Imperial (Defaulted) Chinese Bonds (Again)

Yes, one of us might have sworn up and down that we would never do another episode about defaulted Imperial Chinese bonds. But a brand new case out of the DC federal courts has changed our minds. The case got the back of the hand from the district judge, but the arguments being made were not as weak as a quick glance at the opinion might suggest. Dare we hope for the entertainment value provided by an amicus brief filed by the Trump administration in support of the plaintiffs?

Producer: Leanna Doty

Total Return Swaps

There have been reports in the financial press about the use of Total Return Swaps to provide credit to governments (e.g., Angola), often in situations where the government can't otherwise borrow on capital markets. As best we understand them (i.e., badly) these are derivatives backed by sovereign bonds and sometimes cash as collateral. The collateral reduces borrowing costs and the debt stays off books, since the obligation to pay the bonds is contingent (since the bonds are only collateral). We increasingly hear scuttlebutt suggesting these deals are commonplace, and some of our investor friends complain that TRSs effectively subordinate existing creditors. We don't understand TRSs well, and we have questions. Isn't this just garden variety debt dilution? Does it violate the negative pledge clause?

Producer: Leanna Doty

Cambodia’s “Dirty Debts” to the US — Redux

In the 1970s, the US allowed Cambodia to finance the importation of rice and other agricultural commodities. The debt remains unpaid. One version of this story is that successor Cambodian governments have refused to pay these “dirty” debts. In this telling, the US used the loans to prop up a friendly but illegitimate Cambodian regime. Although the US shipped food, loan proceeds mostly financed the Cambodian military, which the US used as a proxy in the fight against the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge. Meanwhile, the US was bombing the Cambodian countryside, destroying domestic food production and contributing to a humanitarian crisis. To make matters worse, it turns out most of the food was sent to countries other than Cambodia. To some observers, the US bears a significant share of responsibility for the Khmer Rouge’s ultimate rise to power. Decades later, after indescribable suffering (caused at least in part by US interference) the US wants money back. The contours of this story are largely true, but the real story of the PL-480 “Food for Peace” program is more complicated. Today’s episode is about what we have found so far and the questions that still remain open.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5561161

Producer: Leanna Doty

What if POTUS wanted an OBBD?

Let us say, purely hypothetically, that there is a point at which some combination of the spending excesses of the One Big Beautiful Bill, the government shutdown, a rejection by the Supreme Court of tariff mania, and more, result in a shortfall of revenues for the current administration. And let us also say that POTUS goes to his brains trust to ask how best to do an OBBD/R (One Big Beautiful Default/Restructuring). What path might the brains trust take? And what about the option of taxing the treasury holdings of foreign governments, which the administration has already signaled its interest in?

Producer: Leanna Doty

The Invasion Tax

The lawsuit over Ukraine's $3 billion bond debt to Russia seems to be on hold (maybe forever) in the English courts. And maybe there is no way for the Russian government to force repayment. Still, the debt is a minor cloud hanging (along with many bigger ones) over Ukraine. It would be nice if there was a way to make it go away permanently. Might there be? We talk about a common provision in a sovereign bond's Taxation section — we aren't sure how common, but it certainly isn't unique to Ukraine — that lets the issuer tax investors who have a connection to it other than simply holding its bonds. As written, this provision would allow Ukraine to impose a 100% tax on bond payments to Russia. This may not be what the drafters had in mind, and it opens the door to some unsavory tax shenanigans, but an Invasion Tax doesn't seem too objectionable.

Also: "Whatever it takes" means "whatever it takes!" Except when it means something else.

Producer: Leanna Doty

Argentina Again

The Trump administration says it will do “whatever it takes” to rescue the Argentine peso and bond yields, saving buddy Javier Milei from electoral disaster. We do not think the U.S. Treasury can simply dole out money to Milei. If the administration does not want to go to Congress for permission (it generally does not), and if the Mexican bailouts of 1982 and 1995 are indicators, the U.S. Treasury will ask the Argentines to provide collateral of some sort. (The Falklands, maybe?) If so, holders of Argentine sovereign bonds might wonder whether they are entitled to some collateral too. Sovereign bonds have negative pledge clauses, which generally prevent the borrower from creating new secured debt without securing bondholders on equivalent terms. So, we looked at some of the negative pledge clauses in Argentine bonds. They are weird, but don't seem very protective. These are beautiful clauses, folks, BEAUTIFUL. Looks like the U.S. gets collateral, bondholders don't. Total disaster for them!

Producer: Leanna Doty

Ukraine's Expansive "Fiscal Laws" Clause

International sovereign bonds, and particularly those issued under English law, often include a clause providing that payments are subject to the applicable "fiscal and other laws." Usually, the clause makes clear this refers to fiscal laws in the “place of payment” (e.g., Luxembourg). Separately, international bonds also provide that, if the issuer imposes any taxes on bond payments, it must "gross up" payments to foreign investors, so the tax does not reduce their payments. Together, the two clauses usually immunize foreign investors from taxes imposed by the issuer but leave room for taxes imposed by the place of payment. Ukraine's bonds are different. They seem to leave room for Ukraine to impose its own "fiscal" law on payments. Arguably, they leave investors subject even to local laws that aren't fiscal in nature. Might this be a source of leverage for the country in its negotiations with GDP warrant holders, who have so far refused to make concessions in restructuring talks?

Producer: Leanna Doty

The Greek GDP Warrant Drama

Greece’s debt situation has improved remarkably, from default status in 2012 to investment grade in 2025. A few weeks ago though, Bloomberg reported on a brewing drama with the GDP warrants that were offered to investors in the brutal 2012 restructuring. Apparently, Greece has elected to exercise its right to call the warrants, and holders are yelling bloody murder at the low price at which Greece says it is entitled to buy. Every side has lawyered up and claims the other side is acting unreasonably. We speculate wildly on what might actually be going on and what is likely to happen.

Producer: Leanna Doty

Some Questions, Now That it's About 3 Years Since Russia’s Default

It has now been around 3 years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted EU and US sanctions and a default on Russia’s external bonds. The prescription clause in these bonds says that Russia’s obligations become void unless investors make claims within three years of the date payment is due. What does it mean to “make” a “claim”? Filing a lawsuit would do the trick. What about an email requesting payment? An automated message, which the depository sends out every payment date? Should bondholders have sought an agreement tolling the prescription period? Since they didn't, does Russia now have what amounts to an option to pay past due amounts? And what about interest on unpaid amounts? Does Russia owe interest on payments that were impossible to make due to sanctions?

Producer: Leanna Doty

Sovereign Debt Odd & Ends

An odds and ends podcast about unrelated sovereign debt topics. First up, Venezuela. Most investors have been sitting around waiting for an eventual restructuring and lifting of US sanctions. But a handful of funds sued early, got judgments, and have spent years trying unsuccessfully to collect. If they had succeeded, they would have recovered much more than similarly-situated creditors who waited around for a restructuring deal. But they failed and, in a bizarre twist, have asked the court to vacate their judgments, effectively returning them to the creditor queue. We cry foul. Next up, another fiscally-irresponsible and increasingly author ... well, it's the United States. We discuss the crazy (and terrifying) idea that the US might unilaterally extend the maturities of government debt.

Producer: Leanna Doty