What happens if we turn to James Baldwin, not just for the amazing quotations and excellent photos, but as a critical theorist? What if we read his nonfiction philosophically? What can Baldwin help us understand and do now? In So Unimaginable a Price: Baldwin and the Black Atlantic (Northwestern UP, 2025), John Drabinski takes up this project to give a sustained philosophical reading of Baldwin’s nonfiction. Drabinski does so to understand the event of Baldwin’s contributions in the context of the Black Atlantic. Baldwin was a thinker who looked to the United States, even when in exile. But he was also in the broader context of the mid-twentieth century Black Atlantic, of which he was surely aware but wrote little—what if we read for what was absent from Baldwin’s texts?

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While we tend to think of biological individuals in terms of paradigmic cases – a dog, a starfish, a bacterium – our ordinary criteria for distinguishing one individual from another are inadequate for making these distinctions in general. If a starfish can literally split itself in two and each half regenerates into a new starfish, why hold that there was just one starfish to begin with rather than many? In The Units of Life: Kinds of Individual in Biology (Oxford UP, 2025), Ellen Clarke defends the idea of evolutionary individuals: units created and maintained by mechanisms that ensure the parts share a common fate. Such individuals enable good evolutionary bookkeeping, in particular our ability to predict which variations in these individuals will enable natural selection to occur. Clarke, an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Leeds, considers the merits of her view in relation to alternatives, how her view explains the emergence of new levels of biological individuality, and how the need for idealization and scientific choice of individual boundaries can avoid conventionalism about biological individuals.

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“Liberal egalitarianism” refers to a family of political views that are “liberal” in taking individual rights to be of premier importance and “egalitarian” in holding that justice requires that political, social, and economic inequalities be minimized as much as possible. The standard approach to liberal egalitarian theorizing, influenced greatly by John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971), is to specify a set of normative principles to guide the design and functioning of society’s primary institutions (its “basic structure”). In The Anatomy of Justice: On the Shape, Substance, and Power of Liberal Egalitarianism (Oxford UP, 2024), Gina Schouten argues for a reorientation in liberal egalitarian theorizing about justice. She proposes that, instead of prescriptive principles, we should instead think of a liberal egalitarian theory’s most important product to be “evaluative discernment”: theorizing should aim to discern those achievements or values the realization of which would make society more just overall. Schouten offers a weighted specification of the values of justice, what she calls “the anatomy of justice.” The anatomy of justice is deployed by Schouten to help resolve difficulties internal to liberal egalitarianism, in part by deflating longstanding debates, like that regarding whether equality is fundamentally a distributive or a relational value. The anatomy of justice is also used by Schouten to provide systematic and compelling guidance for addressing existing injustices and to defend liberalism from criticisms from the left. The book thus aims to demonstrate the vitality and relevance of feminist liberal egalitarianism.

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How do scientists reason when they posit unobservables to explain their observed results? For example, how did Watson and Crick reason that DNA had a double-helix structure when they observed Franklin’s image 51, or how did Hodgkin and Huxley reason that sodium ions carried the current flowing into the membrane of a voltage-clamped giant squid axon? In Compositional Abduction and Scientific Interpretation: A granular approach (Cambridge University Press), Kenneth Aizawa argues for an account of such reasoning as singular compositional abduction: explaining particular experimental results in terms of lower-level entities, such as the bonds between nucleotides or the positive charges of sodium ions. Aizawa, who is professor of philosophy at Rutgers University—Newark, draws on close examination of scientific practice to argue that dominant views in philosophy of science regarding abduction do not capture what scientists are actually doing. Instead, he articulates compositional abduction as a specific form of inferential practice in science distinct from eliminating alternative hypotheses, employing hypothetical-deductive confirmation, or identifying mechanism components.

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How can habits of racialization be affected by art, in its reception and its creation? How can a carnal aesthetics help us understand Latinx life? What if we listen to photographs? How might they undo us? Can we be undone? In Carnalities: The Art of Living in Latinidad (Duke UP, 2025), Mariana Ortega focuses on photography using a hermeneutics of love and critical phenomenology to think about and with creative practices of primarily Latinx artists. Moving from the ocular to the mouthly, Ortega opens up possibilities for being affected by art. She also shows how artists use aesthetic practices to transform themselves, the possibilities for life, and as means to refuse to forget the dead.

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The word “metaphysics” conjures up thoughts of very hard questions about reality and deep, perhaps unresolvable, metaphysical mysteries. But is that the right way to think about the subject matter of metaphysics? According to Amie Thomasson, very clearly no. In her new book, Rethinking Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2025), Thomasson argues that traditional views of metaphysics make the mistake of assuming that our concepts all function the same way – for example, that the job of metaphysics is to provide truthmakers for statements about necessity and possibility, about morality, about numbers, when each of these discourses have different aims. Thomasson, who is Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College, instead offers a deflationary view of metaphysics in which the job of metaphysicians is conceptual engineering – of figuring out how our concepts and terms work in a discourse, what their various functions are, and what conceptual schemes we should adopt, particularly if our current ones are leading us into metaphysical pseudo-problems.

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How should one live? What should one do? And what do these questions have to do with being a good person? In Unbecoming Persons: The Rise and Demine of the Modern Moral Self (University of Chicago Press, 2025), Ladelle McWhorter reorients these questions through a genealogy of the concept of personhood. That genealogy is in the service of showing us not only that personhood is historically contingent, but that it is also optional. In unbecoming persons, we can feel relief, vital belonging, and exhilaration. We can also embrace an ethos of active belonging, a mode of living that eschews the trappings of personhood for the possibilities of life together.

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Until recently, no one could access the detailed contents of your mind directly the way only you can. This level of protection of our mental data was guaranteed by the way we are built biologically – and it can no longer be taken for granted. In Cyborg Rights: Extending Cognition, Ethics, and the Law (Routledge, 2025) S. Orestis Palermos considers the ethical and legal implications of the extended mind thesis – the idea that information-processing technologies are not merely tools but literal parts of our minds. While this thesis remains controversial, there is little doubt that technological devices can push information that coheres in an integrated way with your thoughts – for example, when your phone presents photographs of last year’s holiday on today’s anniversary. Such mind extensions create new vulnerabilities to invasions of mental privacy, freedom of thought, and protection from personal assault. Palermos, who is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Ioannina, articulates these new problems and explores what levels of protection we should adopt in the face of them, up to the point of making it technologically impossible to access or manipulate your extended mental contents. 

S. Orestis Palermos is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at University of Ioannina, in Greece.

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Humans live in richly normatively structured social environments: there are ways of doing things that are appropriate, and we are aware of what these ways are. For many social scientists, social institutions are sets of rules about how to act, though theories differ about what the rules are, how they are established and maintained, and what makes some social institutions stable through social change and others more transient. In Presentist Social Functionalism: Bringing Contemporary Evolutionary Biology to the Social Sciences (Springer, 2025), Armin Schulz defends a version of the general view that social institutions have functions, drawing on a concept of function from evolutionary biology. On his view, the function of a social institution is not a matter of its history, but those features that explain its ability to survive and thrive in the here and now. Schulz, who is professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas, also uses this account to provide an explanation of what institutional corruption amounts to, and to analyze current debates between shareholder vs. stakeholder views of the function of a corporation.

This book is available open access here

Armin W. Schulz is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kansas

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Why do so many philosophers value anarchy but refuse to call themselves anarchists? Why don’t philosophers draw on the classical anarchist tradition? How can we think de facto anarchism as distinct from dawning anarchism? What is at stake in doing so? Does philosophy need anarchism? To answer these questions, in Stop Thief! Anarchism and Philosophy (Polity Books, 2023), Catherine Malabou reads submerged counter-revolutionary themes in the texts of several key philosophical thinkers. By doing so, Malabou helps us understand the ways in which philosophy has left anarchy unthought, while also stealing from it, and disavowing it. What emerges in her analysis is the importance of the non-governable, not just as a problem for philosophy, but as what opens towards other ways of sharing, acting, and thinking.

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