Strategic Simplicity Podcast

We have a wide-ranging episode to cover the current events wavefront, touching on Vipin’s recent trip to Australia and the state of extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the self-determined end of Russia’s self-imposed purported “moratorium” on INF-range missiles, and how tomorrow’s US-Russia head of state meeting may influence arms control and nuclear deterrence topics—including the dynamics around New START and a potential successor.

In our New START/summit discussion, we discuss the relevance of U.S. nuclear modernization (not just the substance, but the schedule), the U.S.-Russia relationship, Russia’s recent arms control record, deterrence requirements with China, and the interagency back-and-forth involved in arms control policy-making, to frame what a new “deal” after New START could look like between the U.S. and Russia. We even end up agreeing(?) on the possible outlines of a future agreement, while all reserving the option of changing our views on a whim. (Note: our discussion regarding the Anchorage Summit may be dated, as we recorded this conversation on Friday, 8/8).

The only thing better than AI experts talking about nuclear deterrence are three nuclear experts trying to talk about AI. To this end, Austin, Vipin, and I close with a brief discussion of a recent Foreign Affairs article that touches on both worlds, called “The End of Mutual Assured Destruction.” We talk about whether and how AI advancements are different from past technology-focused research that declared the end of MAD, technological developments that stressed concepts of stable deterrence during the Cold War and how they relate to future pressures AI may create on strategic stability, and whether the U.S. government is well-structured to meet issues that arise at the AI and nuclear policy nexus.

Finally, we preview some forthcoming work on proliferation latency versus breakout strategies—drawing Iran, Libya, and North Korea lessons—and summarize some of the work ahead as the three of us prepare for the launch of the MIT Center for Nuclear Security Policy this fall.

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Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

I was happy to host a one-on-one conversation with Alexandra Bell, President and CEO of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a couple of weeks ago. She offered a glimpse into what a career in nuclear risk reduction and arms control really looks like in and out of government. Hopefully this offers some insights to early career professionals thinking about their next steps.

Alex and I talked about her recent experience in government, leading the State Department’s arms control bureau in the early days of the Biden Administration to kick start diplomatic processes to extend the New START Treaty, begin a strategic stability dialogue with Russia, and revitalize the P5 Strategic Stability process. We also discussed the first U.S.-China arms control and nonproliferation consultation in November 2023, and the prospects for bilateral risk reduction. Alex helps highlight the nitty gritty nature of setting up successful diplomatic processes, and how persistence may be the most important attribute for a diplomat trying to advance risk reduction dialogue with major power adversaries.

We also talk about arms control as a profession, and how practitioners slowly build expertise and accomplishments over time, learning lessons from in and out of government. Alex also describes the slightly different (and challenging) nature of multilateral diplomacy, compared to New START and other areas of arms control policy work, and the importance of being an optimist in the field of managing nuclear risk. We also touch on current events, including President Trump’s interest in nuclear arms control, the value of unorthodox approaches to arms control, and prospects (and painful environment) for arms control with Russia as New START’s expiration and the rest of the world’s expectations for U.S.-Russia arms control.

Finally, we talk about the Bulletin’s origins and role as a media organization in the nuclear discourse and debates taking place among experts and the public, particularly in an information environment characterized more by tribes, and the need to overcome political differences to find solutions to the most urgent nuclear risks. Alex and I also discuss the importance of the next generation of nuclear professionals, the value of development programs like those at CSIS PONI, and the need for resilience and creativity in new entrants to the field along with some other advice for young pros. We spend a little time talking about the influence of social media on nuclear debates and education, and how to measure “success” in nuclear policy these days. Alex describes a new short story fiction contest at the Bulletin that listeners should check out here.

Somehow, we slide a Battlestar Galactica quote into the conversation and the importance of pop culture to increasing interest in reducing existential risks in the world. So say we all.

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Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Vipin and I welcome Austin Long, a former deputy director for strategic stability on the U.S. Joint Staff (J5) to the pod, and as a new Senior Fellow with MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy. We had a wide-ranging discussion on

* the recent UK-France joint statement on nuclear deterrence and the possible areas for the two allies to cooperate and implement the “Northwood Declaration” moving forward,

* reactions to our Foreign Affairs article “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age”—including critiques of the U.S. retaining a damage limitation objective in its nuclear strategy,

* the kinds of modest changes to future U.S. nuclear posture that may be prudent given China’s breakout and also in support of a new arms control deal with Russia,

* The Washington Naval Conference (???) and pursuing strategic arms control in a period of global rearmament,

* potential shifts to U.S. extended deterrence and allied assurance approaches,

* how Austin hopes to spend his time as a new former government official (explaining damage limitation), and

* . nuclear modernization “stretch goals.”

A few items we referenced during the show:

“Northwood Declaration.” July 10, 2025 Press release on UK-France joint nuclear statement.

“How to Survive the New Nuclear Age.” Foreign Affairs.

“Optimal Deterrence” by James Acton. CFR.

“Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy.” CGSR Occasional Paper. Brad Roberts, et al.

“A New Nuclear Age: The Sum of All Fears.” Net Assessment podcast at Stimson.org.

Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.

Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Ola and I talk about the Biden administration’s National Security Memorandum on Missile Technology Exports, the new Trump administration executive order, MTCR implementation and defense trade streamlining more generally.

We summarize our recent article (link below at CSIS), and discuss the balance between protecting missile technologies and discouraging allies from pursuing nuclear weapons or other defense trade partners, how allies and industry engage the U.S. government to discuss defense technology cooperation and the barriers they face, and how the deteriorating security environment, technological advancement, and USG’s desire for allies to bolster their own defense capabilities created an interesting moment for reviewing export control approaches during our stint in the Biden NSC.

We also discuss the impacts MTCR policy reforms will have on commercial space cooperation. Missiles for military purposes and space launch vehicles (e.g., missiles are missiles) were treated in exactly the same way under the USG’s implementation of MTCR; the Biden NSM sought to separate the review of space launch vehicles and related technologies from missiles used for a defense end-use.

Finally, we try to forecast the defense trade streamlining priorities of the Trump administration, including FMS reform efforts that may begin under the President’s new E.O. and “pie in the sky” ideas.

In lieu of a more detailed summary of the podcast, I’m sharing a longer-than-usual reading list (below the image and subscribe button below) for anyone interested in further background on MTCR and related export control issues.

Reading List:

MTCR Basics

* Department of State factsheet: “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked Questions“

* FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Introduces New Guidance for Missile Technology Exports to Advance Nonproliferation Goals and Bolster Allied Defense Capabilities (Biden Administration, January 7, 2025).

* Executive Order: Reforming Defense Sales to Improve Speed and Accountability (Trump Administration, April 9, 2025).

* Trump Administration 2020 UAS Policy: “Trump Administration Approves Updated Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Export Policy“

CSIS

* Ola Craft and Pranay Vaddi. “Revising Missile Controls Is Necessary to Help Allies and Prevent New Nuclear States” (2025)

* Audio version

* Sean Wilson. “Missile Technology Control Regime Reform: Key Changes and Next Steps“ (2025)

* Audio version

Arms Control Association

* “U.S. Reinterprets MTCR Rules” (2020)

* Van Vann Diepen. “Missile Technology Decontrol Proposals Are Counterproductive“ (2024)

* Van Vann Diepen. “Biden Loosens Missile Technology Export Controls” (2025)

* “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance“

Congress

* Huizenga/McCaul: “Huizenga, McCaul Introduce Legislation to Modernize Missile Technology Export Controls“ (2025)

USSC

* William Greenwalt and Tom Corben. “AUKUS enablers? Assessing defence trade control reforms in Australia and the United States“

Press

* Allyson Park. “U.S., U.K., Australia Still Ironing Out Tech, Info Sharing Kinks.“ National Defense Magazine.

I also encourage you to follow the work of Fabian Hoffman, who is spending a lot of time and effort analyzing European defense industrial base issues, including conventional missile production and conventional deterrence. [ Fabian Hoffmann ]

See his work at Missile Matters:

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Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Following an earlier conversation with Bob Peters and John Warden on a possible U.S. force posture after New START expires on February 5, 2026, we look at the arms control side of the coin to brainstorm what a New START successor agreement may look like Mallory Stewart and Mike Albertson, two former U.S. government officials with decades of experience in implementing strategic arms control agreements, join us for the discussion. Mallory was most recently the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, whereas Mike has held a number of national security positions across the U.S. Government, working at DoD, State, and the NSC.

Vipin and I talk to Mallory and Mike about how China may factor into a new U.S.-Russia agreement or trilateral discussion. We also consider whether the future accord should focus on numbers or something else, the relationship between quantitative arrangements and strategic risk today, and dive into how negotiators may handle inspections, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and other specific provisions. We also raise the possible format for a multilateral negotiation that brings in other P5 states. The group discusses why flexibility is going to be important for U.S. arms control policy moving forward, as future measure may (and perhaps should) stray quite a bit from the formal, bilateral treaty-based approach of the past.

Finally, we discuss how the U.S. Government should prepare for a new round of talks—how do you get arms control on the agenda?—as well as the international community’s expectations for a U.S.-Russia negotiation before the NPT Review Conference in 2026, and how other states can raise the profile on arms control to help get some forward progress.

Bios for our guests:

https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/experts/mallory-stewart/

https://cgsr.llnl.gov/experts/fellows/mike_albertson

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Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Heather takes the mic to interview Vipin and I.

We covered as much ground as we could in discussing our article, but spent most of our time discussing Iran, U.S. nuclear strategy (including why the United States retains a damage limitation objective and how that is complicated by China’s nuclear modernization and expansion), extended deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and what we hope people are taking away from this writing.

We end with some virtual hugs and talk about our recent experience in government.

Follow Heather:

* @heatherwilly

* ‪@heatherwilly.bsky.social‬

* Heather Williams

And her team:

https://www.csis.org/programs/project-nuclear-issues

Hopefully most of you were able to read the gift link; here it is on the FA website:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclear-age-narang-vaddi

Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.

Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Today, I’m joined by Eric Brewer, a Deputy Vice President for the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Program and former National Security Council Director for Counterproliferation, and Corey Hinderstein, a vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program, the Nuclear Policy Program, and the Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitics Program, and recently she was the acting principal deputy administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In addition to leading two leading D.C.-based organizations on nuclear policy and nonproliferation, both Eric and Corey spent a lot of time thinking about Iran’s nuclear program in their government careers.

We recap our understanding of Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. air and missile strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan; how “complete” the success may or may not have been with regard to Iran’s centrifuges, enriched uranium stockpiles, and other important aspects of the program (as well as the way U.S. intelligence is being discussed publicly, including by U.S. officials); and, what Iran may do next with its nuclear program. We spend a little time talking about Esfahan specifically, as this site is the subject of intense scrutiny in press and open-source analysis circles as it may be the location of Iran’s 60% uranium stockpile and any surviving aspects of the nuclear program in hard-to-get-to tunnels.

We also try to analyze the prospects for renewed diplomacy, the bad options available for Iran and how Iran may shift its nuclear strategy moving forward, and the potential for Iran to accept zero enrichment.

The conversation shifts to considering the broader impacts the U.S. and Israeli attacks may have on the NPT, nonproliferation regime, its participants and proliferation-curious states. Finally, we end by listing our priorities for any potential diplomacy - resuming verification and monitoring - and I easily convince Eric and Corey to come back onto the pod to talk about Section T for 2 or 3 hours.

Follow Corey:

* @CoreyAH

* ‪@coreyah.bsky.social‬

Follow Eric:

* @BrewerEricM

* @ebrewer.bsky.social‬

Recent work:

Corey, @ Carnegie’s “Emissary” blog: “Cutting Nuclear Nonproliferation Funding Will Undermine U.S. National Security“

Eric in Foreign Policy last week: “Israel’s Attacks Make an Iranian Bomb More Likely”

Note: we recorded this podcast just before Iran’s missile retaliation against Al Udeid air base in Qatar, and before President Trump’s announcement of a “complete and total ceasefire.”

Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.

Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We went far and wide into the world of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In addition to talking about the relevance of the NPT in an era of major power disagreement and nuclear proliferation risks, we discussed hot topics among NPT parties, such as the U.S. nuclear umbrella and (the lack of) progress on nuclear disarmament, what non-nuclear weapons states expect from the United States and nuclear allies like the United Kingdom, and how Russia and China use NPT venues to advance narratives that harm tenets of U.S. nuclear strategy, like extended deterrence.

Heather outlines what she’s heard from NPT participants regarding recent meetings, including how effective influence campaigns targeting non-nuclear weapons states impacts the U.S. and U.K. reputations, despite nuclear transparency efforts, and Vipin describes the great power “collusive origins” of the NPT, with credit to friends of the pod (disclaimer: We haven’t asked them whether they’re friends of the pod) Jane Vaynman and Andrew Coe: see here.

After talking about the NPT, we spend a little time thinking through what U.S. arms control policy could be, and should be, taking into account the threat environment and continued expectations of the non-nuclear NPT states parties. The conversation gets a bit wonky as we think about numbers, limits, and foci of future potential arms control agreements with Russia, and whether we should set aside the “old way” of quantitative arms control or think about behavior, norms, and other standards in future agreements.

We end with a strong plug for supporting the next generation of nuclear deterrence and arms control experts - the nuclear “yutes” for My Cousin Vinny fans - a focus for MIT CNSP and of course a huge part of the work Heather is doing at the CSIS Project On Nuclear Issues. Thank you for listening.

Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.

Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Shashank Joshi is the Defence Editor with The Economist, where he covers intelligence, military affairs, and a wide range of other security issues. He has been following the Russia-Ukraine conflict closely since day one, contributing high quality, deep analysis that’s digestible for casual observers and experts alike (kind of what we’re trying to do with our Substack, but better).

We take advantage of Shashank’s patience to cover a whole lot of topics:

* the intent behind and focus of the U.K. Strategic Defence Review,

* the nuclear elements of the SDR, including whether its time for the RAF to purchase F-35A, join the NATO DCA mission, and re-establish a British dyad;

* Ukraine’s daring, Guns of Navarone style raid on Russian bombers and other aircraft and what lessons to take away regarding red-lines, non-nuclear weapons states risk-taking in wars with nuclear-armed states vs. how nuclear-armed states fight with one another, including in the recent India and Pakistan dust-up; and,

* prognosticating Axios’ reporting on the latest U.S. proposal to Iran, and the likelihood a deal actually happens before the mid-October deadline to trigger a reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran pursuant to a 2015 Security Council resolution.

* (we also set up a future podcast to talk about the Wild West in Outer Space).

Reading (and listening) list:

* “Five important ideas from Britain’s defence review“

* The Strategist at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

* “Can Europe Re-arm, and Might This be in Time?”

* The Global Security Briefing podcast at the Royal United Services Institute.

Follow Shashank’s day-to-day coverage and analysis:

* Twitter (@shashj)

* Bluesky (@shashj.bsky.social)

Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.

Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Two pods in one week, we’re really overworking ourselves (MIT’s semester ended and we are in between trips in writing limbo, so why not).

In this episode, Vipin and I talk to Bob Peters, a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence at the Heritage Foundation, and John Warden, a former NSC Director for Strategic Stability and Arms Control in the Biden Administration, about a future U.S. nuclear force. After baselining on:

* anticipated modernization program costs (including a recent adjustment by the Congressional Budget Office on the ten-year outlook for the nuclear modernization “program of record”— $946 billion over the 2025–2034 period, or an average of about $95 billion a year); and,

* the likely continuity in U.S. nuclear strategy (I annoy Vipin with another long quote from a declassified 1960s DoD draft memorandum regarding the risk of not having limited attack options to direct at adversary military capabilities)…

We discuss priorities, timeframes, strategy, and costs through asking the following questions:

* What is the current state of U.S. nuclear modernization, attempts to analyze and buttress it in the last administration, where is there room to make tweaks, if at all, and why should we?

* What is more important to focus on in the near-term, the risk of regional deterrence failure or central deterrence failure?

* How does China’s nuclear expansion change how we think about our current nuclear force and posture? Day to day vs. generated, peacetime vs. crisis?

* How does conventional and nuclear force posture and our nuclear strategy relate to extended deterrence, crisis management, and escalation management within conflict?

* Can we make the math work for a New START follow-on taking into account the possible demands of a larger nuclear force, if one is required? What could that new agreement look like?

* Where can arms control more generally help solve some of the problems that drive consideration of a larger or different nuclear force?

* How will Golden Dome, and developing a capability to defeat limited adversary attacks against the homeland, impact extended deterrence, arms racing and arms control prospects?

Over the course of this conversation, we realized there is so much more to unpack. We will definitely follow up with additional pods and posts to dig further into the nuclear posture topic. In the meantime, we hope you enjoy this episode.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com