Austin, Vipin, and I suspended our unilateralist approach to choosing podcast topics for one recording session, instead taking on questions and comments that you listeners/readers sent to us. Thank you for being willing to engage, on pretty short notice, on a wide array of topics. We will definitely do this again, so please keep sending in your thoughts!

I’m not going to list every question we received, but they ran the gamut of nuclear policy topics. We discussed China’s military parade, Pakistan’s long-range missile program, counterforce and negotiating war termination, advice for new/early-career participants in the nuclear field, and reflected on “surprises” we experienced during our careers in government.

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I really enjoyed this conversation with Lowell Schwartz, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Policy, who joined the podcast to talk about the role Congress plays in overseeing arms control and nuclear policy. I’m glad we were able to get Lowell’s perspective on the opaque world of executive-legislative branch relations, particularly on national security issues, and who better to offer insights on this topic than a former senior professional staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who managed the WMD portfolio.

We talked about the New START and nuclear modernization compromise, how a staffer approaches oversight of the executive branch on these issues, and Lowell’s experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In addition to New START, we talked about the politics surrounding JCPOA negotiations on Capitol Hill, how to ask nicely for briefings from the Department of State, and the comparative advantages the executive branch has over Capitol Hill on the foreign policy, military and technical topics involved in arms control policy.

We also talk about the relevance of public support for arms control and defense spending decisions, Golden Dome, SDI, and missile defense politics historically, and the prospects for arms control with Russia and China today. Lowell and I also spent some time talking about the rationale for arms control, what aspects of arms control policy members of Congress and Senators may find important, and how historical arms control oversight on Capitol Hill—and deal-making involving defense spending and arms control limits—may relate to any contemporary effort to approve a new treaty. Finally, we end with a discussion about how far Congress can go with spending to modernize and possibly grow the arsenal in future without an arms control path to control costs down the road (and how hard that looks right now given relations with potential arms control partners).

Read Lowell’s writing on domestic and international politics at his Substack, “A New Sense of Freedom.“

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We had a long, detailed conversation across a host of policy issues that impact arms control policy, diving into his long career as a DoD and NSC official from the late 80s into the early 2000s, overseeing the policy process that supported negotiated reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces for two decades. Here’s a quick list of the topics we covered:

* The relationship between parity as a policy objective vs. deterrence requirements;

* The potential for an “interim restraint” in continuing New START limits constraining modernization, force posture adjustments, breaking comity among the various USG entities involved in nuclear modernization, and/or diminish negotiating leverage;

* How deterrence requirements can and should inform an arms control position;

* His experience leading a SIOP review starting in the late 1980s, how U.S. officials began prioritizing targets in furtherance of U.S. nuclear strategy, and how these efforts helped lay groundwork for the START process;

* what an “all-warheads” agreement could look like between the US and Russia that takes into account deterrence requirements AND politics;

* the concerns expressed regarding a lapse of New START without replacement (or perhaps replacement with an agreement that permits a larger deployed arsenal) and good arguments and goals for future arms control;

* the impact of national interests and personalistic leadership in arms control diplomacy;

* strategies to try and bring China into arms control discussions;

* the direction of travel on U.S.-Russia relations, the Russia/Ukraine conflict, security guarantees and NATO, and the impact of these issues on U.S. nuclear policy-making in the USG right now; and,

* Where Golden Dome may fit into all of these arms control policy considerations.

We end with a little bonhomie in calling for experts across national security disciplines to come together and integrate their perspectives to tackle these important deterrence and arms control questions moving forward.

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We have a wide-ranging episode to cover the current events wavefront, touching on Vipin’s recent trip to Australia and the state of extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the self-determined end of Russia’s self-imposed purported “moratorium” on INF-range missiles, and how tomorrow’s US-Russia head of state meeting may influence arms control and nuclear deterrence topics—including the dynamics around New START and a potential successor.

In our New START/summit discussion, we discuss the relevance of U.S. nuclear modernization (not just the substance, but the schedule), the U.S.-Russia relationship, Russia’s recent arms control record, deterrence requirements with China, and the interagency back-and-forth involved in arms control policy-making, to frame what a new “deal” after New START could look like between the U.S. and Russia. We even end up agreeing(?) on the possible outlines of a future agreement, while all reserving the option of changing our views on a whim. (Note: our discussion regarding the Anchorage Summit may be dated, as we recorded this conversation on Friday, 8/8).

The only thing better than AI experts talking about nuclear deterrence are three nuclear experts trying to talk about AI. To this end, Austin, Vipin, and I close with a brief discussion of a recent Foreign Affairs article that touches on both worlds, called “The End of Mutual Assured Destruction.” We talk about whether and how AI advancements are different from past technology-focused research that declared the end of MAD, technological developments that stressed concepts of stable deterrence during the Cold War and how they relate to future pressures AI may create on strategic stability, and whether the U.S. government is well-structured to meet issues that arise at the AI and nuclear policy nexus.

Finally, we preview some forthcoming work on proliferation latency versus breakout strategies—drawing Iran, Libya, and North Korea lessons—and summarize some of the work ahead as the three of us prepare for the launch of the MIT Center for Nuclear Security Policy this fall.

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I was happy to host a one-on-one conversation with Alexandra Bell, President and CEO of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a couple of weeks ago. She offered a glimpse into what a career in nuclear risk reduction and arms control really looks like in and out of government. Hopefully this offers some insights to early career professionals thinking about their next steps.

Alex and I talked about her recent experience in government, leading the State Department’s arms control bureau in the early days of the Biden Administration to kick start diplomatic processes to extend the New START Treaty, begin a strategic stability dialogue with Russia, and revitalize the P5 Strategic Stability process. We also discussed the first U.S.-China arms control and nonproliferation consultation in November 2023, and the prospects for bilateral risk reduction. Alex helps highlight the nitty gritty nature of setting up successful diplomatic processes, and how persistence may be the most important attribute for a diplomat trying to advance risk reduction dialogue with major power adversaries.

We also talk about arms control as a profession, and how practitioners slowly build expertise and accomplishments over time, learning lessons from in and out of government. Alex also describes the slightly different (and challenging) nature of multilateral diplomacy, compared to New START and other areas of arms control policy work, and the importance of being an optimist in the field of managing nuclear risk. We also touch on current events, including President Trump’s interest in nuclear arms control, the value of unorthodox approaches to arms control, and prospects (and painful environment) for arms control with Russia as New START’s expiration and the rest of the world’s expectations for U.S.-Russia arms control.

Finally, we talk about the Bulletin’s origins and role as a media organization in the nuclear discourse and debates taking place among experts and the public, particularly in an information environment characterized more by tribes, and the need to overcome political differences to find solutions to the most urgent nuclear risks. Alex and I also discuss the importance of the next generation of nuclear professionals, the value of development programs like those at CSIS PONI, and the need for resilience and creativity in new entrants to the field along with some other advice for young pros. We spend a little time talking about the influence of social media on nuclear debates and education, and how to measure “success” in nuclear policy these days. Alex describes a new short story fiction contest at the Bulletin that listeners should check out here.

Somehow, we slide a Battlestar Galactica quote into the conversation and the importance of pop culture to increasing interest in reducing existential risks in the world. So say we all.

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Vipin and I welcome Austin Long, a former deputy director for strategic stability on the U.S. Joint Staff (J5) to the pod, and as a new Senior Fellow with MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy. We had a wide-ranging discussion on

* the recent UK-France joint statement on nuclear deterrence and the possible areas for the two allies to cooperate and implement the “Northwood Declaration” moving forward,

* reactions to our Foreign Affairs article “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age”—including critiques of the U.S. retaining a damage limitation objective in its nuclear strategy,

* the kinds of modest changes to future U.S. nuclear posture that may be prudent given China’s breakout and also in support of a new arms control deal with Russia,

* The Washington Naval Conference (???) and pursuing strategic arms control in a period of global rearmament,

* potential shifts to U.S. extended deterrence and allied assurance approaches,

* how Austin hopes to spend his time as a new former government official (explaining damage limitation), and

* . nuclear modernization “stretch goals.”

A few items we referenced during the show:

“Northwood Declaration.” July 10, 2025 Press release on UK-France joint nuclear statement.

“How to Survive the New Nuclear Age.” Foreign Affairs.

“Optimal Deterrence” by James Acton. CFR.

“Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy.” CGSR Occasional Paper. Brad Roberts, et al.

“A New Nuclear Age: The Sum of All Fears.” Net Assessment podcast at Stimson.org.

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Ola and I talk about the Biden administration’s National Security Memorandum on Missile Technology Exports, the new Trump administration executive order, MTCR implementation and defense trade streamlining more generally.

We summarize our recent article (link below at CSIS), and discuss the balance between protecting missile technologies and discouraging allies from pursuing nuclear weapons or other defense trade partners, how allies and industry engage the U.S. government to discuss defense technology cooperation and the barriers they face, and how the deteriorating security environment, technological advancement, and USG’s desire for allies to bolster their own defense capabilities created an interesting moment for reviewing export control approaches during our stint in the Biden NSC.

We also discuss the impacts MTCR policy reforms will have on commercial space cooperation. Missiles for military purposes and space launch vehicles (e.g., missiles are missiles) were treated in exactly the same way under the USG’s implementation of MTCR; the Biden NSM sought to separate the review of space launch vehicles and related technologies from missiles used for a defense end-use.

Finally, we try to forecast the defense trade streamlining priorities of the Trump administration, including FMS reform efforts that may begin under the President’s new E.O. and “pie in the sky” ideas.

In lieu of a more detailed summary of the podcast, I’m sharing a longer-than-usual reading list (below the image and subscribe button below) for anyone interested in further background on MTCR and related export control issues.

Reading List:

MTCR Basics

* Department of State factsheet: “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked Questions“

* FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Introduces New Guidance for Missile Technology Exports to Advance Nonproliferation Goals and Bolster Allied Defense Capabilities (Biden Administration, January 7, 2025).

* Executive Order: Reforming Defense Sales to Improve Speed and Accountability (Trump Administration, April 9, 2025).

* Trump Administration 2020 UAS Policy: “Trump Administration Approves Updated Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Export Policy“

CSIS

* Ola Craft and Pranay Vaddi. “Revising Missile Controls Is Necessary to Help Allies and Prevent New Nuclear States” (2025)

* Audio version

* Sean Wilson. “Missile Technology Control Regime Reform: Key Changes and Next Steps“ (2025)

* Audio version

Arms Control Association

* “U.S. Reinterprets MTCR Rules” (2020)

* Van Vann Diepen. “Missile Technology Decontrol Proposals Are Counterproductive“ (2024)

* Van Vann Diepen. “Biden Loosens Missile Technology Export Controls” (2025)

* “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance“

Congress

* Huizenga/McCaul: “Huizenga, McCaul Introduce Legislation to Modernize Missile Technology Export Controls“ (2025)

USSC

* William Greenwalt and Tom Corben. “AUKUS enablers? Assessing defence trade control reforms in Australia and the United States“

Press

* Allyson Park. “U.S., U.K., Australia Still Ironing Out Tech, Info Sharing Kinks.“ National Defense Magazine.

I also encourage you to follow the work of Fabian Hoffman, who is spending a lot of time and effort analyzing European defense industrial base issues, including conventional missile production and conventional deterrence. [ Fabian Hoffmann ]

See his work at Missile Matters:

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Following an earlier conversation with Bob Peters and John Warden on a possible U.S. force posture after New START expires on February 5, 2026, we look at the arms control side of the coin to brainstorm what a New START successor agreement may look like Mallory Stewart and Mike Albertson, two former U.S. government officials with decades of experience in implementing strategic arms control agreements, join us for the discussion. Mallory was most recently the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, whereas Mike has held a number of national security positions across the U.S. Government, working at DoD, State, and the NSC.

Vipin and I talk to Mallory and Mike about how China may factor into a new U.S.-Russia agreement or trilateral discussion. We also consider whether the future accord should focus on numbers or something else, the relationship between quantitative arrangements and strategic risk today, and dive into how negotiators may handle inspections, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and other specific provisions. We also raise the possible format for a multilateral negotiation that brings in other P5 states. The group discusses why flexibility is going to be important for U.S. arms control policy moving forward, as future measure may (and perhaps should) stray quite a bit from the formal, bilateral treaty-based approach of the past.

Finally, we discuss how the U.S. Government should prepare for a new round of talks—how do you get arms control on the agenda?—as well as the international community’s expectations for a U.S.-Russia negotiation before the NPT Review Conference in 2026, and how other states can raise the profile on arms control to help get some forward progress.

Bios for our guests:

https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/experts/mallory-stewart/

https://cgsr.llnl.gov/experts/fellows/mike_albertson

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Heather takes the mic to interview Vipin and I.

We covered as much ground as we could in discussing our article, but spent most of our time discussing Iran, U.S. nuclear strategy (including why the United States retains a damage limitation objective and how that is complicated by China’s nuclear modernization and expansion), extended deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and what we hope people are taking away from this writing.

We end with some virtual hugs and talk about our recent experience in government.

Follow Heather:

* @heatherwilly

* ‪@heatherwilly.bsky.social‬

* Heather Williams

And her team:

https://www.csis.org/programs/project-nuclear-issues

Hopefully most of you were able to read the gift link; here it is on the FA website:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclear-age-narang-vaddi

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Today, I’m joined by Eric Brewer, a Deputy Vice President for the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Program and former National Security Council Director for Counterproliferation, and Corey Hinderstein, a vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program, the Nuclear Policy Program, and the Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitics Program, and recently she was the acting principal deputy administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In addition to leading two leading D.C.-based organizations on nuclear policy and nonproliferation, both Eric and Corey spent a lot of time thinking about Iran’s nuclear program in their government careers.

We recap our understanding of Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. air and missile strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan; how “complete” the success may or may not have been with regard to Iran’s centrifuges, enriched uranium stockpiles, and other important aspects of the program (as well as the way U.S. intelligence is being discussed publicly, including by U.S. officials); and, what Iran may do next with its nuclear program. We spend a little time talking about Esfahan specifically, as this site is the subject of intense scrutiny in press and open-source analysis circles as it may be the location of Iran’s 60% uranium stockpile and any surviving aspects of the nuclear program in hard-to-get-to tunnels.

We also try to analyze the prospects for renewed diplomacy, the bad options available for Iran and how Iran may shift its nuclear strategy moving forward, and the potential for Iran to accept zero enrichment.

The conversation shifts to considering the broader impacts the U.S. and Israeli attacks may have on the NPT, nonproliferation regime, its participants and proliferation-curious states. Finally, we end by listing our priorities for any potential diplomacy - resuming verification and monitoring - and I easily convince Eric and Corey to come back onto the pod to talk about Section T for 2 or 3 hours.

Follow Corey:

* @CoreyAH

* ‪@coreyah.bsky.social‬

Follow Eric:

* @BrewerEricM

* @ebrewer.bsky.social‬

Recent work:

Corey, @ Carnegie’s “Emissary” blog: “Cutting Nuclear Nonproliferation Funding Will Undermine U.S. National Security“

Eric in Foreign Policy last week: “Israel’s Attacks Make an Iranian Bomb More Likely”

Note: we recorded this podcast just before Iran’s missile retaliation against Al Udeid air base in Qatar, and before President Trump’s announcement of a “complete and total ceasefire.”

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