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Before the holiday break, Vipin contributed a new post to the Strategic Stability Substack (I know, two in one year, how can he keep up this lightning pace) titled “Four Shibboleths of Nuclear Strategy.” In the post, Vipin asks whether we should take for granted four strong, consistent ideas that appear in nuclear policy debates: (1) strategic stability is “good,” (2) arms races are “bad,” (3) escalation is uncontrollable, and (4) deterrence is the threat that leaves something to chance (trying to surmise what Schelling really meant). This post highlighted some important questions about how we discuss nuclear policy: do the terms we use still hold the same relevance today as they did when they were first created, do we even operate from the same definitions as one another, and how have changes in the world changed how we think about policy underlying these principles?
And to demonstrate how good of a sport he truly is, Vipin not only brought a new senior fellow on board at MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy, but one who immediately wrote a substack post in response to Vipin’s “Four Shibboleths.” Matthew Sharp joins the group following a long career in government, with stops at the Department of State, NSC, and U.S. Mission to Vienna where he worked on IAEA issues. Matthew described the journey his brain took as he thought about Vipin’s post, elaborating on how he thinks about the risk of increased numbers via either horizontal or vertical proliferation, and shares his own view of the importance of strategic stability as a goal, and valuable if thought of as reaching a stable equilibrium.
We saved a little time to talk about South Korea’s interest in nuclear submarines - what operational value nuclear-powered submarines can provide, and what kinds of activities South Korea may need to begin in cooperation with the IAEA, drawing upon Matthew’s past experience working on AUKUS implementation. We spent our last few minutes tackling a mailbag/chat question regarding the science behind nuclear winter and its place in nuclear policy discussions and international debate.
Things to read:
Sharon Squassoni in The Bulletin: “How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea“
Brent Sadler for Heritage: “The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines With South Korea and Japan”
James Scouras, Lauren Ice, Megan Proper at JHU/APL: “Whatever Happened to Nuclear Winter?”
Strategic Simplicity is an independent publication. The views expressed in articles and podcasts belong to the participants only, and do not represent the United States government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or any other institution.
Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.
Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.
By Pranay Vaddi5
88 ratings
Before the holiday break, Vipin contributed a new post to the Strategic Stability Substack (I know, two in one year, how can he keep up this lightning pace) titled “Four Shibboleths of Nuclear Strategy.” In the post, Vipin asks whether we should take for granted four strong, consistent ideas that appear in nuclear policy debates: (1) strategic stability is “good,” (2) arms races are “bad,” (3) escalation is uncontrollable, and (4) deterrence is the threat that leaves something to chance (trying to surmise what Schelling really meant). This post highlighted some important questions about how we discuss nuclear policy: do the terms we use still hold the same relevance today as they did when they were first created, do we even operate from the same definitions as one another, and how have changes in the world changed how we think about policy underlying these principles?
And to demonstrate how good of a sport he truly is, Vipin not only brought a new senior fellow on board at MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy, but one who immediately wrote a substack post in response to Vipin’s “Four Shibboleths.” Matthew Sharp joins the group following a long career in government, with stops at the Department of State, NSC, and U.S. Mission to Vienna where he worked on IAEA issues. Matthew described the journey his brain took as he thought about Vipin’s post, elaborating on how he thinks about the risk of increased numbers via either horizontal or vertical proliferation, and shares his own view of the importance of strategic stability as a goal, and valuable if thought of as reaching a stable equilibrium.
We saved a little time to talk about South Korea’s interest in nuclear submarines - what operational value nuclear-powered submarines can provide, and what kinds of activities South Korea may need to begin in cooperation with the IAEA, drawing upon Matthew’s past experience working on AUKUS implementation. We spent our last few minutes tackling a mailbag/chat question regarding the science behind nuclear winter and its place in nuclear policy discussions and international debate.
Things to read:
Sharon Squassoni in The Bulletin: “How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea“
Brent Sadler for Heritage: “The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines With South Korea and Japan”
James Scouras, Lauren Ice, Megan Proper at JHU/APL: “Whatever Happened to Nuclear Winter?”
Strategic Simplicity is an independent publication. The views expressed in articles and podcasts belong to the participants only, and do not represent the United States government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or any other institution.
Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.
Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

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