Philippe Aghion

Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Collège de France

Année 2025-2026

07 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : US-Europe-Chine

Philippe Aghion

Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Collège de France

Année 2025-2026

06 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Stagnation séculaire

Philippe Aghion

Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Collège de France

Année 2025-2026

05 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : L'adversité comme levier d'innovation

Philippe Aghion

Chaire Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Collège de France

Année 2025-2026

04 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Les vagues technologiques

Philippe Aghion

Collège de France

Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Année 2025-2026

03 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Trappe malthusienne et transition démographique

Philippe Aghion

Collège de France

Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Année 2025-2026

02 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Révolution agricole, urbanisation

Philippe Aghion

Collège de France

Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Année 2025-2026

Japanese Economy : Demographic Challenges

Takeo Hoshi est invité par l'assemblée du Collège de France sur proposition du Pr Philippe Aghion.

Takeo Hoshi : Professeur d'économie et directeur du Tokyo College, université de Tokyo

Résumé

One of the most pressing issues facing the Japanese economy in recent decades is the set of profound demographic changes. Japan has been experiencing simultaneous shifts: an overall decline in population, a rapid acceleration of population aging, low fertility rates, and a marked decline in the scale of internal migration. Each of these factors interacts with the economy in complex ways. In this lecture, I argue that although demographic change is often cited as the main culprit behind Japan's long stagnation, its direct impact on economic growth has been smaller than that of the slowdown in productivity growth. The exception, however, lies in the decline of internal migration, which has had a more immediate effect on labor market fluidity and regional dynamism.

Japan's population peaked around 2008 at approximately 128 million people. Since then, the number has steadily declined, falling below 125 million by the early 2020s, and projections suggest that by the middle of this century it may shrink to near 100 million or even lower. Population decline naturally raises concerns about the shrinking of domestic markets, reduced tax revenues, and the sustainability of public services. However, from a macroeconomic perspective, population size alone does not necessarily reduce per capita income growth. Countries with smaller populations than Japan—such as Switzerland or the Scandinavian nations—have achieved high levels of prosperity. What matters more is the ability of an economy to generate productivity growth and adapt its institutions to demographic realities.

Closely tied to the overall decline is the remarkable speed of population aging. Japan is already the world's oldest society, with more than 28 percent of its population aged 65 and older. This share is projected to reach one-third within the next decade. Aging raises fiscal and social challenges: increased expenditures on pensions, health care, and long-term care, coupled with a shrinking working population that supports these systems. Economists debate whether aging itself is a drag on productivity growth. Some argue that an older workforce may be less innovative or less mobile; others note that older workers often bring experience and stability. What is more certain is that aging imposes heavy redistributional pressures. Given the current social security systems in advanced countries, it requires governments to tax, borrow, or cut spending elsewhere in order to finance the growing needs to support the elderly.

A key driver of both population decline and aging is Japan's low fertility rate. For more than four decades, Japan's total fertility rate has hovered well below the replacement level of a little bit above 2. In recent years, it has dropped to around 1.3 or even lower. Policymakers often frame low fertility as the cause of economic stagnation, but the causality may run in the opposite direction. Economic uncertainty, sluggish wage growth, long working hours, and high costs of childrearing have made family formation more difficult for younger generations. In particular, the severe constraints on women—who face strong pressures to choose between family and career—contribute to delayed marriage and fewer births. The underdevelopment of childcare infrastructure, persistent gender wage gaps, and rigid corporate practices all reinforce this trend. Thus, low fertility should be understood not just as a demographic phenomenon, but as a reflection of deep structural and social issues within Japanese society.

Among the demographic shifts, the decline in internal migration deserves special emphasis. Historically, Japan's postwar growth was supported by the large-scale movement of workers not only from rural areas to urban centers but also in the other direction. This internal migration allowed human capitals to flow toward their best uses, thereby sustaining economic growth dynamics. However, in recent decades, this movement has slowed markedly. Fewer people are relocating, and regional labor mobility has declined. The reduced reallocation of labor across regions and sectors has diminished Japan's overall economic dynamism. In this sense, the decline in internal migration has had a more direct impact on productivity growth than population decline or aging alone.

It is worth stressing that demographic change, while dramatic, does not fully explain Japan's prolonged stagnation. What was more important for Japan was the sharp decline in productivity growth beginning in the 1990s. In fact, if productivity growth were stronger, Japan could offset many of the burdens of aging and population decline. Conversely, even if fertility rates were to recover somewhat, without productivity growth the economy would still struggle to generate prosperity. Aging may have discouraged innovation and led to slower productivity growth, but a more important cause for the productivity growth decline was the lack of creative destruction.

Nonetheless, the demographic challenges cannot be dismissed. They exert continuous pressure on the social fabric, highlight the limitations of current gender and labor policies, and constrain fiscal choices. The low fertility rate, in particular, reflects the frustrations of a generation that finds it difficult to reconcile work and family life. Addressing demographic challenges therefore requires more than pronatalist policies; it demands comprehensive reforms in labor practices, childcare support, gender equality, and regional revitalization.

In sum, Japan's demographic changes are real and significant, but their economic meaning is often misunderstood. Population decline and aging are frequently portrayed as insurmountable obstacles to growth, when in fact the more fundamental challenge lies in productivity growth. The one demographic factor that does have a direct bearing on productivity—declining internal migration—deserves much more attention. Understanding this distinction allows us to focus policy debates where they matter most: on fostering innovation, mobility, and inclusivity, rather than simply lamenting demographic destiny.

Philippe Aghion

Collège de France

Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Année 2025-2026

01 - Innovation et croissance à travers l'histoire : Introduction

Philippe Aghion

Collège de France

Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Année 2025-2026

Conférence - Takeo Hoshi : Rapid Growth and Long Stagnation

Takeo Hoshi est invité par l'assemblée du Collège de France sur proposition du Pr Philippe Aghion.

Takeo Hoshi : Professeur d'économie et directeur du Tokyo College, université de Tokyo

Résumé

Japan's postwar economic growth is often described as a miracle, and for good reason. Having suffered immense destruction during the Second World War—with roughly one quarter of its national wealth and production facilities lost—the country emerged from devastation and rebuilt rapidly. Early stabilization policies, such as the Dodge Plan, helped curb postwar hyperinflation, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought a surge of demand for Japanese goods. This laid the foundation for what became known as the rapid economic growth period.

Between 1950 and 1973, Japan's real GNP expanded at an average annual rate exceeding 9 percent. Growth accounting exercises show that capital accumulation was important: Japan invested heavily in physical capital, supported by high savings rates. Labor force increase also contributed, but the most significant factor was the acceleration of productivity growth. Total factor productivity accounted for more than half of Japan's overall growth in this era, highlighting the role of technological catch-up and improvements in efficiency.

The catch-up process followed the logic of diminishing marginal productivity: starting from a low capital base, the returns to investment were very high. Japan imported advanced technologies from abroad, adapted them, and combined them with its own strong base of human capital. Educational achievements of Japanese workers were already high even compared with economically advanced countries such as the U.S., so the workforce could absorb and utilize new methods quickly. In the language of growth theory, Japan had both the stock of human capital and the institutional framework for rapid technological adoption.

The first major break in this rapid expansion came with the oil shocks of the 1970s. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 caused inflation and forced Japanese industries to restructure. Although Japan adapted relatively well by shifting to more energy-efficient production, the overall growth rate slowed. From 1973 to 1987, Japan's average annual growth was closer to 4 percent—still impressive by international standards, but less than half of what it had been during the rapid economic growth period.

Several explanations for this slowdown have been proposed. An obvious one is the end of catch-up phase of economic growth: as Japan approached the technological frontier, it could no longer rely on simply importing and adapting foreign technologies. Productivity growth naturally decelerated as the scope for catch-up diminished.

Yet even in this period, Japan was far from stagnating. The economy continued to expand, industries remained competitive internationally, and living standards continued to improve. However, the seeds of later problems were beginning to take root—particularly in the financial sector and in the structural rigidity of industries that resisted creative destruction.

The expansion from 1986 to 1991, sometimes referred to as the "bubble economy," was one of the longest postwar upswings. Asset prices surged dramatically: the Nikkei 225 stock index tripled between 1985 and 1989, while urban land prices rose to unprecedented levels. This boom was fueled by a combination of loose monetary policy, speculative expectations, and financial liberalization that outpaced regulatory adaptation.

Many observers at the time believed that Japan had entered a new growth stage. But in retrospect, it is clear that asset values far exceeded fundamentals. It was indeed a "bubble economy." Speculative bubbles always end up collapsing. The Japanese bubble was not an exception. Japanese asset prices experienced severe declines in the early 1990s. The Nikkei 225 fell from nearly 39,000 at the end of 1989 to below 15,000 by the mid-1990s, and land prices also declined sharply. The collapse of the bubble had serious consequences on the real side of the economy: households cut back their consumption, corporations stopped borrowing money and investing in productive capitals, and banks found themselves burdened with non-performing loans.

What followed has been described as Japan's "lost decade"—and in fact, many now speak of "lost decades," as stagnation persisted well into the 2010s. Real GDP growth slowed to barely above 1 percent annually, far below the OECD average. Deflation set in, suggesting there was a serious demand shortage.

The core of the problem, however, was not simply weak demand. Japan experienced problems on the supply side. Productivity growth fell dramatically. Decompositions of total factor productivity (TFP) show that the reallocation effect—the contribution from shifting resources from low-productivity to high-productivity firms—declined significantly. Even more troubling, the exit effect turned negative: high-productivity firms exited the market while low-productivity firms remained.

The negative exit effect is closely related to the zombie problem. Banks, saddled with bad loans, kept extending credit to insolvent or unproductive firms in order to avoid recognizing losses on their balance sheets. These "zombie" firms absorbed resources but did not contribute meaningfully to productivity growth. More importantly their survival reduced profitability of otherwise healthy firms and discouraged entry by new productive firms. In other words, zombies slowed the process of creative destruction, which is essential for productivity growth in a mature economy. The result was a long stagnation in which capital and labor were trapped in inefficient uses.

Demographics also played a role in reducing the supply capacity. Japan's labor force was no longer expanding as rapidly, and the aging population began to constrain growth.

One debate during the 1990s was whether Japan's stagnation was primarily a demand-side problem (a persistent demand shortage) or a supply-side problem (lack of productivity growth). If only a prolonged demand shortage was the problem, it should have produced a deflationary spiral, but Japan instead experienced persistent but mild deflation. This suggests that both demand and supply constraints were at work. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies occasionally provided stimulus, but without addressing the structural problems, their effects were limited.

In the 2010s, Abenomics attempted both demand stimulus and structural reforms. The first two "arrows"—monetary easing and fiscal expansion—succeeded in eliminating the demand shortage and ending deflation. But the third arrow, structural reform, was more difficult to implement. Measures such as corporate governance reform, labor market reform, and policies to increase female labor participation had some impact, but the deeper challenge of fostering productivity through creative destruction remained.

Japan's experience thus underscores a central lesson: demographics and demand matter, but productivity growth is decisive. Without mechanisms that promote restructuring and reallocation, mature economies stagnate. For Japan, the unwillingness to allow inefficient firms to exit severely depressed creative destruction. It was a key reason for the lost decades.

Philippe Aghion

Collège de France

Économie des institutions, de l'innovation et de la croissance

Année 2024-2025

Colloque - The Economics of Artificial Intelligence

Chad Jones : A.I. and Economic Growth

Chad Jones

Stanford GSB