief of an Office of Defense Cooperation in Italy, where we had almost two dozen exchange officers from the various services that were in Italy, working alongside our Italian allies. And, in this case, what I learned from that assignment is what a combat multiplier these individuals can be as we look at how do we partner and ally with other countries as we look towards great-power war. [British Prime Minister Winston Churchill] once said that the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without allies. And so, I think this is something that, as we move forward thinking about ourselves, we also need to think about how we can harness this coalition of capabilities and capacities by working with our allies and partners. And so, I’m looking forward to providing some recommendations back to the Army staff on that question. First, as a very, kind of, short paper that’s a little bit more digestible, and then maybe going a little bit deeper so that way those who really need to go into that kind of depth can look at some of the more granular recommendations.

Manning

As I looked at the list, I was really taken aback by just the breadth of questions that were being brought up by most of the commands. Now, I’ll be candid, I actually don’t have a specific question. I am a medical guy by training, so I did appreciate the OTSG (Office of the Surgeon General) questions on the medical operations in LSCO (Large-Scale Combat Operations), specifically, question 22. I spent a number of years working on that particular problem of how do we look at medical operations in LSCO fights, especially as we’re looking at significant [increase] in casualty estimates and evacuations and that sort, but what I most appreciate about this list is the list itself. I [would] probably estimate every year we have about 40 percent of the students here that have a difficult time coming up with a topic. It is an overwhelming and anxious time for them to try to think of this idea, and what the beauty of the SQRL does is that [it] comes in and it provides that framework for these students to really start with. And I will tell you that that pays dividends over the course of their experience here at the War College, and, candidly, the quality of the written work that they produce because they are invested in that process. So, the framework of the SQRL with the 100 questions this year, I think it’s gonna be next to a game changer for some of the things we’ll get out of students this year.

Deveraux

All right, well, gentlemen, I appreciate the time. I won’t hold you any longer than we need to. The SQRL, as part of the annual Strategic Estimate, which is actually officially called the Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment, is online. It’s published. [A] link will be included in the podcast description (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1975&context=monographs#page=93).

Thank you for your time today. I’d like to tell our listeners and readers—read the SQRL and the Estimate—we will be pursuing some more podcasts and conversations specifically about the Estimate. We’ll be pulling in some of the authors here at the War College to discuss the narrative, now that we’ve discussed the questions. So, stay tuned for those.

Listeners, for more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC (China Landpower Studies Center) Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Commander of the Canadian Army Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright discusses the Canadian Army, modernization, Ukraine, technology, and more. Listen in for insights about the Canadian Army, its mission, its future, and how America’s neighbor to the north partners with the United States. 

Keywords: Canada, Arctic, Canadian Army, technology, modernization

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright, commander of the Canadian Army, is joining me remotely today. Wright enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1990 as an infantry officer. He has commanded from platoon to brigade and Joint task force levels. He served in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, as well as in Canada. On promotion to Lieutenant General in July 2024, he was appointed as the commander of the Canadian Army.

Welcome to Conversations on Strategy, sir. Thank you for joining me.

Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright

Stephanie, thanks very much for the invitation. [I am] really looking forward to this.

Host

I'd like to open our discussion with land warfare and modernization. Looking at the last three years of fighting in Ukraine, what are your most important takeaways regarding the evolution of land warfare, and how is the Canadian Army modernizing to meet this moment?

Wright

Thanks, Stephanie.

The Canadian Army, like all of our close allies, are paying very close attention to what’s happening on the battlefield in Ukraine. I think I’ll start with three key takeaways and then how it’s shaping what the Canadian Army is doing.

The first one is that it has proven that Landpower absolutely matters. Landpower in terms of the conventional large-scale combat operations capability absolutely matters, which is really driving the modernization effort that we’re doing within the Canadian Army. Not only for the capabilities that we’re trying to bring in, but also for the wholesome review of our force structure that we’ve engaged in.

The second one—and this is one that I actually spend a lot of time thinking about and, frankly, worrying about—is how rapidly technology is evolving on the battlefield. Just looking at drones, for example, the multiple iterations of drones, how they are used—how they’re use for reconnaissance, how they’re used for strike—has changed so many times over the past three plus years, and knowing the challenges that we have in many of our militaries in keeping up with innovation and procuring the equipment that we need in the right time frame.

The third key take away is following on from that rapidly evolving technology, we certainly see the importance of precision, but I always like to remind people that it is not a binary decision between precision or mass. We actually need precision and mass because—I’ll go back to the first part—Landpower matters. And in fact, I think one of the major reasons why we’re seeing this conflict, this war, go on over three years is because that decisive Landpower has not been—certainly in the past year to year and a half—has not been able to be applied at the level that’s required to see a decisive victory by either side.

Host

These are big enough challenges in the present, and I know you’re working a lot on modernization and looking into the future. Can you talk a little bit about your vision for the Canadian Army?

Wright

My vision of the Canadian Army is really building upon the great work that was done by my predecessors. Immediately before coming into command of the Canadian Army, the focus of my predecessor, Lieutenant General Joe Paul, was very understandably on making the transition from our primary force-generation mission, the multinational brigade in Latvia, setting the conditions to move from the battle group level up to the brigade level. What I’m trying to do is the great work that was done there to ensure that all those capabilities that are being put in place in our mission in Latvia are actually going to be able to be scaled across the Canadian Army.

The vision that I’ve laid out is that we need to make sure that we are a credible, interoperable, digitally transformed, modern Army that's capable of offering the government of Canada with agile and scalable options for employment in competition, in crisis, or in conflict. The way that I’ve divided that up in terms of priorities are modernization, reconstitution, and readiness, and it’s a deliberate ordering of those priorities because we need to modernize, and we need to reconstitute our forces both in terms of people and equipment before we can augment our level as readiness.

If you want, I can talk a little bit about the modernization effort that we’ve embarked upon.

Host

I’d love to hear a little bit about that, please.

Wright

Absolutely. Certainly, part of our modernization effort is a wholesale modernization of the capabilities we have in the Canadian Army. We are actually going through the largest modernization since the turn of the century, and that modernization that we did at the turn of the century really set the conditions for the decade plus that we spent in the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan, and then, certainly, the operations we were involved with in the Middle East. We have 47 major capital projects, but we all know, and you don’t have to learn this at War College, you can’t go around saying, “I have 47 priorities.” So, the way I describe it are there are four plus one, which are incredibly important for the future of the army. Those four are long-range precision strike; this is a capability that Canada has never had. It’s a capability that will, first of all, be incredibly important as part of that NATO mission in Latvia. But, it’s also a capability that has a continental and Canadian Defense nexus to it.

The second one is ground-based air defense [GBAD]. This is actually a capability that Canada had, but then we divested earlier this century, and certainly lessons learned from Ukraine show the incredible importance of ground-based air defense. Luckily, there we’re already seeing the fielding of some dismounted systems in Latvia, but we’re moving aggressively to bring both dismounted and mounted systems into Latvia, but then also to field them across the Canadian Army and again including GBAD, being a perfect example of where that has a role in the defense of Canada.

The third one is modernization of our indirect fire. So, that’s everything from our mortars up to what is going to be the eventual replacement for our M777 [howitzer 155mm artillery]. I think it’s going to be a self-propelled howitzer. Certainly, as we look at whether it’s the US Army or our closest allies around NATO, they’re all going the self-propelled howitzer route. So, I think that’s where we’ll end up going.

The fourth one is actually directly tied to our defense policy update that our government put out last April, Our North, Strong and Free, which really emphasize the importance of the continent, but then [it includes] Canada and the Arctic for our national defense. And so, that’s domestic and Arctic mobility and enhancement, which is basically having the vehicles that allow us to be mobile and survivable in the Arctic.

Now, I said “plus one,” and that plus one is making sure—it’s one thing to get all of those capabilities in, but we need to make sure that we have the command, control, and communication systems to allow us to integrate them across the Canadian Army, across our Canadian Armed Forces, and probably most importantly with our allies, whether that’s in a NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], a NATO, or another partnership perspective.

Host

I’m really glad that you brought up the Arctic. My next question is about America and Canada. We have shared interests in the Arctic, including security and economic development. Tell me a little bit more about the collaborative efforts between our two countries and maybe share your thoughts on them.

Wright

Absolutely. And, it’s interesting because I was on a panel earlier today where I was side by side with the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. If he was here, he would talk to you about the importance of our binational relationship, really a unique binational relationship that we have with the United States through NORAD. Traditionally, from the Canadian Armed Forces perspective, we’ve looked more at the Air Force, and then, over the past decade, the Navy as well, because it’s not only that aerospace, but also maritime approaches [that we need in the Arctic]. But I think it’s important for me to be able to express to our government the role that the Canadian Army can play in continental defense.

I spoke a little bit about some of the capabilities that we’re pursuing and how that will involve the Army more in terms of that homeland defense. It’s also for the Canadian Army right now, we represent the only permanent posture, or the only permanent presence, in the Canadian Arctic with our Rangers [a component of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve]. Now, our Rangers are not like American [US Army ] Rangers or even [the Swedish Army Rangers]. I had the opportunity to visit Sweden last month and saw their Ranger regiment. What our Rangers are a force of 5,000 people who are located in over 200 isolated and coastal communities in the north and the Arctic. And, in fact, 1,800 of them are actually north of the Arctic Circle.

What they do provide for us is presence [and] sovereignty. We’re ensuring that we are tying them closer into reporting so we’re able to plug into that domain awareness that we have in the Arctic. But, they’re also incredibly important for us, not only in terms of the relationships they have with the communities in the north and in the Arctic, but also as we send up members of both our regular force and reserve forces to train, we rely a lot on the Canadian Rangers for their knowledge of the land, of the customs, and for how we can not only be able to fight, but to survive in a harsh climate like that.

Host

You mentioned a few minutes ago continental defense. How do the United States and Canada work together to defend the continent?

Wright

The simplest answer to that is we work together through NORAD, a long existing binational relationship. Again, the Army has not traditionally played a large part in that when you look at the over 300, I believe it is, Canadians who are serving in NORAD. [It is] much more heavily weighted on the Air Force and on the Navy side—particularly the Air Force. But, it’s absolutely an area that as we look at the future of making investments, and I’ll note we’re recording this podcast on the 19th of March, yesterday, in only his fourth full day on the job, our new prime minister, Mark Carney, along with the minister of national defence, and our chief of the defence staff, were up in the Arctic talking about not only investments that are being made in terms of the modernization of the over-the-horizon radar systems, but also giving more opportunities for training that’s being done in the Arctic. That’s where, again, I return to the role of the Canadian Rangers, but also, with us sending up our Arctic response company groups, sending up members of the regular conventional Army to do training up North, and in fact, just over the last month we’ve had two large-scale exercises in the Arctic: Operation NANOOK, which is controlled by our Canadian Joint Operations Command and then NOREX [Northern Exercise], which is an opportunity we have for one of our divisions to exercise their Arctic response company group. Both of those exercises took place with American forces. In one case, the USAF [US Air Force] National Guard and some Navy divers. And, in the other case, the US Army working side by side.

We also benefit from a great relationship we have with [11th] Airborne Division in Alaska. We actually have [a] deputy commanding general in the division, who’s a Canadian. And regularly, now, we are sending Canadian elements through JPMRC [Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center] in Alaska, which gives us not only a fantastic training opportunity, but the absolute importance of ensuring that we are well connected and interoperable with our closest ally.

Host

In a perfect world, do you see a place where we could do better working together, America and Canada?

Wright

Of course, there’s always ways that we can improve. I think the area that I’m really looking forward to working [on] with the United States Army is I spoke about the modernization that we’re going through and, particularly when we’re talking about those command, control, communication systems, we want to work hand in hand with the United States Army. Just last week, I was out in Fort Irwin, California, for Project Convergence Capstone 5 [PCC5]. I was excited about going there last week. I can tell you I’m even more excited about [Project Convergence Capstone] PCC6 happening next year because I have a clear vision as to what the areas [are] that I’d like the Canadian Army to bring innovation and experimentation [to] next summer.

I spoke a little bit earlier about our force structure review. We do not, in Canada right now, have what, certainly, our American listeners would consider to be a division. We do have four divisions within the Canadian Army, but they’re very much administrative and regionally based and with capabilities such as long-range precision strike. Those are capabilities that are very much going to rest at the division level. So, we are actively going through a holistic review of our structure, with a view to knowing that we need to be able to generate a war-fighting division headquarters. So, my focus for PCC6 is going to be what do we need to do within the Canadian Army to make sure that not only we have the proper technology, the proper procedures to field that division headquarters, but also to make sure it is able to integrate with our allies?

Host

We just covered, very broadly, some really big topics. We have a little extra time if there’s anything you'd like to revisit or expand on.

Wright

Yeah. Stephanie, maybe if there’s just a thought I could end off with: It’s great to be down here in Washington [DC]. This is an annual event we have where we celebrate the long-standing partnership and the close relationship that we have with all elements of the United States military and the Department of Defense. I don’t think it’s ever been as important as it is now. Certainly, when we look at the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, when we look at the potential impacts that could have on our mission—Canada’s largest NATO deployment with the forward land forces in Latvia—and that overall collective defense and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, it’s incredibly important to maintain the strong military-to-military relationships that we’ve enjoyed for decades. Geography will not change. We remain neighbors and we will remain incredibly close allies between the Canadian Army and the United States Army.

Host

What a great thought to end on. Thank you so much for making time to speak with me today.

Wright

Hey, thank you, Stephanie. It’s been a real pleasure.

Host

Listeners, for more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and a Better Peace.

This podcast was recorded on January 28, 2025, and updated on February 11, 2025.

In this episode, Dr. R. Evan Ellis discusses the Panama Canal, including its history and significance to the United States, China’s involvement in the region, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Panama in February 2025.

Keywords: Panama Canal, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, China, trade, President Jimmy Carter

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m happy to be here today with Dr. Evan Ellis. Ellis is a professor of Latin American studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College.

First, I just want to welcome you back. I know that we’ve been talking for a while about recording another podcast. Thank you for making time to join me for another Conversations on Strategy.

Dr. Evan Ellis

Stephanie, it’s a pleasure to be part of the program today. Thanks for having me.

Host

So, we’re talking about Panama today. I’d like to really dig in and get a better understanding of things here. What did the original agreement regarding the Panama Canal say?

Ellis

Well, by “original agreement,” of course, we’re talking about the agreement on September 7th, 1977, in which President [Jimmy] Carter agreed with President [Martín ] Torrijos of Panama to, essentially, return the Panama Canal and, in turn, Panama agreed to, essentially, defend and maintain and operate the canal. So, there are really two components of this. One, which is the more commonly known Panama Canal Treaty, which made arrangements for the return, again, at the end of December 31st, 1999, although there were different enclaves that the United States was able to hold on to after that point and that one by one [it] released or turned over to Panama in an organized fashion. Panama then, in turn, agreed to defend the canal and to operate the canal. Indeed, Article 4 of the treaty that talks about its obligations for protection and defense is a very important component of that, and that also served [as] the basis for the military coordination that we have today with Panama, in which we not only work with their border service SENAFRONT but also the air and naval service SENAN, international police, and also conduct one of the largest military exercises, multilateral exercises, that we conduct in the hemisphere, which is the two-part PANAMAX exercise.

But, it’s also important to note that aside from the Panama Canal Treaty itself, there was a second related treaty invoked the same day—the Neutrality Treaty—and that made provisions that the Panama government would operate this in what was referred to as a just and equal or equitable fashion and at what was called a reasonable fashion from the perspective of rates. In other words, the commitment on the Panamanian side was not only to ensure that all nations, the United States, China, et cetera, had access to it but also that the rates that it would charge would not prejudice one country or another—that even though you could have different rates for different classes of ships at different times—but, essentially, every country would have equal right and prioritization. Now, having said that, there are some important exceptions to that. Number one is pointing out that essentially, US military warships get to go to the head of the queue, and there’s also a separate related Treaty of Montería, which actually gives the Colombian government and the Costa Rican government [the] right to have free access or free use of the canal. So, there’s a number of different little-known details but, really, the bottom line is the turnover of the canal but [also] the corresponding responsibility for neutral operation access for all to use it.

Host

How is the canal used today, and how is its use different from America’s original understanding with Panama?

Ellis

That’s a great question. And, really, even when the Panama Canal was given back by the treaty by President Carter with President Torrijos, the canal’s use was already then evolving. But, when the canal was first built, and as it was used, especially during World War II and in the post-war period, it was initially largely about US commercial movements and military movements between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Now, a couple things have happened since then. First of all, global containerized shipping has become much more important. One of the primary uses back in those earlier days was largely about the Pacific and Atlantic [coasts] of the United States. Today, the Panama Canal has become a global shipping hub. Although the primary traffic is that which goes between the East Coast of the United States and Asia, you also find that traffic going between Asia and Europe has a certain role, also, between various other points that involve the use of the canal.

But also, the composition and volume of shipping has increased. First of all, from the time of the signing of the treaty, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of transits. In 2024, there were a total of about 11,240 transits—according to the Panama Canal Authority—a total of 210 million long tons. But also, there have been [an] increase in use by the Panama Canal by larger ships—so, what is now called the Post-Panamax category. And so, you’re looking at 14,500 TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit] ships in terms of bulk carriers and others, [including] some of the very big LNG [liquified natural gas] carriers that take US LNG from East Coast terminals to Asia to customers that really need that US LNG like Japan and others. And so, those uses are different from what was initially contemplated.

Also, beyond just serving as a transit point, Panama itself, through the port of Colón and through logistics staging areas like Panama Pacífico, has become an important logistics hub for companies that want to warehouse and distribute their products from the Panama Canal.

Now, finally, [it is] important to note that while there was that initial importance of the military access, especially by the US military to the canal, and while, if there were ever a war in the Pacific, it would be important for the US to get certain smaller or mid-size ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific or, frankly, certain sustainment items or deployment items—especially heavier cargo—through the canal, at the end of the day, certain categories of ships (for example, carriers) do not transit the canal. And also, the deployment concept is arguably somewhat less reliant on the canal than it used to be—although in military terms it is still substantially important, especially as we look at the possibility of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

Host

Tell me a little bit more about how the Panama Canal contributes to international trade and economies.

Ellis

First, it’s useful to understand that as international shipping has become increasingly globalized, especially containerized shipping, that you have a series of international logistics you’d refer to as hubs or choke points. Of course, one is the Straits of Malacca, just outside of China. One, of course, being the Suez Canal and, of course, Panama, then, being the third of those major three. But, as I noted before, the function of Panama is not just as a logistics choke point but also as a transit hub for the transfer and on loading and offloading of cargo for, again, the warehousing of certain types of cargo for distribution throughout the region. And, beyond its role as a logistics center, [it also has] a role as an international financial center. And oftentimes, the commerce that you find moving through the canal and warehoused there, there’s actually a tie to some of those financial operations of Panama as an international banking center.

Again, in terms of overall volume, you can point out that only about 5 percent of all international shipping actually moves through the canal. And yet, at the same time, if you look from a US standpoint, again, about two-thirds of everything that goes through the canal actually either starts at, or ends at, a US port. And so, especially for that traffic going from the East Coast of the United States, and secondarily the East Coast of South America—countries such as Brazil—connecting to Asia, it is substantially important, and any disruption to the canal—as we saw during the period of drought where it had to restrict throughput just last year—any type of restriction has a really adverse impact on those flows [in] which the East Coast of the United States and others rely.

Host

How did China enter the picture? I’ve heard comments in the news about China and the Panama Canal.

Ellis

It’s a great question, and it really occurred in stages. First of all, understanding that as China increasingly engaged as the manufacturing factory floor of the world, especially in the 1990s and expanding in the 2000s with its entry in 2001 in the World Trade Organization, the role of Chinese products needing to access US East Coast and Latin American East Coast destinations were increasingly important. During that period, you had Chinese shipping companies (such as China Shipping and COSCO, which eventually merged) becoming increasingly important as users of the canal behind the United States and in conjunction with other partners such as the Japanese and the Chileans. But, in the context of the turnover of the Panama Canal—again, December 31st, 1999—to Panamanian authorities, so the Panama Canal Authority, the question was as they moved towards that period, well, who would operate ports on the Atlantic and Pacific? Who would get those concessions? And so, there was a deal that was somewhat criticized for a lack of transparency at the time in which Hong Kong–based Hutchison Whampoa [Limited] was given one of what was eventually three ports on the Cristóbal side and one of two on the Balboa side. As Hutchison proceeded through, and in conjunction with, COSCO as a user of the canal, it built a relationship with the Panama Canal Authority, and China increasingly got involved in Panama.

Now, it’s also useful to remind the listeners that this was not the first time that ethnic Chinese had been in Panama. Indeed, ethnic Chinese had been brought over to Panama in the mid-nineteenth century to work on the railroads and eventually other projects. But, when we look at the expanding role of China, of course, one of the big moments was in the run-up to the change in recognition. About two years before recognition, there’s a question of allowing yet another Chinese port operator to establish a presence on the Colón side. This was a somewhat shady consortium called [the] China Land Bridge that was coming in to build a new operation, which was going to be called the Panama Colón Container Port. Again, there were a lot of issues involving the way in which the deal was signed and the supporting construction of infrastructure—like an LNG-fired power plant.

But, in the context of some of those preliminary agreements, the real takeoff occurred in 2017, when the government of Juan Carlos Varela, who had previously served in a government position working in China and who recognized the power commercially of China for Panama, decided to switch relations from Taiwan to the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. This allowed a dramatic jump in the Chinese commercial role and in engagement in a variety of different areas. Initially, there were 19 nontransparent MOUs [memorandums of understanding] signed between the new PRC government and the Varela government in Panama. And, at the time, it seemed like Chinese activity was just rapidly exploding everywhere. You had the use of a company locally known as China Construction Americas that built a vast, shiny new convention center near Panama City. You had talk of a $4 billion China-built bullet train. You had the Panama Canal container port that I mentioned before. You had a new power plant that was going to be built and the power transmission line (under questionable conditions) to support the new Chinese operations. You had a cruise ship terminal, which was being built up by the Chinese on the Pacific side of the canal [and] which was kind of curious because it was an area where you didn’t have, really, a lot of market things that new cruise ships would actually want to see. And then, you had some symbolically worrisome things such as, for example, the Varela government was going to allow the Chinese to put its new embassy on a hill over what’s known as the Amador Peninsula. Symbolically, that meant that as ships approached the canal from the Pacific, basically looking at the entrance of the canal, the first thing that they would see at the entrance of the canal was a big red Chinese flag on the hill there, over the Amador Peninsula.

If you added that to the role of China in purchasing copper from a major new Canadian-run copper mine that was starting up by a company by the name of First Quantum [Minerals Ltd.] and then negotiation by China of a free-trade agreement that also accelerated Chinese companies coming into both Colón and other places like Panama Pacific, you had the Chinese digital technology telecom company Huawei [Telecom Limited] expanding a big distro center on that side. And so, there was a moment in which it seemed that the Chinese presence was taking off.

To kind of bring this to a where we’re at today, it’s of use to note that because of the sense that Panama had gotten itself on the bad side of the relations with the United States under the rule of the Varela government, Panama had an election in which voters chose a change. The new government of [Laurentino] “Nito” Courtizo basically gave a new look to a number of Chinese projects. And so, the Panama Colón container port collapsed. The bullet train project went away. The fourth power line was reconsidered. Work on the free-trade agreement was stopped. Although one of the things that did happen is under questionable terms. That lease, which comes to be an important part of the story later—Hutchison’s 25-year operating lease to operate on both sides of the Panama Canal was renewed under questionable conditions. And then, of course, COVID hit about the same time, which slowed the projects down a lot.

And so, again, what you really had was an explosion that largely occurred under the Varela administration, which slowed down but did not stop completely under the Cortizo administration. And now, today, with the current government of José Raúl Mulino, you have the relationship continuing to evolve through smart cities, safe cities, projects, and possibly the regeneration of the FTA [free-trade agreement].

That’s kind of how we got where we are today in terms of a relatively massive Chinese presence. [There is] a lot of people-to-people contexts that go with that presence, and thus concern over what that all means in terms of China’s position of influence with respect to the Chinese government both in peacetime and if there ever [is] a military conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

Host

What does all of this mean for America, then?

Ellis

That’s a great question, and as you point out, this is something that often times people misunderstand. And so, what I have long argued is that there are both challenges and implications for the United States and the region in peacetime and if we ever have a war in the Indo-Pacific. Now, the issue in peacetime is the broader context of PRC-based companies as they seek to extend their operations in global logistics and in commercial penetration and capture as much of the value added [as] possible as they extend into Central America, into Mexico, as they extend their construction operations. A lot of those companies are based in Panama or have logistics and distribution hubs in Panama. A number have financial operations in Panama. And so, Panama [is] a base where they have a relatively good relationship with the government, have headquarters operations, a warehousing operation, that really facilitates the broader penetration of Chinese commercial (and with it, related human networks in influence) throughout the hemisphere.

At the same time, however, [as the] Department of Defense, and if you look at it from the perspective of US Southern Command (that has responsibility for the area encompassed by Panama and the canal) if we ever found ourselves in a conflict, you have to prepare for what your principal adversary—we have to presume here, that would involve, largely, the People’s Republic of China—might do not just in the in the Indo-Pacific but in other parts of the world to try to impede the US ability to project and sustain power in a fight in the Indo-Pacific. And so, to that end, when you look at a map, you see things that are competent, and often clever adversaries in the People’s Liberation Army might think about [them]. And, one of those things is how, by shutting down the Panama Canal and in [undeniable] ways, you could impede US deployment and sustainment flows in the movement of some forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific in a way that might limit the number of forces or the amount of ammunition to support those forces that could get to support Taiwan in such a fight and, thus, give the PRC an opportunity to push Taiwan to surrender before substantial forces could come.

To that end, one of the things that’s most misunderstood is it’s not the control of those two port operations in Cristóbal and Balboa by Hutchison Port Holdings [Trust] that is critical. It is the broader Chinese presence in the region that creates options for the Chinese. And I’ll use a pithy example: During the Second World War when we were fighting Japan, the empire of Japan actually had a crazy program where they were trying to build a huge submarine with an underwater aircraft deck. And, the idea was to have a submarine that could get close enough to the Panama Canal to launch an aircraft that could then launch one bomb that could theoretically shut down the canal.

If you think about all the things that the Japanese were willing to do during World War II just to get close enough to have one bomb go against the Panama Canal, think about the fact that Chinese companies not only operate on the port on both sides but have commercial operations in those staging areas, again, in Colón in Panama Pacific, the construction of bridges, et cetera. And so, the danger is that the Chinese today, through their commercial presence, have the operational knowledge plus the physical access that one would need to do any type of deniable, mischievous operations that could at least temporarily shut down the canal. Whether that would be to sink a ship into one of the narrow parts like Culebra Cut or sink a ship or detonate explosives in one of the locks themselves or do a cyberattack against the locks or mine part or all of the canal or even put ships at risk as they’re waiting at the entrance or exit to the canal. The number of things that one could do are numerous but, at the end of the day, the key point is that it’s not the PLA physically being in the canal today, but it is the access that they have through their ample commercial presence that creates those opportunities that they could exploit in wartime, in relatively quick but deniable ways.

Host

Let’s say that America decides to reclaim the Panama Canal. What would that potentially look like?

Ellis

That’s a great question, and there are different layers to this, and I would start with the legal issues, military issues, and what I would call negotiations based on the prospect of changing control of the canal. With respect to the legal issues, it really goes back to the question I illustrated before, whether the increase of freight rates Panama Canal authorities engaged in or the types of freight rates that are charged to some of the types of users that use it most, such as those big LNG tankers, and whether the questionable practices of Hutchison Whampoa can be construed to violate Panama’s neutrality commitments. Certainly, lawyers on both sides can argue that issue. There’s the broader question of whether the United States could take military action. We can remember 1989 when we felt that international drug dealer and anti-US populist Manuel Noriega was taking actions that were strategically unacceptable to the United States—to have the canal in control of somebody like Manuel Noriega. You can remember that the US militarily intervened in Panama to remove Manuel Noriega.

It’s interesting that today the long-standing, very close US security cooperation with Panama, with their border service SENAFRONT front, with the air and naval service SENAN, with the national police, it’s almost unthinkable in military operation. It’s as if, you know, Big Brother is going to militarily intervene against Little Brother. But, the issue probably would not be a question of could it be done? Certainly, the prospect of [a] military solution grabs everyone’s attention on both sides. But, at the end of the day, what, and again, in my academic judgment, is likely is the talks about what could be really serve as a basis for the Panamanian government to have a discussion about how their operation of the canal and the role of China there possibly could be adjusted to address some of those US policy concerns. And so, that might not be a renegotiation of the treaty.

There certainly are things that could be done, [including] potentially the inclusion of the United States under the Treaty of Montería to get it out of paying freight rates for some of its container ships—if that would not be regarded as prejudicial. There is the possibility that, based on the very questionable circumstances in which Hutchison’s Port Holdings [Trust] operations at Cristóbal and Balboa were renewed back in 2021—that what’ literally going on now, which is a detailed audit of Hutchison—could lead the Panamanian government fully within their treaty to [decide] the previous government’s extension of the licenses was fraudulent and null and void, and, thus, possibly to take those operating concessions away from Hutchison and perhaps give them to a more reliable, perhaps US-based operator such as Manzanillo International Terminals, which is there in Colón today.

And so, I think at the end of the day, there are probably ways in which, within the context of the treaty and short of military intervention, adjustments can be made or discussed that would address US concerns about both China and the freight rates again, you know, within the legal confines of existing treaty. And so, I think that's probably part of what Secretary [Marco] Rubio’s conversations and those of others with the Panamanian government of José Raúl Molino are probably all about today.

Host

Secretary Rubio has completed his trip to Panama and the region. What were the key results of and agreements from that visit and what are the implications for China's position in Panama and US-Panama relations going forward?

Ellis

By all accounts, Secretary Rubio's visit with President Molino was very positive, very cordial, and some of the initial results that came out were, first of all, an offer by President Molino following that trip to pull Panama out of the Belt and Road agreement that its previous president, Juan Carlos Varela, had committed to with China. Now, that is largely symbolic. There is no legal obligation that being part of that treaty puts on Panama to do anything for China, nor does it oblige China to give any type of priority to Panama in terms of its investments, although the investments have been substantial by the PRC. However, the act was an important symbolic gesture of goodwill with respect to the presidency of Molino. And in addition to that, perhaps the more significant offer that was made was [an] independent action by the Molino government to do an audit on the contract that gave Hutchison the authorization to operate the ports in Cristóbal and Balboa on both sides of the canal and the renewal of that contract by Panama Ports in 2021. Now, that renewal was seen as somewhat suspicious by a number of people in that the terms were extremely generous to Hutchison. And, also, there was relatively limited transparency with respect to the criteria with which the negotiations of renewal took place. And so, without violating Panama's commitments under the ND 97 Treaty [the treaty between the United States and Panama that transferred control of the Panama Canal to Panama by the year 2000] or the other commitments that legally it has to administer the canal in [an] equitable fashion, it might create the grounds to find sufficient corruption or wrongdoing in the renewal of Hutchison's license that could be taken away from Hutchison, rebid, and possibly given to another Western company, which would, at least symbolically, allow President Trump and the Trump administration to show a victory and decrease, at least to some degree, China's presence in the region. Although there are a number of other vulnerabilities that would still continue to be there with respect to Costco's regular operation in the canal zone, with respect to the operation of the Chinese companies with construction projects, as well as logistics facilities in Panama Pacifico [a community in Panama] and Colón and other places. However, it seems to be at least a goodwill gesture showing that the Molino government wants to work with [the] Trump administration to try to resolve some of these issues. And perhaps, going forward, also, the commitment that's been shown to work together and to study ways in which some of the US concerns over China's presence can be mitigated. So, it seemed like a good start for the relationship to go forward to address some of those very real concerns that the US and the Trump administration has.

Host

In our pre-podcast conversation, you talked about Colombia a little bit. Can you speak to that?

Ellis

Absolutely. As the listeners will likely be more than familiar with, on the 26th of January, you had [an] explosive diplomatic event. Both under the Biden administration and continuing under the Trump administration, Colombians who were in the United States without proper authorization were being deported, initially through State Department-chartered deportation flights. But then, President Trump authorized the use of military aircraft to supplement those capabilities. Initially, there was pushback by the government of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, over these military flights. But, the real difference was what Gustavo Petro, the president of Colombia, did. The Colombian government had already agreed to the military flight in question to repatriate Colombians to their own country. There’s international legal precedent that a country is responsible or obligated to accept the migrants from their country that are expelled from a country where they do not have legally authorized status. The issue was that when that US military plane had left the ground, left California en route, at that time, probably in order to score political points, President Petro suddenly expressed a concern over the use of military aircraft and, again, in mid-flight when it was already in air, said that he was not going to allow that aircraft to land in Colombia.

And so, there was really two different levels. Number one is that the principle of Colombia’s obligation to accept its own nationals being repatriated, that is fundamental to the entire thrust of President Trump’s national security strategy on immigration in general in dealing with Mexicans and dealing with Venezuelans and dealing with all of the other actors in the region. And so, one just can’t allow that precedent. In addition to that, [is] the question of how one would respond, understanding that the world was watching and needing to send a clear message that the US would push back and push back hard. And so, what happened very quickly— and it was interesting that the administration really had a pre-planned set of very significant actions—most significantly, they announced a 25 percent immediate tariff on Colombian exports to the United States. Again, about one-third of Colombia’s exports actually go to the United States, so that’s significant. It was going to go up to 50 percent in the course of a week if the issue was not addressed. And perhaps more subtly, but actually more importantly, there was going to be extra prioritization given to the inspection in customs of Colombian cargo. Now, why is that important? It’s important because although most of Colombia's exports to the United States are oil and minerals and other items of that nature and, of course, coffee, one of Colombia's significant [industries] is the export of flowers. And, as some may know well, the first two weeks of February correspond to something very important in the United States, that being Valentine’s Day. And so, in other words, not only the tariffs but those inspections of cargo given flowers, which literally are perishable (and in heated containers) in a course of hours, that would have decimated at the high point of Colombia’s flower export season—its major export product.

That was consequential. There was also the announcement of suspension of visa processing. And so, again, many, many Colombians have legal relationships, come to the United States under all the proper documentation, but you have to apply for the visa. People have aunts and uncles and grandmothers. And so, suddenly, because of what Petro had done, reneging on this previous commitment, Colombians found themselves with their visa applications cancelled, as well as an announcement that those Colombians working for the Colombian government in the United States would also have their visas pulled. So, it was a very hard pushback very quickly, and I think [it] sent the message that President Trump was disposed to push back very hard on those countries that did not behave [consistently] with their international obligations and their previous commitments. And so, again, the outcome in which basically Gustavo Petro backed down, I think, you know, had implications not only for the US-Colombia relationship, but also, as Secretary Rubio is coming to Panama and elsewhere in Central America, and as President Trump engages the region in general, that the US was adopting this policy in which it was going to push back hard against those that challenged US equities as Petro had done.

Host

Thanks, Evan. Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share?

Ellis

Just to really reinforce the fact that, obviously, President Trump has taken policy in a very new direction. At the end of the day, what we see with the Panama Canal, both commercially and strategically, and with a migration issue that we’ve also talked about today, is, I think, a reminder that although oftentimes we focus on other parts of the world, there really is no other region in the world in which US prosperity and US security is, as closely and immediately connected as Panama. And so, what is happening now, having a Secretary of State with Latin American expertise, having a National Security Council Director, Mike Waltz, also with extensive Latin American background, having key presidential appointments such as Mauricio Claver-Carone, basically an ambassador with [a] portfolio, with those type of Latin America contacts, [is that] we’re getting what has been historically unprecedented attention to this region. And, although that is shaking up a lot of trees, I think it also is a welcome reflection of the importance that Latin America has always had for the United States that merits greater thinking and resources from the United States, and that’s the direction we seem to be moving in today.

Host

It’s always a pleasure to work with you, Evan. Thank you so much for your time today.

Ellis

Pleasure is mine. Thank you, Stephanie.

 Host

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Dr. James D. Scudieri and Colonel Jon Klug analyze Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr.’s extensive operational reports and his role as Theater Army commander under Admiral Nimitz. The discussion highlights Richardson’s advocacy for Joint operational planning and the importance of interservice cooperation. They explore his unique command challenges, including a notable civil-military incident, and reflect on how his strategic insights offer valuable lessons for today’s military leaders. This exploration underlines the significance of integrating historical perspectives into contemporary military education.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast

Podcast record date: August 14, 2024

Keywords: US Army in Pacific War, World War II Central Pacific, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr., Army war-fighting functions case study, Joint functions case study

Episode Transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

I’m in the studio with Dr. James D. Scudieri and Colonel Jon Klug, PhD. Scudieri is the author of Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Central Pacific Theater Army Commander for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, 1943–45. Scudieri is also a senior research historian at the Strategic Studies Institute.

Klug is the associate dean at the US Army War College.

Welcome to Conversations on Strategy. I’m so glad you are here.

Okay, Jim, why this book? Why now?

Dr. James D. Scudieri

So, my joke is, some historians, if you can’t be good, you can be lucky. And, I started doing a search on the AHEC [US Army Heritage and Education Center] website, and I blundered across a Pacific War report. It was done by General Richardson, and it turned out, as I dug more deeply, that it was only one, and I found all six reports.

Host

Nice.

Scudieri

There were five operational reports for specific operations, and the sixth report are a series of addenda. And, that sparked a deeper look at what was going on here.

And then, I’d combine that with putting a briefing together for US Army Pacific during their first theater Army staff course, which was in July of ’22 [2022]. And, [I] had to try to condense very, very broad-brush assessments of Richardson’s reports, because the reports altogether total almost 2,000 pages. They were very sweeping, very comprehensive, highly formal, [and] categorized. The outlines follow a general trend, but they’re not necessarily all the same because the five of the six reports are specific to the operation and what he wanted to make sure everybody knew.

And then, with a tip from [my] colleague Dr. John Bonin, [I discovered] there was a small series of Richardson papers at AHEC. And, in those papers, I found unpublished notes labeled as chapters for an unpublished autobiography.

Now, the vast majority of his papers are actually at the Hoover Institution, and I was in contact with them, too. They were very helpful. It was very much a voyage of discovery. I mean, I hadn’t been tracking Richardson even in my World War II readings before.

Host

Did you want to add anything, Jon?

Colonel Jon Klug

I think General Richardson is an example of how we can look back at history and draw lessons and see how people dealt with problem sets in the past that we [still] have to today. Jim mentioned that US Army Pacific, today, is interested in what General Richardson did [and] have had similar requests about command-and-control issues in the Pacific and World War II that INDOPACOM has been interested in. So, I think it’s just a great example for Richardson [about] how we can learn and [develop] interest today in that.

Host

For non-historians like myself, what do we need to know about Lieutenant General Richardson? Who was he? Tell me more.

Scudieri

Well, I’ve been looking at General Richardson’s material for a couple of years now, and my joke is I was beginning to think I was a stepson.

I believe he’s an unsung hero. I mean, if you talk [about the] Pacific War, most people think of Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific for the Army, and even his subordinates are not as well known. But, based on what General Richardson did, I believe he is an unsung hero, which is why I say de facto he was the theater Army commander for Admiral Nimitz, and he also had several responsibilities to support General MacArthur. And, I believe that should get some more wide press.

Congress recognized his accomplishments. He was posthumously promoted to four-star general by [an] act of Congress after the war and after he had passed away.

Klug

Yeah, a couple other things on General Richardson I think that are interesting is he was at West Point as a cadet at the same time that General MacArthur was a cadet. So, they overlapped. So, one of the important things looking at the flag officers of the past is when they overlapped and who they were connected to, so to speak. You know, there [are], kind of, general officer family trees, if you will. Some of them real and some just who they know. So, Richardson and MacArthur knew each other very well from that time period. The other thing, I think, that’s important to note, just about Richardson, was [that] Marshall had sent him to the Pacific on kind of a fact-finding, you know, inspection tour before some of what Jim’s going to talk about with General Richardson in Hawaii. But, Marshall had sent him as his representative to the Pacific. So, Richardson [was] already very well known to General Marshall and had just left command of the 1st Cav [Cavalry] Division early—well, before Pearl Harbor. So, [he was] an interesting and accomplished general.

Host

Jim, you talked a little bit before about this treasure trove of untapped primary resources that you had access to. Did you find any surprises in your research?

Scudieri

Oh, yes. Besides the initial surprise of finding the material, as I read more deeply into the papers, I realized how much that General Richardson and his command had accomplished, not just for Nimitz in the Central Pacific, but also for General MacArthur. I spent 30 years as an Army logistician, but his work at this echelon above Corps touched a very wide area. He did not just do logistics. He touched everything across the Army’s war-fighting functions and the Joint functions. So, he did it all in some way, shape, or form, and the monograph talks about that in some detail.

Klug

Yeah, Jim, didn’t you write at one point, I think his peak was 12 divisions that he controlled, and [he] was a battle space owner—using a little bit older term, but one we’re familiar with in the last 20 years. Was it 12 divisions?

Scudieri

Yes. So, he commanded 12 Army divisions. They were released for combat either to Admiral Nimitz or to General MacArthur only when he deemed they were ready. The other interesting point is lots of books will talk about Japanese stay-behind units or individuals. Who took care of those security concerns? Well, it turned out General Richardson’s people did.

Understandably, we did not want to commit Army divisions to that long-term operation, but General Richardson and his subordinates conducted combat operations with separate infantry regiments, which is just one example of the command and all of his enabling units, and individuals did a lot more than just logistics.

Host

What lessons can today’s strategists and leaders learn from this historical study?

Scudieri

Once I discovered the sheer scope, depth, and breadth of what Richardson accomplished, I realized there are significant, I prefer the term insights to lessons learned, for the challenges that face US Army Pacific today. Richardson operated in all of the current, what we now call Army war-fighting functions and the Joint functions, and I deliberately analyzed his reports and his comments in his unpublished autobiographical notes in terms of the challenge of setting the theater—and, in particular, for setting the theater with regard to large-scale combat operations. And, I see several insights between what Richardson accomplished then and what US Army Pacific does in that area of responsibility for Indo-Pacific Command but also probably applicability to other Army service component commands across the world.

KIug

I think another example, a much more [US Army] War College example, is for the Military Strategy and Campaigning Course for the Theater Army lesson. I was a lesson author for that lesson for several years, and I had put in General Richardson as an exemplar as a bit of a historical pieceؙ to show the students a historical antecedent of what a Theater Army does. Although, that also has to do with [the fact that] General Richardson did more than just the Theater Army piece. We talk about dual hatting or triple hatting, where you have one officer who’s responsible for multiple major roles. So, we use Richardson as [an] example of that [in the] discussion as well. A historical example that we can talk about that’s completely unclassified in a way that’s interesting to the students in that this is a real-world historical example of how it was done.

Host

Tell me what was unique about Richardson’s approach to planning.

Scudieri

I wouldn’t phrase it as much as his approach, but it was based on the scope of his responsibilities. There is no other equivalent to his command in all of the Pacific.

Host

Okay.

Scudieri

And, this goes back to certain command-and-control issues where he didn’t just have to support Nimitz. He was responsible to Nimitz in terms of command and control, but he also had responsibilities that came from the War Department for MacArthur. And, another one that most people don’t realize is [that] even throughout all of this, as the commands changed from the Hawaiian Department to his commands in Central Pacific and then Pacific Ocean areas, throughout, he retained authority for martial law for Hawaii, which is a completely different line of authority. He did so many things simultaneously.

And again, the Army was expanding. The dark days of Pearl Harbor through early ’42 [1942] were over by the time Richardson took the commands discussed in the monograph, but that’s why the monograph talks about some of the interwar discussions as well as some of those issues with regard to the dark days. And, that’s why I wanted to highlight not just the prewar plans, but what existed in Louisville, [Kentucky], we would now call Joint doctrine because they just weren’t making this up. They had some guidance. The guidance was not authoritative, and there was a road map on how to accomplish Joint operations without just starting from scratch. But again, the Army grew quickly, as did the other services. So, this is a lot of discovery learning as he goes along.

And, it wasn’t just unique for him, necessarily, but it was [important] for the Army and the other services to be able to start with the relatively small size of the prewar Army that had focus on the color plans against single countries, and then, that morphs into the rainbow plans to conduct global war simultaneously.

Klug

I think it would also be fair to say that General Richardson was an advocate for Joint operations and Joint planning. Tying back to his relationship with Marshall, as Marshall worked with Admiral King, his equivalent in the Navy, they advocated for Nimitz to take more steps down the Joint path, if you will, and that included building what became a Joint staff for Nimitz—really the first staff. And, when we look at the history of Joint operations, it’s really Nimitz’s J-4, so the supply area, that was really your first true Joint staff section. And Richardson had worked with his boss, Nimitz, to try to convince him to go in that way. And, Nimitz was already in favor of that. He was a believer in Joint operations, but his Army commander, Nimitz’s Army commander, and Nimitz, and then support from Marshall and support from King—they ended up building what, in essence, is the first true Joint staff section, and then headquarters, which was vital for operations in the Pacific against the Japanese. So, [it played] a huge part there, and Richardson advocating for a gentleman named Brigadier General Edmond Levy, who was really the key leader in the J-4 when they first built the J-4 section. So, he’s an Army logistician working with Navy logistics to try to bring them together. But that’s a whole other story.

Host

This has been really great. Do you have any anecdotes or other insights that you can share?

Scudieri

Well, most readers for this period will not be surprised to see that there was a considerable amount of interservice rivalry, especially at the higher levels.

And, perhaps more so since there was guidance but not definitive law or doctrine for Joint operations. But, I came across an interesting comment by Richardson in his autobiographical notes that he issued to his staff, and that was, “Hey, we’re here to win the war. We will support Nimitz to the best of our ability, bottom line.”

Klug

The other thing that I would always emphasize with the military strategy and campaigning instructors was a little anecdote I find fascinating that General Richardson was held in contempt of court as the military governor. So, what was going on here was federal judge Delbert [E.] Metzger wanted two German-Americans to appear in his court, but they were in military custody, and Richardson, as his military governor and in his military governor role, said, “No.”

So, the judge held him in contempt and levied a $5,000 fine on him for that—and this was drug on for a while in the newspapers in Hawaii, Honolulu, but also back in the US. It went so far as President FDR [Frankline Delano Roosevelt] actually had to pardon General Richardson for this charge. And, I think it’s interesting, but it’s also a great example of civ-mil [civil-military] friction at, kind of, the lowest level, and that civ-mil relations is an important aspect of what we teach here at the [US Army] War College [and] what we explore with the students.

Host

This has been really fun, but we do have to wrap it up. Do you have any concluding thoughts that you’re willing to share?

Scudieri

Well, this was a long road because, as I mentioned, it began with a briefing to the US Army Pacific staff in July of ’22 [2022], and the publication date’s two years later.

[When] we originally started the project, I was going to write an article, and there’s so much material. Then the Press said, well, expand [it] to two articles, and then it went from two articles to a full-blown monograph. So, it’s been a pretty long road, but I would not have gotten there without the incredible support of the War College Press editors.

And, I also like to use this as an example of what some of us call applied history, which is why I organized the monograph in terms of the current Army war-fighting functions and the Joint functions. We don’t have time to do history for history’s sake in this environment. And so, I wanted to package it so that our current practitioners can get the biggest bang for the buck with the least effort.

Host

Jon, do you have anything?

Klug

Just that this is a tremendous contribution. I’m glad that Jim has pressed through and offered this up. I know it’ll impact the folks in Hawaii or going to Hawaii, but I also know that, not just moving forward, we’ve used a lot of Jim’s research for discussion in our Pacific campaigns elective with students. So, we’ve been doing that for a few years now, Jim and I, with different students. So, this has informed their understanding of the strategic but also the campaigning level of what we’re doing in that elective.

Host

Listeners, you can find the historical study at press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/969. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

This has been great. Thank you.

Klug

Thank you.

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This episode’s topic is A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, with Dr. John A. Nagl and Colonel Katie Crombe. They discuss the project’s origins and its goal to extract key lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War for US military strategy. Nagl outlines the collaborative research behind the publication, while Crombe highlights strategic lessons related to US military preparedness. The conversation covers the impact of technology and the necessity of multidomain operations, emphasizing the importance of strong alliances and the need for adaptive training in anticipation of future conflicts. The authors’ insights underscore the critical need for the military to learn from current events to enhance its readiness for tomorrow’s challenges.

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine War, strategy, military preparedness, drone warfare, cyber warfare

Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/14/2003583942/-1/-1/0/COS-54-CROMBE-NAGL-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

LTG Ben Hodges (US Army, retired) America and the International Order

In this episode, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (US Army, retired) discusses America’s role in the international order. The podcast covers the Russia-Ukraine War and what it means for NATO, maintaining stability in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, strategic competition between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the economic and technological competition between the United States and China, South America and immigration, North Korea, and more. 

E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast

Date recorded: August 12, 2024

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine War, China, North Korea, South America, NATO

Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/30/2003575009/-1/-1/0/COS-53-HODGES-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

This episode delves into the concept of strategic culture and how it influences international relations, military strategy, and deterrence, particularly between the United States, China, and Russia. Dr. Scobell and Dr. Kuznar share insights from their extensive research and highlight the nuances of strategic culture in peacetime, crisis, and conflict scenarios. 

Keywords: culture China, Taiwan, strategy, strategic culture 

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Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/23/2003569840/-1/-1/0/COS-52_KUZNAR_SCOBELL%20TRANSCRIPT.PDF